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101.
When an unreliable supplier serves multiple retailers, the retailers may compete with each other by inflating their order quantities in order to obtain their desired allocation from the supplier, a behavior known as the rationing game. We introduce capacity information sharing and a capacity reservation mechanism in the rationing game and show that a Nash equilibrium always exists. Moreover, we provide conditions guaranteeing the existence of the reverse bullwhip effect upstream, a consequence of the disruption caused by the supplier. In contrast, we also provide conditions under which the bullwhip effect does not exist. In addition, we show that a smaller unit reservation payment leads to more bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects, while a large unit underage cost results in a more severe bullwhip effect. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 203–216, 2017 相似文献
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可靠性鉴定中 Bayes 方法的运用 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
张金槐 《国防科技大学学报》1993,15(3):121-132
本文论述可靠性鉴定的Bayes方法。文中讨论了成败型和寿命型两种模型。给出了可靠性鉴定方法及可能犯的两种错误的概率计算公式。论述中,充分注意了工程实践中出现的问题,并提出了处置方法。 相似文献
104.
Alan Washburn 《海军后勤学研究》2001,48(4):270-280
Gass, Zafra, and Qiu (1996) introduce a modified version of fictitious play for matrix games where only the more successful player's strategy is retained. This paper introduces additional modifications that appear to converge faster. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.* Naval Research Logistics 48: 270–280, 2001 相似文献
105.
This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game in which player I chooses in integer interval [1, N] two integer intervals consisting of p and q points where p + q < N, and player II chooses an integer point in [1, N]. The payoff to player I equals 1 if the point chosen by player II is at least in one of the intervals chosen by player II and 0 otherwise. This paper complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, Lee, Garnaev, and Zoroa, Zoroa and Fernández‐Sáez. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 98–106, 2001 相似文献
106.
Leaving marks at the starting points in a rendezvous search problem may provide the players with important information. Many of the standard rendezvous search problems are investigated under this new framework which we call markstart rendezvous search. Somewhat surprisingly, the relative difficulties of analysing problems in the two scenarios differ from problem to problem. Symmetric rendezvous on the line seems to be more tractable in the new setting whereas asymmetric rendezvous on the line when the initial distance is chosen by means of a convex distribution appears easier to analyse in the original setting. Results are also obtained for markstart rendezvous on complete graphs and on the line when the players' initial distance is given by an unknown probability distribution. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 722–731, 2001 相似文献
107.
Zhimin Huang 《海军后勤学研究》2000,47(8):669-685
This paper explores the role of franchising arrangements in the context of game theory. We assume a single franchisor and a single franchisee channel and address the impact of fixed lump‐sum fees, royalties, wholesale price, and retail price on the franchise contracts. We start with the chance cross‐constrained noncooperative situation where the franchisor, as the leader, first specifies his/her strategies. The franchisee, as the follower, then decides on his/her decision. We then relax the assumption of franchisee's inability to influence the franchisor's decisions and discuss cooperative situation between the franchisor and the franchisee. Nash's bargaining model is utilized to select the best Pareto‐efficient payment scheme for the franchisor and the franchisee to achieve their cooperation. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 669–685, 2000 相似文献
108.
两人多冲突环境下的双矩阵对策集结模型 总被引:3,自引:1,他引:2
针对用多个双矩阵对策来描述的两人多冲突环境,首先基于局中人所受到的约束条件,构造局中人面向多冲突环境的可行策略串集合;其次以所有局中人的可行策略串集合建立新的结局空间,构造局中人在新结局空间上的支付函数,进而建立两人多冲突环境下的对策综合集结模型;最后给出了一个军事例子,该算例说明了模型的实用性. 相似文献
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110.
When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008 相似文献