一类搜索型多对二随机格斗的获胜概率

研究搜索型多对二随机格斗战斗模型。假设格斗开始时A方有m件武器,B方有2件武器,B方处于隐蔽状态,格斗开始后B方可以直接对A方进行射击,A方需先搜索到B方后才能进行射击。双方各为同类武器,都是集火射击,所有开火都是独立的,每件武器开火射击直到毁伤对方才重新射击下一个目标。对搜索时间和毁伤间隔时间都服从一般分布的随机格斗模型,通过分析各状态的特征,利用状态概率分析方法和向后递归时间方法建立状态方程,求出了格斗处在各个状态的概率,并得到双方的获胜概率计算公式。     

East versus West in the defeat of Nazi Germany

One of the most commonly expressed opinions about victory in the Second World War is that the Soviet Union was mostly responsible for beating Nazi Germany. Supposedly the great land war fought between these two powers in the East was the decisive front in Europe. The West's contribution to German defeat, on the other hand, is often seen as somewhat marginal. The Anglo‐American strategic bombing campaign in 1943 paid few dividends and it was not until after the Normandy landings in June 1944 that the West really began to divert a large amount of German resources.

The purpose of this article is to challenge some of these basic notions. Through analysing what Germany produced, where it was sent and how it was destroyed, the West's contribution to defeating Germany moves from an ancillary position to a dominant one. Taking German war production as a whole, from 1943 onwards the West was responsible for tying down and destroying a significantly larger share than the Soviet Union.     

反商业贿赂立法的国际经验及其启示

旨在以世界的眼光观察中国的问题,借鉴国际经验,解决中国问题。不仅介绍了美国、德国和日本的反商业贿赂立法,而且对《联合国反腐败公约》——联合国向世界推荐的反腐败指南的相关规定做了详细介绍。在此基础上,提出了一些可资我国借鉴的立法经验。     

Bringing Balancing Back In: Britain's Targeted Balancing, 1936–1939

This article challenges the conventional wisdom that Neville Chamberlain rejected the British tradition of balance of power in the 1930s. In contrast to balance of power and balance of threat theories, states do not balance against aggregate or net shifts in power. Instead, leaders define threats based on particular elements of a foreign state's power. The import is that different components of power of a foreign state are more or less threatening and aggregate shifts in power alone may not provoke counterbalancing behavior. In the 1930s, Britain balanced against the most threatening components of power: the German Luftwaffe and the threat of a knock-out air assault against the homeland, Japan's Imperial Navy and its threat to Britain's commercial trade routes and the Dominions in East Asia, and the Italian Navy and the threat to Britain's line of communication through the Mediterranean Sea to India and Asia. Given Britain's difficult financial circumstances, all other components of power, such as the army and the land components of power of Germany, Japan, and Italy were ranked as secondary in terms of its rearmament priorities. Thus, London was able to narrow the gap with Berlin in specific components of power of strategic importance such as aircraft production or to exceed Germany in other areas such as the Royal Navy and its battlefleet.     

Western drones and African security

While unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become a standard element of modern armed forces, African countries have been reluctant to acquire remotely piloted aircraft for military purposes until recently. This is mainly due to a lack of industrial capabilities and, for military purposes so far, procurement policies that have concentrated on small arms and light weapons, more prestigious armoured vehicles and combat aircraft. Moreover, counter-insurgency strategies in Africa tend to focus on manoeuvre warfare, co-opting rebels or fighting them using armed proxies. As a consequence, international counterterrorism operations against fanatical and reckless groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram in sub-Saharan Africa are characterised by a strong dependence on Western forces providing UAV-based reconnaissance and, in some cases for the United States, military strikes by drones. This essay reviews some of the incentives and problems of the use of UAVs in the African context. Given the geographical and military conditions of asymmetric warfare in Africa, and potential problems concerning international law, ethical aspects of the use of arms, and civil–military relations notwithstanding, it is argued that African security forces should develop their own UAV capabilities by intensifying their cooperation with Western armed forces.     

信息化条件下单炮多发同时弹着研究

信息化条件下,炮兵火力打击的强度对炮兵火力打击效果的影响呈指数函数递增,集中火力依然是炮兵战斗的首要原则,也是提高火力打击效果的首要手段,炮兵火力打击的速度与强度结合创造决定性效果.分析了信息化条件下单炮多发同时弹着的目的和用途,给出了实现多发同时弹着的约束条件,讨论了弹道计算模型和同时弹着方案的确定方法,并以某155mm自行火炮为例进行了多发同时弹着的计算与分析,论证了单炮实施多发同时弹着的可行性.     

