基于云重心理论的装甲团主攻方向优选

主攻方向选择的合理与否对战斗的成败有重大影响,合理确定主攻方向是战斗决心的核心内容。为解决主攻方向优选问题,引入了云重心理论,根据主攻方向选择的基本要求,通过对相关军事问题的结构化分析,建立了主攻方向的评价指标体系,并采用层次分析法确定各指标的权重。然后通过专家打分法,确定各属性指标的值,再运用云重心理论进行评估,最后通过对比评估结果确定最优主攻方向。通过多种方法的运用,较好的完成了装甲团主攻方向优选的问题,为科学解决主攻方向的优选问题提供了一定的方法参考和理论依据。     

基于模糊综合评判法的敌空袭主攻方向预测研究

针对主攻方向预测的主要特点,运用模糊理论探索解决其主观推理、决策问题。应用隶属函数及变权重模糊综合评判方法分析,建立了评估模型,得到了类似人主观判断的结果,最后通过示例说明应用模糊综合评判法预测主攻方向的可行性。     

要地防空群对敌主攻方向确定度分析

针对目前防空作战中对敌主攻方向判断的困难和复杂性,运用系统工程理论、模糊数学等理论探索要地防空群对敌主攻方向定量判断问题。全面分析了影响敌主攻方向选取的诸多因素,建立了分析指标体系和模糊综合分析模型,为判断敌主攻方向提供了一种新的思路和定量分析的方法。在影响敌空袭目标选取的因素中,不确定和灰色的因素多,模糊综合分析方法采取定量与定性分析相结合的办法,把定性的因素定量化,较科学地解决了要地防空群对敌主攻方向判断的问题,进一步丰富了防空兵作战指挥精确决策理论。     

基于TOPSIS法攻击机编队主攻方向选择研究

针对影响攻击机编队主攻方向选择因素的特点,依据逼近理想点排序法基本原理,研究攻击机编队主攻方向选择问题。建立了不确定信息下多属性决策的数学模型,采用熵权法确定各因素权重,引入贴近度的概念和计算方法,按照综合指标值的大小对各方案进行优劣排序。最后给出一个示例说明此法的有效性和可行性。     

基于综合集成赋权法的主攻方向和突破口决策模型

针对现有主攻方向和突破口决策过程中指标权重确定方法的不足，提出了一种多属性决策方法。首先基于模糊层次分析法确定主观权重、熵权法确定客观权重；然后把主观权重和客观权重综合，使得到的综合权重同时反映主观和客观程度。最后，通过实例分析，说明采用该方法进行主攻方向和突破口选择排序是可行、有效的。     

弹炮结合目标防空部署方案优化评估

针对弹炮结合目标防空,选取主攻方向角、有效杀伤重叠区、有效火力范围、抗干扰能力、兵力机动能力、圆周遮蔽角、抗击概率、被掩护目标的安全性和火力密度9个评估准则,提出了弹炮结合目标防空部署方案的优化模型和评估方法.     

空袭主攻方向的卷积神经网络判断模型

针对传统空袭主攻方向判断方法对评价指标体系准确性、完备性要求高,对于信息模糊、缺失、矛盾等复杂条件适应性不强的问题,将卷积神经网络引入空袭主攻方向的判断模型,利用其较强的非线性建模能力,对信息模糊、含噪等条件适应强的特点,通过大样本集的训练,获得隐含其中的人的经验、知识等直觉思维。实验结果表明,建立的评判模型具有较强的容错能力和良好的鲁棒性。     

军工大中型企业军转民发展道路探析

一些军工大中型企业军转民成功的经验是：确定高起点的发展目标;正确决策民品发展的主攻方向;深化企业改革;开拓占领市场。     

信息化条件下军事训练体系结构的设想

完善信息化条件下军事训练的体系结构,对提升我军信息化条件下军事训练的质量与效益具有重要意义,文章从总体目标、主攻方向和人才培养三个方面出发,提出了完善我军信息化条件下军事训练体系结构的设想。     

建设适应“两场”的军队物资勤务专业学科体系

军队物资勤务专业学科建设,必须适应“两场”需要,着重抓好以下几点:第一,更新教学内容体系,包括重新组合课程设置、重新组合教材内容、重新组合课堂讲授内容等;第二,改进教学方法体系,采用案例教学法、现场教学法、研讨教学法等;第三,完善教学实践体系,突出在课堂上综合演练,在实验室模拟演练,在岗位上操作训练;第四,建立科研主攻方向体系,以军队物资系统正规化、现代化建设和军队物资改革的重大问题等为主攻方向,丰富管理科学、管理技术和产品技术科学以及管理理论教学内容。     

Mirror,mirror on the wall,who is the most offensive of them all? – Explaining the offensive bias in military tactical thinking

This article explores why the offensive predominates military tactical thinking. With survey results showing an offensive bias among 60 per cent of senior Swedish officers and as many as 80 per cent in the case of the army, it is clear that this is not just a problem of the past but is equally relevant today. The article asks why there is a tendency to perceive and understand offensive tactics as the preferred choice and the way to conduct battle that should be encouraged and preferred. Drawing on existing research and the findings of a pilot study, ten propositions for why the offensive bias exists are tested using a mixed-method approach. Based on the findings, the article develops a model to understand why the offensive dominates military tactical thinking. It is found that the two key constitutive factors behind the offensive bias are military culture and education. These factors most directly and profoundly influence an officer’s identity, perceptions, and thinking. Military culture and education, in turn, work as a prism for four other factors: military history, the theory and principles of war, doctrine and TTPs, and psychological factors.     

