我国边境法制建设中需要重点完善的方面

在国家法制建设不断推进的背景下，我国边境法制建设的某些方面还不够完善，需要加快立法进程，尽快制定全国统一的陆地国界法，为陆地边境管理提供法律依据；完善海上边防管理法规，为维护国家海洋权益提供法律保障；加紧出台统一的出入境法典，整合出入境法律体系；完善打击“三股势力”和跨境犯罪的法律制度，维护边境安全稳定。     

第二专题 地区国家对亚太安全的看法 应对地区安全威胁需要建立多边合作关系

安全对可持续发展来说具有十分重要的意义。塔吉克斯坦共和国由于其特殊的地理位置,可以说是地区复杂社会政治进程的风暴眼。塔吉克斯坦非常重视安全问题,也重视打击恐怖主义的问题。维护地区的安全、和平和稳定,坚持打击三股势力是我们合作的优先方向。今天,国际社会都聚焦阿富汗问题的解决。对我们来说,阿富汗是个十分友好的国家,它的稳定和可持续发展对我们非常重要。     

应对地区安全威胁需要建立多边合作关系

安全对可持续发展来说具有十分重要的意义.塔吉克斯坦共和国由于其特殊的地理位置,可以说是地区复杂社会政治进程的风暴眼.塔吉克斯坦非常重视安全问题,也重视打击恐怖主义的问题.维护地区的安全、和平和稳定,坚持打击三股势力是我们合作的优先方向.今天,国际社会都聚焦阿富汗问题的解决.对我们来说,阿富汗是个十分友好的国家,它的稳定和可持续发展对我们非常重要.     

东突恐怖势力与对策

20世纪 90年代是“东突”恐怖势力发展最为迅速、活动最猖獗的时期 ,恐怖分子组织、策划了一系列爆炸、暗杀、纵火、投毒、袭击等恐怖暴力事件 ,严重危害了国家安全和各族人民群众的生命财产安全。本文追溯了“东突”恐怖势力的渊源 ,分析了其恐怖手段、袭击对象、组织、活动范围、训练等方面的特点 ,阐述了我国政府打击“东突”恐怖势力的主要对策。     

镜头中的和平使命-2007

"和平使命-2007"上海合作组织成员国武装力量联合反恐军事演习是上合组织成立以来参演国家最多、规模最大的联合军演,是成员国共同应对新威胁、新挑战,维护地区安全与稳定,促进共同发展与繁荣,打击和震慑恐怖主义、分裂主义、极端主义"三股势力"的一次重要行动,反     

西北地区反恐怖作战后勤保障浅析

1西北地区反恐怖作战后勤保障的特点西北地区社会和地理环境特殊,反恐怖作战后勤保障除具有一般地区的特点外,还具有以下特点。1.1政治性强,后勤保障更具有复杂性西北地区恐怖活动往往是国际恐怖势力、非法宗教势力和民族分裂势力为代表的“三股势力”相互勾结,以某一事件为借口,采取爆炸、暗杀、投毒、劫持和煽动不明真相群众暴乱等非法手段,与政府和社会对抗,对国家和人民的生命财产构成严重的威胁,具有明显的政治目的。根据恐怖组织所采取的手段和方法,反恐怖军事行动既要对恐怖分子实施有效的打击,又要对人民群众进行宣传教育。同时,要…     

反恐,中国军队在行动

“9·11”事件后,国际社会面临的恐怖主义威胁日益严峻。为了有效打击这股邪恶势力,尽早铲除人类社会的这个毒瘤,近年来,中国政府和军队不断加强与周边国家的反恐交流与合作,共同打击分裂主义,极端主义和恐怖主义“三股势力”。仅2006年,中国军队就先后参加了中塔“协作-2006”、中巴“友谊-2006”联合反恐军事演习,使反恐合作取得新的突破。     

入地“三尺” 别有洞天备受青睐的钻地弹

当今时日，由导弹、火炮发射或飞机投掷的、钻入地下延时起爆的钻地弹，正日益受到人们的青睐和关注。它不仅是以美国为代表的军事大国、强国研究开发的一个重点，也是众多国家防范遭受打击、特别是一些“上了美国黑名单”的国家防范遭受“斩首”攻击所关注的一种武器。由于钻地弹对精确制导技术、引信、侵彻战斗部材料要求极高，目前还只有美国、俄罗斯等极少数军事技术强国有研制钻地弹的能力。     

