美军飞机易损性实弹测试现状及启示

飞机易损性分析与评估是指对飞机在战斗状态下遭受攻击后受损的难易程度的评价,是衡量飞机战斗性能的重要指标。研究飞机易损性对于飞机高生存力设计和飞机战伤预测评估具有重要意义。本文首先简要介绍了飞机易损性分析的一般方法与流程,收集并整理了美军飞机易损性实弹测试的历史沿革和条件建设现状,同时以F-35整机、F135发动机和C27机翼油箱为例介绍了易损性实弹测试的方法。可以发现,在制度层面上,美军已经形成了由实弹测试机构、装备供应商以及军队用户三方联合协作的标准化、制度化的飞机易损性实弹测试体系;同时,其所建立的实弹测试平台力求更加真实地模拟战场环境,能够有效实现部件/子系统在特定工况下使用功能的监控,测试结果能够有效支撑飞机毁伤树与部件/子系统毁伤判据的构建,从而确保测试结果可以有效指导飞机的低易损性设计。     

美军航母战斗群空袭火力及其效能分析

以美军航母战斗大队标准编成为例,简要分析了美军航母战斗群的空袭火力构成。进而分析了影响航母战斗群空袭火力效能的主要因素,分别建立了机载对地攻击弹药和巡航导弹对地面目标的毁伤能力的模型。然后以此为基础,从空袭兵器的突防概率、对目标的发现概率、对各类目标的毁伤概率和空袭某一目标所需的兵力四个方面,对航母战斗群空袭火力体系的作战效能进行了深入研究,并建立相应的数学模型。最后根据在历次战争中得到的经验数据,对美军航母战斗群空袭火力效能进行了计算,并分析了计算结果,为科学判断敌情提供了依据。     

The elephant in the room: US ballistic missile defence under Barack Obama

Conventional wisdom seems to hold that under Barack Obama, the US ballistic missile defence programme has been pushed aside to allow for a refreshed domestic and international agenda. Proponents point to Obama's campaign thinking and rhetoric, the ballistic missile defence (BMD) budget cuts, the decision to end the Third Site in Europe, and the reset relations with Russia through the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) as evidence that the programme has undergone a significant period of change, retraction and rationalisation. This article argues instead that BMD has not fallen from prominence and that there is a change in focus rather than retraction of its strategic goal. Consequently, BMD continues to grow in importance as a component of US national security strategy.     

美军航天力量发展走势分析

美军一直奉行全球战略极度依赖天基信息支援。美军航天力量在夺取制天权,确保战时进入、利用太空自由,为海外军事行动提供信息支撑方面发挥决定性作用。美军认为航天领域颠覆性技术的应用将会迅速而深刻地颠覆传统战争规则,是应对新兴国家军事威胁,实施第三次"抵消战略"的核心技术。美军高度重视航天力量装备规划、体制编制、理论研究和人才培养的创新发展。研究近年来美军航天力量的建设发展重点,可以透过其一系列的航天力量发展规划,得出美军航天力量发展战略和走势,具有强的启示性。     

Signaling and Military Provocation in Chinese National Security Strategy: A Closer Look at the Impeccable Incident

On 8 March 2009, five Chinese vessels shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in close proximity to the US Naval Ship (USNS) Impeccable. This paper seeks to explain the incident and its aftermath in the context of Chinese coercive diplomacy. China's strategy, designed to motivate the US to cease surveillance operations near its militarily sensitive areas in the South China Sea, included three components: (1) the use of military provocation, (2) a coordinated media campaign, and (3) a challenge to US interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). This study goes beyond traditional research on Chinese use of force to explain why China's coercive diplomatic campaign took the form it did. Only by understanding the nature and factors affecting Chinese coercive diplomacy can the US design the effective counter strategy needed to protect US regional and global interests.     

Allies at War: British and US Army Command Culture in the Italian Campaign, 1943–1944

This article compares the philosophy and practice of command in the British and US Armies during the Italian Campaign of 1943–44. It assesses pre-war influences on the command approach adopted by each army, and shows how refinements derived from wartime experience enabled British and American commanders to successfully utilise mission command principles to outfight the German Army in the latter years of World War II. This examination directly challenges the historical consensus that Allied commanders were disadvantaged by an inability to exploit the advantages of mission command, and that the German Army retained superior command practices, despite its other failings, throughout the fighting between 1939 and 1945. These conclusions hold additional relevance to modern military organisations which have emphasised mission command as the optimal solution to effective command in battle since the 1980s, but from an inaccurate understanding of German, British and American command traditions and experience that persists to this day.     

The symbolic politics of ballistic missile defense: seeking the perfect defense in an imperfect world

Ballistic missile defense (BMD) politics present an interesting evolution in how the USA, especially Congress, has come to think about BMD both as operational reality and as a symbolic policy. The argument here is that BMD's operational reality is increasingly overshadowed by its symbolic aspects. Such a status arose from rapidly changing international and domestic politics. The end result is a situation in which BMD policy in a sense floats above the question of its actual combat effectiveness. Its primary mission in part is sustaining US capacity to remain a global power and support its allies.     

‘I have seen the future and it works’: The US defence industry transformation – lessons for the UK defence industrial base

The US has embarked upon a major transformation of its approach to defence industrial base planning. Although bureaucratic and industrial inertia, as well as budgetary constraints, may delay transformation, its effects will lead to radical changes in the US defence industrial base with new entrants and new combinations of players. The UK, with more modest defence ambitions, capabilities and budget, will seek to keep in touch with the US. However, a commercially‐led drive to embed UK industry even more deeply in the US defence market could be the last step in creating a largely US–UK North Atlantic relationship, with much of Europe very much a subsidiary business concern. This contains a risk that the UK will become increasingly dependent on the US for design and integration of major systems and national defence industrial capability focused on a limited number of niche technologies.     

Empirical analysis of the defense interdependence between Japan and the United States

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the defense interdependence between Japan and the United States (US) in the short and long run and to investigate whether Japan is a follower or a free rider of the “US” over the 1975–2009 period. Given that mutual aid between Japan and the US has been maintained, the empirical results suggest that Japanese defense has a stable relationship with US defense. Furthermore, the results reveal that Japan is not a free rider but rather a follower in the period under consideration.     

How not to pay for the war

As a result of allied subsidy and the influence of sunk costs, the marginal cost of the Gulf War to the US was reduced to negligible size. This result is at variance with the Olson‐Zeckhauser thesis that in an alliance “the small exploit the large.” A game theoretic alternative explanation suggests that the relation between allies resembles the game of Chicken, successfully played by the US. The ability to shift the marginal costs of war in the short term raises questions about the possible underestimation of long term effects.