When the military became militarised: Accounts of Zimbabwean National Army deserters in exile in South Africa

In post-colonial Africa, the military has been central to sustaining freedom. However, the current political trends in Zimbabwe represent a different phenomenon, with the army perpetrating violence against its own citizens. For many years, the concept of ‘militarisation’ has been used to define social and political practices outside the military. Scholars have deployed the concept of militarisation as a category of analysis and practice. In doing so, scholarly writing portrays the military as an instrument of militarisation. So, who militarises the military? While scholars use the concept of militarisation to analyse other state institutions, the central argument of this paper is that the concept of militarisation has been deployed inappropriately and narrowly by scholars to refer to the appointment of military personnel in state institutions. I argue that in the Zimbabwean post-2000 political crisis, what has in fact been militarised is the military itself as an institution – through the command and control of soldiers against their moral will – and this phenomenon is exemplified by the growing involvement of the military in the perpetration of political violence against the civilian population in Zimbabwe. This paper draws on the experiences of 44 Zimbabwe army deserters.     

When the military become a security and political threat: Zimbabwean army generals in electoral politics

The military poses an ongoing threat to modern democratic rule in some African countries, especially in the Zimbabwean context. This paper reveals the ways in which Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) generals have played a political role in the Zimbabwean elections, an issue which is both a political threat and a security threat to the state. It is argued that the ways in which ZNA generals engage in the political process goes against Section 208(2) of the constitution of Zimbabwe, which summarily states that the military must be apolitical. In substantiating this argument, the paper presents and analyses various public speeches made by army generals. It is contended that the army generals’ support of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and President Robert Mugabe has to be understood as a ‘mutual accommodation’, i.e. the generals are offered privileges in return for the political protection of the ruling regime which negatively impacts the security of the vote.     

Controlling the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: ‘Political’ and ‘Military’ Strategies from Successful Counterinsurgency in Punjab – India

This article examines the ‘political’ and ‘military’ strategies used by the Indian state successfully to quell the Sikh insurgency in Punjab, and applies these lessons to controlling the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. At a conceptual level, this article argues that insurgencies are both a ‘military’ and ‘political’ phenomenon, and that ways to quell them can be either ‘military’ or ‘political,’ or a combination thereof. At the empirical level, this article argues that stability cannot be restored to Iraq until Sunni political actors are effectively brought into the mainstream political process through either ‘military’ or ‘political’ means, or a combination thereof. The analysis in this article provides substantive depth and detail to these otherwise seemingly straightforward propositions.     

The security sector and the plunder of Zimbabwe’s Chiadzwa alluvial diamonds: the ‘goat mentality’ in practice

While the human rights impact of the deployment of state security agencies in the Chiadzwa diamond fields has been explored, it is important to continue to expose the increasing tendency within the sector to take public resources that should be protected by the state and used for the benefit of the people and channel them for personal gain. The security sector stranglehold of President Robert Mugabe and the ruling political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), has facilitated the siphoning of Chiadzwa diamond revenue into the pockets of individual security personnel. The unfolding sociopolitical crisis in Zimbabwe has also meant that these security personnel have been deployed beyond conflict zones and into traditionally civilian domains, with dire consequences for the public purse. With this in mind, it is asserted that these issues have driven state security agencies to enrich themselves through what is termed in this article as a ‘goat mentality’. The article thus explores the ways in which state security agencies have been deployed and gone on to promote personal enrichment in the Chiadzwa diamond fields.     

US warfare in Somalia and the trade-off between casualty-aversion and civilian protection

This article examines the ways in which the two normative concerns of casualty-aversion and civilian protection influenced US military strategy in the particular context of the asymmetric conflict in Somalia in the early 1990s. The article critically evaluates US military operations through the prism of international humanitarian law and examines whether American forces started prioritizing casualty-aversion over the safeguarding of Somali civilians. Finally, by drawing on emerging moral guidelines (such as Michael Walzer's idea of ‘due care’), the article examines whether lower numbers of Somali civilian deaths could have been achieved if marginal increases to the risks faced by US soldiers had been accepted.     

Political transition to democracy

This paper argues that the crisis of electoral democracy in Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire is a result of underlying structural and institutional deficiencies within national and regional multinational institutions. It assesses the extent to which they have been ‘enablers’ or ‘spoilers’ of electoral-based transitions to democracy. Yet it avoids generalisations of the security sector's involvement in political transitions. In terms of structure, the paper is divided into four sections. Section one will briefly discuss the theoretical perspectives of the election-democracy trajectory. It argues that although elections are a major variable for democracy, unless the ‘ecology of elections’ is conducive, elections may not be an instrument of transition to democracy. The second section analyses the militarisation of politics and the role of the security sector in aiding or stalling democratisation. Section three will assess the role of regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community, Economic Community of West African States and the African Union in electoral-based political transitions in Africa. Lastly, the paper will discuss how the security sector and multinational African institutions can aid political transitions to democracy in troubled African countries.     