Shifting power,preventive logic,and the response of the target: Germany,Russia, and the First World War

If a declining state has incentives for preventive war, the rising state should have incentives to delay a confrontation until it is stronger. We develop the theoretical paradox and examine the July 1914 crisis. Why did Russia, rising relative to Germany, not adopt a buying-time strategy? We argue that although most Russian leaders hoped to avoid a confrontation, they feared that the failure to support Serbia would lead to a loss of Russian credibility and a significant setback to Russia’s position in the Balkans, one that could not easily be reversed, even with Russia’s expected increase in relative military power.     

A view from Berlin: Colonel Frederick trench and the development of British perceptions of German aggressive intent, 1906–1910

This essay traces the image of Germany that emerges from the reports of Colonel Frederick Trench (1857–1942), British military attache in Berlin from 1906 to 1910. At this time, the British Army possessed only the most limited intelligence‐gathering apparatus and had to rely heavily on the reports of military attaches for information about their continental rivals. Trench, who believed that Germany planned to wage war against Britain and said so categorically in his reports, was the main source of data on the German Army. From the limited surviving records of who read these reports and how they responded to them, this essay posits that Trench's views contributed to the growing British perception of a German threat, a perception that did much to influence British strategic planning in this period.     

Theorist of Maritime Strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and his Contribution to Military and Naval Thought

The Volkssturm (People's Storm or Home Guard) was formed by the Nazi Party in late 1944 as Allied forces closed in on the Reich from the east and west. The political ambitions of Martin Bormann, Hitler's secretary and the head of the Nazi Party Chancellery, were the driving force for this new national organisation. Lacking resources, the Volkssturm's military value was negligible even in eastern Germany where battalions occasionally fought with great tenacity against the Red Army. However, its foundations, character and nature were indicative of the process through which Party power had reached its zenith on the eve of the Third Reich's collapse.     

The growth in military expenditure in Germany 1951–2011: did parties matter?

We examine whether government ideology was correlated with the growth in military expenditure in Germany over the period 1951–2011. Using various measures of government ideology, the results do not show any effect. The exception is an ideology measure based on the Comparative Manifesto Project (left-right scale): using this measure, the results show that the growth in military expenditure increased by about 2.4 percentage points, when the ideology variable (right-wing) increased by one standard deviation. This effect, however, is based on observations until the early 1960s and cannot be generalized. The major political parties agreed on how to evaluate international risks and threats. Government ideology retired to the background. We conjecture that the consensus among the major parties will persist – even if military spending needs to be increased in response to new international risks and threats.     

Defence industrial policy – a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy?

This article explores whether it makes sense for national governments to employ defence industrial policies – such as offsets and discriminatory procurement practices – to support their domestic defence industries. This question has so far primarily been discussed by economists, who have argued strongly against the use of defence industrial policies. This article maintains that these economists fail to address the often complex motivation behind the introduction of these policies. It illustrates these shortcomings by contrasting their arguments against a case study of Norway, which accounts for the country’s use of defence industrial polices from the early post-Second World War era up until today. The article concludes that, depending on their objectives, defence industrial policies can be seen as either a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy.     

Noncombatant Immunity and the Ethics of Blockade

This article counters Michael Walzer's argument against tight blockades. It shows that the interdiction of food shipments need not violate the principle of noncombatant immunity. Whether it is morally permissible to impose a strict blockade depends on the circumstances of the target state. The more self-sufficient a country is, the more acceptable it should be for a belligerent to cut the enemy's external lines of supply. The Allied blockade of Germany during the First World War illustrates the argument. Fault in this case should be assigned to the German government for the loss of civilian lives.     

桁梁式壁板结构优化设计

文中把承受集中载荷的多桁单梁壁板,简化为单桁单梁壁板计算模型。用有限元素法对大梁进行强度分析和用数学规划法进行结构综合,提出了一个优化设计方法。用此方法计算的实例表明,与现有设计方法相比,在相同载荷作用下,可降低结构重量19.2%.     

