RUSSIAN NAVAL NUCLEAR FUEL AND REACTORS

Russian naval nuclear fuel and reactors pose both proliferation and environmental threats, ranging from the possible theft of highly enriched uranium fuel to the radioactive contamination of the environment, whether due to accident, neglect, or sabotage. Current conditions at Russian naval bases, together with a history of accidents and incidents involving Russia's nuclear fleet, make a convincing case for the large-scale assistance that the G8 is now providing to improve the safety and security of Russian naval reactors and fuel. However, virtually no data has been released to allow accurate, reliable, and independent analysis of reactor and fuel properties, risking misguided international efforts to assist in the areas of nuclear cleanup, nonproliferation, and security. This article identifies and assesses relevant properties and developments related to reactor and fuel design, provides a comprehensive presentation of Russian nuclear naval technologies, and examines technological trends in the context of proliferation and environmental security.     

船用反应堆堆芯放射性核素总量计算

采用KORIGEN程序对船用堆的堆芯放射性核素总量进行了计算,并对连续满功率运行和实际变功率运行的计算结果进行了分析与比较,探讨了放射性核素总量随功率运行史的变化规律.     

HEU FUEL CYCLE INVENTORIES AND PROGRESS ON GLOBAL MINIMIZATION

In 2007, 334 nuclear reactors (including for naval propulsion) and isotope production facilities employed highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel or target material. One year of operations at these reactors and facilities required more than 3,100 kilograms (kg) of HEU for naval propulsion, more than 750 kg for research reactors, and 40?–50 kg for isotope production in civilian facilities—in addition to several tons used in other types of reactors. Material with high enrichment levels and low radiation barriers stored or handled in large batches, such as HEU target waste and certain types of fuel from isotope production, research reactors/critical assemblies, and naval fuel, presents serious safety and security concerns. Forty-eight civilian research reactors have converted to low-enriched uranium as a result of a three-decade international effort to minimize HEU use, resulting in a decrease in HEU consumption of 278 kg per year. This article's establishment of baseline measurements for assessing the results of HEU minimization efforts calls for additional focus on the scope and methodology of HEU minimization. Facility decommissioning and dismantling should play a larger role in the future HEU minimization effort, materials with specific weapons-relevant properties should be given higher priority compared to bulk HEU material, and the use of large quantities of weapon-grade HEU fuel for naval propulsion should be reconsidered.     

钠冷快速中子增殖反应堆钠火研究综述

核电站是利用原子核裂变反应放出能量发电的装置,其核心是核反应堆。介绍了核电研究背景和钠冷快速中子增殖反应堆,指出钠冷快堆核电站的主要消防安全隐患是钠循环工艺的泄漏火灾,对国内外钠火研究现状进行了详细介绍,提出了钠火研究的主要内容及关键技术。     

NUCLEAR POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

With the exception of Iran, no Middle Eastern state has an operating nuclear power reactor. Several states, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt are considering constructing such reactors; some have even taken steps towards commencing nuclear power projects. There exist, however, considerable economic, technical, safety, and security challenges to achieving these goals, many of which are acute in the Middle East region. Regional and international cooperation on nuclear technology could not only help regional states meet their energy objectives, but it could also help to build trust among states as a basic step towards a future Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone.     

气动剥离液滴的附面层分析方法

本文根据附面层理论,对高速气流中的液滴,因气流和液滴表面相互作用而产生的气动剥离现象进行了分析,建立了气液两相附面层耦合问题的理论分析模型,得到了发生气动剥离时的最小气流速度的计算公式,为液体燃料在高速气流申雾化机理研究提供参考。     

Reactor-grade plutonium and nuclear weapons: ending the debate

The claim that reactor-grade plutonium cannot or will not be used to produce nuclear weapons has been used to justify non-nuclear-weapon states’ large stockpiles of plutonium that has been separated from highly radioactive spent fuel. However, by using reduced-mass plutonium cores, it is possible to manufacture reliable nuclear weapons with reactor-grade plutonium. These weapons can have the same design, size, weight, and predetonation probability as weapons using weapon-grade plutonium and would require no special cooling. The increased radiation from reactor-grade plutonium could be easily managed by shielding and operational procedures. Weapons using plutonium routinely produced by pressurized-water reactors could have a lethal area between 40 percent and 75 percent that of weapons using weapon-grade plutonium. In the past, both Sweden and Pakistan considered using reactor-grade plutonium to produce nuclear weapons, and India may be using reactor-grade plutonium in its arsenal today. Despite claims to the contrary, the United States used what was truly reactor-grade plutonium in a successful nuclear test in 1962. The capability of reactor-grade plutonium to produce highly destructive nuclear weapons leads to the conclusion that the separation of plutonium, plutonium stockpiling, and the use of plutonium-based fuels must be phased out and banned.     

