CIVIL CONTROL OF THE ZAMBIAN MILITARY SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Democratic rule requires, amongst other things, orderly civil-military relations. Zambia's military, with some exceptions, have generally remained under firm civilian control, unlike many forces in the region. Initially the military was based on the British colonial model but during the struggle for independence the force was indigenised. Instead of representing a colonial power, the military came to represent a specific political viewpoint: one party participatory democracy. President Kaunda, the leader of UNIP, was chiefly responsible for the politicisation of the military and ensuring its loyalty to the ruling party. Quasi-military institutions such as the Combined Cadet Force and the Home Guard Unit were useful links between civilian and military personnel. When Frederick Chiluba, leader of the MMD, took over in 1991 he tried to make the military more professional and curb its power over civilian affairs. A defence council and parliamentary regulation were instituted to avoid further military coups.     

Power-Sharing in Civil War: Puzzles of Peacemaking and Peacebuilding

Syria's slide into sectarian civil war in 2011 raises a new fundamental knowledge question about the conditions under which power-sharing pacts can be clinched as an approach to war termination. When intrastate conflicts escalate into violent sectarian struggles, power-sharing is a likely basis of an eventual political settlement in situations where partition is off the table. This article contends that there remain two puzzling knowledge gaps about power-sharing as the basis for peace agreements to end civil wars: first, the specific conditions under which elites find it in their own interest to share power with bitter adversaries rather than fight on the battlefield, and second, how war-ending elite-negotiated pacts may evolve into more enduring social contracts. These puzzles, critical for policymakers and still unresolved in the scholarly literature, suggest the need to develop more contingent- and context-specific knowledge if research findings are to more capably contribute to peacemaking efforts.     

基于FFT的自适应频率估计算法

为了解决FFT算法中因能量泄露和栅栏效应而导致的算法估计性能下降的问题,提出了一种基于FFT的自适应频率估计算法.分析了Rife算法,指出当信号频率位于量化频率附近时,由于插值方向错误,会导致频率估计性能下降;对于分段FFT相位差频率估计算法,当2段信号最大谱线处对应的相位相差比较大时,容易产生相位模糊,从而增大估计误差.基于FFT的自适应频率估计算法将2种算法进行了综合,既保留了2种算法的优点,又对算法性能有所改进.仿真结果表明:该算法的估计精度、稳定性和抗噪能力都有显著提高.     

Book Reviews

Patrick Finney (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War. London: Arnold, 1997. Pp.xvi + 461, index. £15.99. ISBN 0–340–67640‐X.

Maria Emilia Paz, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the US as Allies in World War II. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Pp.xii + 264, 10 illus., biblio., index. $55 (cloth); $19.95 (paper). ISBN 0–271–01665–5 and 01666–3.

Norman J.W. Goda, Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa and the Path toward America. College Station, Texas A&;M University Press, 1998. Pp.xxvi + 307, 2 maps, biblio., index. $39.95. ISBN 0–89096–807–1.

Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp.xii + 525, biblio., index. £25; $34.95. ISBN 0–521–64044‐X.

Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. Pp.viii + 270, index. $35. ISBN 0–801403201–4.

Eric Arnett (ed.), Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban, SIPRI Research Report No.14. Oxford: Oxford University Press/Stockholm Int Peace Research Institute, 1998. Pp.viii + 98, index. £12.99. ISBN 0–19–8294115.

T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett and James J. Wirtz (eds.), The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and Emerging International Order. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1998. Pp.vi + 312, index. $47.50/£36. ISBN 0–472–10863–8.     

Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy,Policy, and Grand Strategy

Many scholars, strategists and pundits contend that the US is in decline. They argue that America's national capabilities are significantly eroding, and that with the rise of important regional powers, its primacy in world affairs is rapidly diminishing as well. Yet America continues to possess significant advantages in critical sectors such as economic size, technology, competitiveness, demography, force size, power projection, military technology, and in the societal capacity to innovate and adapt. This article argues that the nature of material problems has been overstated, and that the US should be able to withstand modest erosion in its relative strength for some time to come without losing its predominant status. Instead, where limits to American primacy do exist, they are as or more likely to be ideational as they are material. The problem inheres as much or more in elite and societal beliefs, policy choices, and political will, as in economic, technological or manpower limitations at home, or the rise of peer competitors abroad.