The British Army, ‘Understanding’, and the Illusion of Control

Over the past decade, Western military doctrines concerned with matters of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency have emphasised the requirement for properly ‘understanding’ the social, political and cultural environments in which those militaries may operate; the so-called human and socio-political ‘terrain’. This has led to a number of advancements and initiatives designed to facilitate the way that militaries may enhance that understanding. One of those initiatives has been the emergence from within the British military of a doctrine – JDP 04 ‘Understanding’ – designed for that purpose. Using that doctrine and other subsequent publications as a template, this article will examine the utility of ‘understanding’ for those commanders seeking to match military activities with political ends. It proposes that while any advances in understanding the operating environment are to be applauded, the ‘understanding’ of greatest importance is that relating to the feasibility of the strategic objectives at hand. If those objectives lack inherent feasibility, then the development of subordinate forms of understanding, particularly in relation to the socio-political dynamics of target societies, will likely only serve to slow the process of failure.     

PARLIAMENT AND DEFENCE OVERSIGHT

Abstract

A tremendous amount of important work has been done recently on operationalising the protection of civilians as a military task. The bulk of the discussion has focused on how militaries should respond to direct attacks on civilians. This is an important issue, but thinking about civilian protection should also include a serious examination of the ways in which the approach of military organisations to the problem of ‘spoiler’ groups can affect the level and dynamics of attacks on civilians – importantly, where armed groups are interested in violent control of civilian populations, attempts to ‘dislodge’ them from areas of control may substantially increase the level of violence against civilians (beyond the dangers to be expected from being near areas where active fighting is taking place). In 2009, the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) supported the Congolese military in operations to dismantle the Hutu-dominated FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) militia group, at massive human cost. Critics have primarily focused on MONUC's failure to protect civilians from direct attack, consonant with the general discourse on tactics for civilian protection. These criticisms are valid, but in this paper I argue that two crucial additional considerations should be kept in mind: the way that military operations can affect violence against civilians, and the way that moralising the approach to armed groups, even those which have committed serious abuses, can limit military and political options – potentially in ways that increase civilian risk in the name of protecting them.     

The Needs of Political Policy versus the Reality of Military Operations: Royal Navy Opposition to the Arctic Convoys, 1942

It has become commonplace, especially in the post-Vietnam strategic environment, to quote Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other means. We are told that military operations are dictated by, and must serve, clear political ends. Such thinking has been invoked to support everything from punitive strikes, to peacekeeping missions, to the ‘Powell’ doctrine and its political ‘exit strategies’, but at times political policy and military operations do not mix. In 1942 the Royal Navy bowed to political pressure and, against its collective better judgement, continued the Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union. These military operations culminated in the destruction of convoy PQ 17 in early July. This conflict between political policy and military strategy provides an object lesson of why in war issues of means and priorities must outweigh the importance of any given political policy.     

Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014

In 2013, France launched Operation ‘Serval’ to halt the southwards advance of Islamist insurgents in Mali. Using a Clausewitzian analytical framework, this article provides an assessment of France’s political and military aims in Mali and the degree to which they have been attained. Clear political goals, coordinated international diplomacy, an effective use of military force and blunders by the rebel forces turned ‘Serval’ into a short-term success. Strategically, however, the mission has proven unable to address the conflict’s underlying causes. Serval’s long-term effect is probably better measured by what it prevented than what it contributed.     

‘Blackmailing the army’ – ‘Strategic Military Refusal’ as policy and doctrine enforcement: the formation of a new security agent

The study shows how ‘strategic military refusal’ in Israel developed as a rational and institutional means to influence security policies. As opposed to the perspective that sees military refusal as a spontaneous individual act, the study illustrates how organizations operate to distribute military refusal in order to pressure decision-makers to change their military policies. This strategy has proven to be effective when the military is involved with groups that threaten it with refusal – which threatens the military's operational ability and its official and apolitical image. These include soldiers whose civilian authorities, rather than their military commanders, are perceived as an epistemic authority regarding security issues. The case study refers to the impact of strategic military refusal in Israel on security policies and the military doctrine. This was influenced by leftist groups, which, although they belonged to the parliamentary opposition, had dominant presence in the military ranks. Furthermore, the study examines the effect of the use of strategic military refusal on the model of military recruitment.     