船用反应堆堆芯物理计算软件包的研制

基于船用反应堆结构特点与运行方式 ,通过对核电站大型机版堆芯物理计算软件的移植与修改 ,研制了微机版船用反应堆堆芯物理计算软件包 .可用于船用反应堆燃料组件参数及堆芯三维细网临界与燃耗的计算研究     

浅析储油罐安全容量的确定计算

由于油料具有热膨胀性，在运输和储存期间，如果油罐装油超过安全容量，当温度升高时，罐内油料体积膨胀，就可能导致溢油事故的发生，不仅造成油料数量的损失，甚至会引发火灾事故。正确确定不同油罐的安全容量，对油料的安全具有重要意义。文章阐述了油罐安全容量的概念，分析了安全容量计算不准确可能造成的危害，提出了油罐安全容量的计算方法。     

运动场馆火灾烟气蔓延规律数值模拟研究

运动场馆规模大、人员密集、功能复杂、用电负荷大、配电线路多、火灾荷载大,一旦发生火灾可能导致群死群伤恶性事故的发生。研究运动场馆火灾情况下烟气变化规律,能够更好的指导消防安全设计。以某运动场馆为例,应用火灾模拟软件对其火灾情况下烟气蔓延过程进行数值模拟研究,分析了常见自然排烟方式对烟气层的高度、温度、氧气浓度、一氧化碳浓度变化的影响,从而为运动场馆防排烟设计提供依据。     

核反应堆运行中安全校核快速计算方法

本文根据潜艇核动力装置运行管理的需要,提出了一个供核反应堆运行中安全校核使用的快速计算方法。     

GERMANY'S CURRENT AND FUTURE PLUTONIUM INVENTORY

In the past, Germany reprocessed a significant amount of its spent nuclear fuel, partly on its own territory but mostly as a customer of British and French reprocessing plants. In mid-2005, Germany stopped this practice, banning new transports of spent fuel for reprocessing—although the already-exported material would be allowed to be reprocessed and recycled in German reactors as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. In total, about 6,500 tonnes of heavy metal have been contracted for reprocessing, but a significant portion of this material has neither been reprocessed nor recycled as MOX fuel in German reactors. Due to the complex import-export history and the partly nontransparent information policy of the German government and utilities, a comprehensive and up-to-date plutonium balance for Germany is not publicly available. This report provides an assessment of Germany's plutonium inventory (stored domestically or abroad) based on open-source information. Special attention is paid to the issue of whether the entire inventory of separated plutonium can be completely irradiated in German nuclear reactors before the last of them are shut down in 2022. The authors conclude that Germany's stock of plutonium waiting to be recycled was about 12.2 tonnes as of 2010; this plutonium should be completely re-imported from the United Kingdom and France by 2017. Germany's MOX-consumption capacities should be sufficient to irradiate the remaining plutonium, although further delays are expected that could leave Germany with an inventory of separated (unirradiated) plutonium.     

舰艇核反应堆堆芯寿期的论证研究

服役年限是核舰艇可靠性要求的一个组成部分,影响其确定的一个主要因素是核动力装置反应堆的堆芯寿期。本文讨论了堆芯寿期与核舰艇服役年限的关系,在分析核燃料消耗的影响因素基础上建立其估计模型以供服役年限与堆芯寿期进行权衡,最后参考军情况,提出堆芯寿期的确定原则。     

Nuclear Fusion Power for Weapons Purposes

Fusion reactors have the potential to be used for military purposes. This article provides quantitative estimates about weapon-relevant materials produced in future commercial fusion reactors and discusses how suitable such materials are for use in nuclear weapons. Whether states will consider such use in the future will depend on specific regulatory, political, economic, and technical boundary conditions. Based on expert interviews and the political science literature, we identify three of these conditions that could determine whether fusion power will have a military dimension in the second half of this century: first, the technological trajectory of global energy policies; second, the management of a peaceful power transition between rising and declining powers; and third, the overall acceptance of the nuclear normative order. Finally, the article discusses a few regulatory options that could be implemented by the time fusion reactors reach technological maturity and become commercially available; such research on fusion reactor safeguards should start as early as possible and accompany the current research on experimental fusion reactors.     