Signaling resolve,democratization, and the first battle of Fallujah

Perceptions and efforts to signal resolve can play an important role in counterinsurgency. The Coalition offensive against Fallujah in April 2004 demonstrates the limitations of relying on military force to signal resolve. The offensive catalyzed insurgent violence in Iraq and generated popular support for the insurgency. The Coalition prematurely halted the offensive because the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) could not maintain support for the Coalition in the face of popular outrage. Given the importance of democratizing Iraq and establishing a sovereign government, the objections of the IGC could not be ignored. Without Iraqi political support, military force ultimately signaled weakness instead of resolve.     

美国太空安全领域最新发展分析

美国认为太空已被普遍认定为最重要的作战域之一,未来的太空安全态势将愈发严峻。本文认为, 美国正面向未来太空对抗环境进行全面转型, 从顶层战略、作战理论、组织结构、战备训练、装备技术等方面开展研究、调整和长远布局, 如以我为主要对手谋划布局、发布系列军事航天顶层指导文件、大幅增加太空攻防作战相关经费投入等。 目前, 美军正处于新旧体系转换、 下一代能力构建发展的关键期, 不仅正在变革军队组织体制、重组太空攻防作战力量, 还积极开展系列演习演训, 以加速形成太空攻防实战能力。美军这一系列动向将对未来太空领域安全与发展产生重大影响, 应引起我高度重视。     

The 'Cult of the Offensive' Revisited: Confronting Technological Change Before the Great War

Conventional wisdom maintains that military thinkers before the Great War resorted to an irrational, and ultimately self-defeating, 'cult of the offensive' to overcome the rapidly increasing effectiveness of modern firepower. On the contrary, an underlying and, indeed, compelling military rationale did exist for placing renewed emphasis on the offensive spirit, particularly after the Russo-Japanese War. Moreover, the cult's central argument was not that moral forces alone could overcome material factors, but that the human element must be made strong enough to complement the newfound power of military technology. The idea was not to pit man against machine, but to make man worthy of machine.     

The Hidden Factors that Turned the Tide: Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Intelligence in the 1973 War

This article analyzes the quality of the Egyptian and Israeli intelligence advice and decision-making process in the October 1973 War as key factors that determined its course. Following a background to the subject, we focus on the 9–13 October standstill stage, in which Sadat decided, despite his generals’ advice, to renew the Egyptian offensive. Effective Israeli intelligence collection about the coming attack, which was well used by the decision-makers, saved Israel from accepting an undesired ceasefire. The result was the 14 October failed Egyptian offensive that turned the tide of the war and led to Israeli military achievements at the war’s final stage     

信息技术对军队政治工作主体的新挑战

信息技术的迅猛发展给军队政治工作带来了机遇,同时也提出了一系列新挑战。本文以军队政治工作主体为视角,深入分析了信息技术对军队政治工作主体的认知思维、工作方式和信息素质等三个方面带来的新挑战,提出了相应的对策,指出了军队政治工作主体需要改进的方向。     

Operational Combat Analysis of the Al Qaeda Network

Contemporary network organizational structures have gradually developed over the last decades of the twentieth century. These new structures are challenging the traditional hierarchical structure form in a number of venues. In conflict and war, they made their potentials unequivocally known on 11 September 2001 via Al Qaeda's strategic suicide bombings against the United States. To better understand the military potentials of networks, an operational combat analysis of the Al Qaeda network was conducted. This analysis, a modification of weapons systems analysis, focused on network speed, along with offensive, defensive and combat multiplier attributes. Such analysis allows for a better understanding of the military capabilities and vulnerabilities of non-state OPFORs (opposing forces) and our own emergent counter-insurgency networks.     

Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic?

In contrast with a widespread perception of Russia as an expansionist power in the Arctic, this article argues that Moscow does not seek military superiority in the region. Rather, Moscow's military strategies in the Arctic pursue three major goals: first, to demonstrate and ascertain Russia's sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the region; second, to protect its economic interests in the High North; and third, to demonstrate that Russia retains its great power status and still has world-class military capabilities. The Russian military modernization programs are quite modest and aim at upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them with additional offensive capabilities or provoking a regional arms race. The Russian ambitions in the Arctic may be high, but they are not necessarily implying the intentions and proper capabilities to confront other regional players by military means. On the contrary, Moscow opts for soft rather than hard power strategy in the Arctic.     

Unnecessary or unsung? The utilisation of airpower in Britain's colonial counterinsurgencies

Making extensive use of primary archival documents, this article seeks to explore whether airpower in three of Britain's most significant post-war colonial counterinsurgency campaigns, Malaya, Kenya and South Arabia, was an unnecessary part of British strategy, offering little useful military force due to the futility and strategic damage rendered by offensive bombardment, or whether airpower was indeed an unsung factor that provided operational flexibility through its effectiveness in a supply context, as well as its intelligence role in providing valuable aerial reconnaissance. In all three case studies the role played by the RAF in medical evacuations, in troop drops, in crop spraying during food-denial initiatives, and in providing ‘Voice Aircraft’ for the propaganda campaign, provide insights into an under-explored component of Britain's politico-military efforts in counterinsurgency in the 1950s and 1960s and suggests that the main strategic value of airpower in counterinsurgency, then and now, lies in its non-kinetic functions.