声音

“乌鲁木齐‘7·5’事件是境内外‘三股势力’精心策划和组织的一起严重暴力犯罪事件，其实质不是民族问题，不是宗教问题，也不是人权问题，而是意图破坏中国统一和民族团结。中国政府依法采取果断措施，完全是为了维护宪法和法律的尊严，确保社会稳定和各族人民的权益。”     

防范武警部队财务风险的对策

新形势下，武警部队财务面临的风险主要表现在资金、经费和资产三个管理领域。有效防范武警部队财务风险，要健全无缝隙人防体系，打造财务安全“约束链”；要创建封闭式防范格局，筑牢财务安全“防护墙”；要建立网络化控制机制，铺设财务信息“监督网”。     

U.S. SPACE WEAPONS

Under the administration of President George W. Bush, Pentagon rhetoric has increasingly articulated a more robust vision of space as a future battlefield. This analysis details some of the ongoing spending for research and development programs identified in current U.S. Air Force, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and Defense Advanced Research and Planning Agency (DARPA) planning and budget documents related to “space control” and “space force projection.” This analysis finds that current support for “space superiority” and “space control” systems remains largely rhetorical—with little actual budgetary support. Unclassified technology development programs included in the six-year Future Years Defense Plan are a decade or more away from deployment. Programs related to offensive counterspace, space-based missile defense interceptors, and space-based strike total slightly less than $300 million in FY 2006 funding. We conclude significantly higher expenditures in research and development would be required to develop and deploy killer micro satellites, space-based missile defense interceptors, and military space planes.     

Layered defense of deceptively based ICBMs

The basing of ICBMs is a fundamental problem of defense analysis. Deceptive basing and antiballistic missile defense are two of the methods available to attempt to insure that there are ICBMs surviving after undergoing an attack. This article treats tradeoffs among missiles, silos or shelters, exoatmospheric interceptors, and endoatmospheric interceptors. Most of the analysis deals with 200 missiles, the number of MX missiles which were recommended to be moved among the 4600 shelters of the Multiple Protective Shelter (MPS) deployment, though some variants in the number of missiles (from 115 to 400) are also treated here. The basic reference point of the analysis is the provision of 1000 ICBM warheads delivered in a second strike. The combination of exoatmospheric interceptors and endoatmospheric interceptors is referred to as “layered defense.” Warheads are destroyed by interceptors after the warheads separate from the missile which carries them. Exoatmospheric interceptors are assumed to achieve a non-nuclear kill, while endoatmospheric interceptors are assumed to achieve either a non-nuclear or nuclear kill, depending on the technology available to both sides. Exoatmospheric interceptors may be capable of protecting value targets against the warheads of a second strike. To the extent that this can be achieved, they facilitate a first strike with relative impunity and hence are destabilizing. This article explores various layered defense topics.     

基于作战环路的指挥信息系统抗毁性建模与分析

在指挥信息系统抗毁性研究中,网络节点异质性和作战机理的表征与分析不足.针对该问题,基于指挥信息系统主导的观察、判断、决策和行动作战环路,区分网络中信息、指控、打击和通信4类节点,提出作战信息链的概念来反映指挥信息系统运行机理;采用平均时延来刻画作战信息链的时效性,通过转化为经过指定点的最短路径问题给出计算方法;采用链路贯通率来刻画全系统内信息节点和打击节点之间形成有效链路的程度.结合"预先规划+随遇接入"生成的指挥信息系统网络模型,进行了抗毁性仿真分析,验证了方法的有效性.仿真结果进一步表明,指挥信息系统网络在随机攻击和度优先攻击下抗毁性表现出了复杂网络的共性,但其抗毁性结果的异常变化也具有一定的特殊性,从而证实了节点异质性和系统作战机理的影响.     