Neutrino-Based Tools for Nuclear Verification and Diplomacy in North Korea

We present neutrino-based options for verifying that the nuclear reactors at North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center are no longer operating or that they are operating in an agreed manner, precluding weapons production. Neutrino detectors may be a mutually agreeable complement to traditional verification protocols because they do not require access inside reactor buildings, could be installed collaboratively, and provide persistent and specific observations. At Yongbyon, neutrino detectors could passively verify reactor shutdowns or monitor power levels and plutonium contents, all from outside the reactor buildings. The monitoring options presented here build on recent successes in basic particle physics. Following a dedicated design study, these tools could be deployed in as little as one year at a reasonable cost. In North Korea, cooperative deployment of neutrino detectors could help redirect a limited number of scientists and engineers from military applications to peaceful technical work in an international community. Opportunities for scientific collaboration with South Korea are especially strong. We encourage policymakers to consider collaborative neutrino projects within a broader program of action toward stability and security on the Korean Peninsula.     

基于ISM的油库安全事故成因分析

分析油库安全事故成因，划分事故成因类型，对于有效控制事故发生、保障油库运行安全是极其重要的。运用系统工程思想，对油库安全事故成因要素的相互关系进行分析，建立了油库安全事故成因多层递阶解释结构模型（ISM）。分析和计算结果表明：油库安全事故成因大致可分为根本原因、直接原因和间接原因三个类型（层次）。针对不同层次结构的事故成因，可以制定相应的预防和控制措施，为军用油库抓住安全管理重点、有效防止事故发生提供理论依据。     

军用飞机服役过程的风险管理

墨菲定理指出系统危险源必然引发事故,海恩法则强调事故发生是量的积累,因此欲提高飞机这种高风险系统的服役安全就必须展开风险管理。风险管理是安全管理的重要组成部分,系统安全性理论是安全管理的基础,在对系统安全性进行定义、明确目标和组成的基础上,建立了一种适用于飞机服役过程的风险管理模型,并分析了其风险控制步骤,对于飞机服役过程的风险管理有一定的指导意义。     

坦克射击过程中炮膛内火药气体温度计算

坦克射击后出现炮膛内壁烧蚀及身管温度上升等问题，其首要因素为火药爆炸燃烧所产生的高温气体。应用内弹道零维模型，以空间平均热力学参数描述坦克射击过程中炮膛内弹道状态，采用四阶龙格一库塔法求解内弹道常微分方程组，计算出内弹道时期火药气体的压力、流速和温度等随时间的变化规律。应用指数函数拟合出后效期炮膛内火药气体温度公式，最后得到坦克整个射击过程中炮膛内火药气体温度的变化规律。通过计算结果与试验数据的对比，验证了计算结果的合理性。此计算结果可为坦克炮身管的烧蚀、热状况及红外辐射特性的研究提供理论依据。     

Military intelligence and the problem of legitimacy: Opening the model

This brief essay looks at some of the emerging dilemmas facing the Intelligence Community (IC), and suggests a model for action that is based on the growing importance of legitimization now evident in all phases of US military activity abroad. The challenge for the IC is to satisfy the needs of a demanding and highly varied set of consumers while maintaining a clear priority on missions of military concern. When the legitimization priorities of broadly varied mission tasks are disaggregated and linked with the intelligence cycle, we see that total war, limited war, and operations other than war (OOTW) have distinct and incompatible priorities. Rather than try to adapt the existing system to fish‐out‐of‐water applications, and in the process degrade the capabilities of the IC to conduct total warfare support operations effectively, it may be time to envision a new, parallel intelligence agency for the support of limited war and OOTW.     

Nuclear Subsidies and Proliferation: Clarifying the Link

ABSTRACT

In March 2015, the South Australian state government established a royal commission to investigate the financial, social, technical, diplomatic, and nonproliferation benefits and risks of expanding its nuclear industry, including activities related to uranium mining; enriching, reprocessing, and fabricating nuclear fuels for both domestic use and export; producing nuclear power; and storing radiological waste, including foreign spent reactor fuel. Given its enormous uranium reserves and current mining activities, some Australians have argued that Australia could benefit financially by expanding the mining sector and by adding value to its uranium exports by enriching the material and fabricating it into reactor fuel assemblies. Others have maintained that Australia can realize significant economic benefits by recycling and storing foreign spent fuel and producing carbon-free nuclear power. In the end, the commission recommended that Australia consider opening up a high-level waste repository to take in foreign spent fuel. It did not recommend any other nuclear activities at this time. The following viewpoint is based on testimony I delivered to the commission on the nuclear weapon proliferation implications of the proposed activities. If Australia wants to avoid the temptation of selling nuclear goods to states that might use these goods to make bombs, it should only consider new nuclear activities that can be entirely financed by the private sector and turn a profit without having to resort to foreign sales. This policy would also enable Australia to set an important, new international nonproliferation standard.