中德警卫人员招募与教育训练比较

德国要人防护局招募警卫人员的理念是“把一名警察变为一名警卫”，而且要求应招者必须经过三到五年的警察培训，并且具备射击、法律、搏击等方面的基础。中国警卫人员招募途径多元，强调严把“入口关”。德国警卫部门在教育训练方面强调“完全贴近实战”。中国警卫部门则采取多种教育训练模式，强调“战训合一”。通过比较研究发现，德国警卫部门在人员招募与教育训练方面有很多先进的理念和做法值得中国警卫部门学习和借鉴。     

The strategy of the organisation of Ukrainian nationalists in its quest for a sovereign state, 1939–1950

ABSTRACT

The armed resistance offered by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) to the Soviet state was the toughest internal political challenge that the Soviet regime faced from World War II to the 1980s. However, OUN’s grand strategy was based on self-delusion and was, therefore, always irrational. It resulted in misinterpretation of the sentiments of Ukrainians and the international situation, collaboration with Nazi Germany despite incompatible goals, counterproductive ethnic violence and sweeping terror against alleged Soviet collaborators. Local civilians rather than the representatives of the Soviet regime were OUN’s primary target; this alienated most residents of Western Ukraine.     

GERMANY'S CURRENT AND FUTURE PLUTONIUM INVENTORY

In the past, Germany reprocessed a significant amount of its spent nuclear fuel, partly on its own territory but mostly as a customer of British and French reprocessing plants. In mid-2005, Germany stopped this practice, banning new transports of spent fuel for reprocessing—although the already-exported material would be allowed to be reprocessed and recycled in German reactors as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. In total, about 6,500 tonnes of heavy metal have been contracted for reprocessing, but a significant portion of this material has neither been reprocessed nor recycled as MOX fuel in German reactors. Due to the complex import-export history and the partly nontransparent information policy of the German government and utilities, a comprehensive and up-to-date plutonium balance for Germany is not publicly available. This report provides an assessment of Germany's plutonium inventory (stored domestically or abroad) based on open-source information. Special attention is paid to the issue of whether the entire inventory of separated plutonium can be completely irradiated in German nuclear reactors before the last of them are shut down in 2022. The authors conclude that Germany's stock of plutonium waiting to be recycled was about 12.2 tonnes as of 2010; this plutonium should be completely re-imported from the United Kingdom and France by 2017. Germany's MOX-consumption capacities should be sufficient to irradiate the remaining plutonium, although further delays are expected that could leave Germany with an inventory of separated (unirradiated) plutonium.     

French war plans, 1914: The ‘Balance of Power Paradox’

Historians have noted that both German and French war preparation in 1914 fell victim to the inadequacies of traditional threat-based planning: vulnerability to ‘threat deception’ which caused each to underestimate or mischaracterize the threat; a tendency to ‘mirror-image’ by fitting intelligence into preconceived notions of how the enemy was expected to behave; and ‘group think’ that discouraged a serious consideration of alternative scenarios. This article applies the ‘Balance of Power Paradox’ to explain why, at the dawn of the twentieth century, war planning in both Germany and France was driven by an acute sense of weakness which encouraged each side to fashion highly ‘risk acceptant’ strategies. In particular, he examines why and how French commander-in-chief General Joseph Joffre evolved and rationalized his audacious, and disastrous, Plan XVII to leverage French weaknesses and prevent the stronger German Army from bringing the full weight of its military strength to bear against France. The potential implication of this historical vignette is that leaders, and by extension military planners, of both strong and weak states focus on the constraints faced by their opponents, and assume that they can avoid the limitations of their position, while their opponent cannot.     

舰空导弹协同攻击目标分配方法研究

根据双舰编队反导队形的配置和舰空导弹的战术技术性能,提出了针对多批目标的实时火力分配决策方法,根据当前态势和火力单元特性对需分配的目标进行静态实时火力分配,系统不断循环直至目标分配完毕,最后用实例进行了分析,计算结果表明了该方法的有效性.     

The Telefunken Affairand the internationalisation of the Algerian War, 1957–59

Between 1957 and 1959 the West German company Telefunken and the Bonn government became prime targets in the French army's campaign against the Front de Libération Nationale's (FLN) efforts to establish communications networks. To the French military, the prevention of sales of Telefunken equipment to the FLN or its allies constituted a matter of strategic importance. To the Germans, it was an act of economic protectionism that exposed France's continued misgivings of Germany. The problem exerted a considerable strain between Paris and Bonn, and even threatened to harm German-Arab relations. The Telefunken affair thus highlights the Algerian war's international ramifications. It further reveals the responsibility of the French military in the internationalisation of that war.     

国外消防中介组织运作模式及启示

介绍了美国、加拿大、俄罗斯、德国、日本等国消防中介组织运作模式概况及特点，提出了其对我国消防中介组织发展的启示。