“经济自由”与“自由经济”辨析——理想与政策

自由主义的实践历史 ,是从争取宗教自由开始 ,继而争取政治自由 ,直到近代和现代 ,却转移集中争取经济自由。“经济自由”虽然是个极重要的课题 ,但是一般论著却把目标 (理想 )性的经济自由混淆作手段 (方法 )性的自由经济 (制度 )。相应地 ,一般论者也把“经济自由主义”错误地狭限于“放任 (自由 )经济制度”以满足一小撮人的经济自由。再者 ,本文认为高寿昌先生早在 6 0年代在外地发表的《经济的自由主义》一文很具卓见和勇气 ,现在试图运用 (广义 )逻辑学把它精确化 ,特别是严格区分“经济自由”与“自由经济(制度 )” ,以显示逻辑分析的重大实用价值     

发挥教师教学主导 提升课程教学实效——对增强《思想道德修养与法律基础》课教师教学主导性的思考

《思想道德修养与法律基础》课是一门帮助大学生培养良好的思想道德素质和法律素质，进一步提高分辨是非、善恶、美丑和加强自我修养能力的课程。由于该课是一门融政治性、知识性、思想性、实践性于一体的综合性课程，内容涉及广泛，现实性和针对性很强。因此在教学上对教师提出了很高的要求。如何发挥好教师教学的主导性，调动学生主体作用是当前进一步提高该课程教学质量的关键。该文分析了发挥教师教学主导性的重要作用和当前这一课程教学面l临的主要问题，提出了增强教师教学主导性的有效途径。     

“微时代”下大学生思想教育研究

在大量数据充斥的“微时代”，各个领域的信息以多样化的方式传播到大学生群体中，碎片化的信息为原有高校思想教育带来了机遇和挑战。本文通过“微时代”对大学生思想教育的影响进行总结，调查、归纳其影响产生的原因。“微时代”对现代大学生思想教育的影响具有正、负两面，而究其产生的原因则是大学生对网络的频繁使用及“微时代”信息的隐蔽性。根据这些原因，本文对现在的大学生思想教育工作进行总结，并对未来的教育提出建议。     

Nuclear deterrence and cyber warfare: coexistence or competition?

Nuclear deterrence and cyber war seem almost antithetical in their respective intellectual pedigrees. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time. Information or “cyber” weapons, at least for the most part, aim at sowing confusion or mass disruption instead of widespread physical destruction. Nevertheless, there are some intersections between cyber and nuclear matters, and these have the potential to become troublesome for the future of nuclear deterrence. For example, cyber attacks might complicate the management of a nuclear crisis. As well, information attacks on command-control and communications systems might lead to a mistaken nuclear launch based on false warnings, to erroneous interpretations of data or to panic on account of feared information blackout. It is not inconceivable that future nuclear strike planning will include a preliminary wave of cyber strikes or at least a more protracted “preparation of the battlefield” by roaming through enemy networks to plant malware or map vulnerabilities.     

New terrorist threat to India's internal security: the danger from Pakistan's “Karachi Project”

The spectacular commando-style terrorist strike on Mumbai in November 2008 exposed India's lax internal security structure. As nearly all the security apparatus broke down during the long spell of attacks, massive public outrage flared up across the country calling for a firmer government response. Shockingly, India has done little to prevent a recurrence and a new security threat faces the country every single day not merely before but even after the Mumbai attacks. In contrast, Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence and the Lashkar-e-Taiba have successfully evaded pressures from both India and the international community and continue their terror campaign against India under the “Karachi Project” with the explicit intention to unsettle South Asia. Classified documents indicated that India is at the forefront of a cataclysmic “nuclear terrorism” threat from a “combination of Pakistan-based terrorists and homegrown radicals.” This article analyses the danger posed by the Indo-Pak radical groups targeting India and India's lack of preparedness to the new security threat from the “Karachi Project.”     

“Effing” the military: a political misunderstanding of management

The use of commercial business management techniques is widespread in all government departments, including the Ministry of Defence. This article examines the use of popular management techniques in the Armed Forces and argues that their application is misplaced. It looks at what the “effs” – “efficiency” and “effectiveness” – mean in the business world and to the Armed Forces. It compares the definitions both in business and the Armed Forces and finds that there are few, if any, situations where the same measurements can be applied. Whilst many management techniques are suited for business, the function of the Armed Forces and its output cannot be measured in the same way, complicated by the different metrics of “efficiency” in peace and in war. This difference may not be clearly understood by some politicians, or indeed by some senior military personnel. Using examples from some of the most popular management techniques such as “Lean” and “Agile” it is possible to see that their use might actually diminish the capabilities of the Armed Forces when it comes to performing their principal role – the use of force to achieve political objectives.