The Strategic Use of Soft Balancing: The Normative Dimensions of the Chinese–Russian ‘Strategic Partnership’

This article examines Chinese and Russian foreign policy and military strategy from the theoretical standpoint of soft balancing. Analysis of their thinking indicates that both seek to offset US military superiority without engaging American power directly. To that end, Chinese and Russian strategists have adopted ‘soft’ or ‘normative’ power assets as strategic capabilities in their military and foreign policy. Alternative norms, such as the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’, allow China and Russia to deliberately ignore human rights issues in order to achieve diplomatic advantage with respect to the United States. The two powers have institutionalized these norms within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which they use to counterbalance US interests in Central Asia.     

The Taliban's ‘military courts’

The Taliban's ‘code of conduct’, which lists rules of discipline for the fighters, has been widely discussed, but do the Taliban try to implement it? This article discusses the structures that the Taliban have put in place for this purpose and their evolution over the years. It assesses that while the Taliban's ‘military justice’ system is still work in progress, the fact that it has attracted a significant investment in human resources bears witness to a serious intent of the leadership. However, the Taliban's concern with the behaviour of their fighting force is driven by their own political calculus, not by any sympathy for the international law of conflict.     

ZIMBABWE'S ZEZURU SUM GAME

Reflecting on the crisis in Zimbabwe, one is immediately struck by the preoccupation of most commentators with President Robert Mugabe and the land reform programme. Many have touted the confluence of these two issues as the main drivers of that country's political, economic and humanitarian woes. This particular perspective, which is most dominant in the media, has captured popular attention. However, while these two factors are certainly important to understanding the current problems faced by Zimbabwe, little room has been left for the consideration of a number of underlying dynamics that have also contributed to the current stalemate. This omission encourages the perpetuation of myths and rumour, and leads to serious miscalculations in the various transition scenarios that have been mooted. One of the dynamics that has been largely omitted from the debate is the critical role played by what we have chosen to term the ‘security dilemma’ faced by Zimbabwe's elite.

This essay will also present Zimbabwe's political crisis as the result of attempts by the ruling elite to block the transition to enhanced democracy. Also central to the article is a conceptual framework that explains how this powerful group has responded to the threat implicit in political transformation, and how the dominant nationalist ideology represented by the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU-PF) has fed into this dynamic.     

When Will Non-Democratic Actors Win a Moral Victory Following Highly Costly Military Defeats?

Following costly military defeats political elites usually attempt to persuade their publics that the battlefield outcome was not a shameful defeat but a ‘moral victory’. Yet, only sometimes their public accepts these claims. The paper tries to explain this variation in the domestic publics' perceptions in the cases of non-democratic entities. It is argued that the key variable that determines actors' success in claiming a moral victory is the existence of certain battlefield elements, or at least symbolic military acts/achievements of the defeated actor which can persuade his public that these battlefield elements existed. Propaganda efforts to misrepresent the battlefield facts can play only a secondary role and only under certain conditions.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

Ideoscapes in the World Society: Framing Violence in Somalia

The article uses the example of the Somali war to analyse how globally travelling ideas and political concepts are adapted to local settings and translated into frames that promote collective action and feature violence. It outlines how two ideas with universal claim, nationalism and modernisation were combined with an anti-colonial rhetoric and evolved into the meta-narrative of Somali history. This meta-narrative changed little, and keywords such as (pan-Somali) nationalism, anti-colonialism, development, sovereignty structure most of the discursive repertoires of political actors in Somalia. The main difference is that politicized clan affiliations were during the war dragged out of their shadowy existence and placed in the spot-light of political practice. They alone were however not sufficient to justify claims to power, but were complemented by ‘injustice’, ‘modernisation’ and ‘territorial’ narratives that justified violent deeds as ‘liberation’, ‘defence’ or ‘territorial rights’. Islamists employed similar key narratives and revived the pan-Somali anti-colonialist nationalism, but rooted it in a religious rational. Their ability to abandon culturalised frames contributed to their success.     

Norms,Military Utility,and the Use/Non-use of Weapons: The Case of Anti-plant and Irritant Agents in the Vietnam War

The role of norms and military utility in the use of weapons is disputed by constructivist and realist scholars. Through an examination of US decision-making regarding anti-plant and irritant agents in the Vietnam War, I advance this debate in three key ways. First, I develop structural realism’s expectations regarding the role of military utility. Second, I demonstrate that social and material factors are at play in our understandings of both ‘norms’ and ‘military utility’, and that both played a role in US decisions. Third, I find that the dominant role – as structural realism expects – was played by military utility.     

关于军人基本权利限制之限制的构想

军人作为“穿着军服的公民”享有宪法规定的公民基本权利，基于其特殊使命和公共利益的需求。军人的基本权利要受到严于普通公民的限制。但为了保护军人自身的权利，防止公权力的过度介入，对军人基本权利的限制也应当有所限制。