On a ruckle problem in discrete games of ambush

The following zero-sum game is considered. Red chooses in integer interval [1, n] two integer intervals consisting of k and m points where k + m < n, and Blue chooses an integer point in [1, n]. The payoff to Red equals 1 if the point chosen by Blue is at least in one of the intervals chosen by Red, and 0 otherwise. This work complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, and Lee. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 353–364, 1997     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000     

On estimating the reliability of a component subject to several different stresses (strengths)

This paper is concerned with estimating p = P(X₁ < Y …, X_n < Y) or q =P (X < Y₁, …, X < Y_n) where the X's and Y's are all independent random variables. Applications to estimation of the reliability p from stress-strength relationships are considered where a component is subject to several stresses X₁, X₂, …, X_N whereas its strength, Y, is a single random variable. Similarly, the reliability q is of interest where a component is made of several parts all with their individual strengths Y₁, Y₂ …, Y_N and a single stress X is applied to the component. When the X's and Y's are independent and normal, maximum likelihood estimates of p and q have been obtained. For the case N = 2 and in some special cases, minimum variance unbiased estimates have been given. When the Y's are all exponential and the X is normal with known variance, but unknown mean (or uniform between 0 and θ, θ being unknown) the minimum variance unbiased estimate of q is established in this paper.     

Computational analysis of MMAP[K]/PH[K]/1 queues with a mixed FCFS and LCFS service discipline

This paper studies a queueing system with a Markov arrival process with marked arrivals and PH‐distribution service times for each type of customer. Customers (regardless of their types) are served on a mixed first‐come‐first‐served (FCFS) and last‐come‐first‐served (LCFS) nonpreemptive basis. That is, when the queue length is N (a positive integer) or less, customers are served on an FCFS basis; otherwise, customers are served on an LCFS basis. The focus is on the stationary distribution of queue strings, busy periods, and waiting times of individual types of customers. A computational approach is developed for computing the stationary distribution of queue strings, the mean of busy period, and the means and variances of waiting times. The relationship between these performance measures and the threshold number N is analyzed in depth numerically. It is found that the variance of the virtual (actual) waiting time of an arbitrary customer can be reduced by increasing N. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 399–421, 2000     

To catch an intruder: Part A—uncluttered scenario

We analyze an interdiction scenario where an interceptor attempts to catch an intruder as the intruder moves through the area of interest. A motivating example is the detection and interdiction of drug smuggling vessels in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. We study two models in this article. The first considers a nonstrategic target that moves through the area without taking evasive action to avoid the interdictor. We determine the optimal location the interceptor should position itself to best respond when a target arrives. The second model analyzes the strategic interaction between the interceptor and intruder using a Blotto approach. The intruder chooses a route to travel on and the interceptor chooses a route to patrol. We model the interaction as a two‐player game with a bilinear payoff function. We compute the optimal strategy for both players and examine several extensions. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 64: 29–40, 2017     

Selecting review periods for a coordinated multi‐item inventory model with staggered deliveries

Consider an N‐item, periodic review, infinite‐horizon, undiscounted, inventory model with stochastic demands, proportional holding and shortage costs, and full backlogging. For 1 ≤ j ≤ N, orders for item j can arrive in every period, and the cost of receiving them is negligible (as in a JIT setting). Every T_j periods, one reviews the current stock level of item j and decides on deliveries for each of the next T_j periods, thus incurring an item‐by‐item fixed cost k_j. There is also a joint fixed cost whenever any item is reviewed. The problem is to find review periods T₁, T₂, …, T_N and an ordering policy satisfying the average cost criterion. The current article builds on earlier results for the single‐item case. We prove an optimal policy exists, give conditions where it has a simple form, and develop a branch and bound algorithm for its computation. We also provide two heuristic policies with O(N) computational requirements. Computational experiments indicate that the branch and bound algorithm can handle normal demand problems with N ≤ 10 and that both heuristics do well for a wide variety of problems with N ranging from 2 to 200; moreover, the performance of our heuristics seems insensitive to N. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48:430–449, 2001     

Some probability functions in reliability and their applications

There has been much research on the general failure model recently. In the general failure model, when the unit fails at its age t, Type I failure (minor failure) occurs with probability 1 ? p(t) and Type II failure (catastrophic failure) occurs with probability p(t). In the previous research, some specific shapes (constant, non‐decreasing, or bathtub‐shape) on the probability function p(t) are assumed. In this article, general results on some probability functions are obtained and applied to study the shapes of p(t). The results are also applied to determining the optimal inspection and allocation policies in maintenance problems. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Rendezvous of three agents on the line

This paper considers a three‐person rendezvous problem on the line which was introduced earlier by the authors. Three agents are placed at three consecutive integer value points on the real line, say 1, 2, and 3. Each agent is randomly faced towards the right or left. Agents are blind and have a maximum speed of 1. Their common aim is to gather at a common location as quickly as possible. The main result is the proof that a strategy given by V. Baston is the unique minimax strategy. Baston's strategy ensures a three way rendezvous in time at most 3.5 for any of the 3!2³ = 48 possible initial configurations corresponding to positions and directions of each agent. A connection is established between the above rendezvous problem and a search problem of L. Thomas in which two parents search separately to find their lost child and then meet again. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 244–255, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10005     

A note on sojourn times in M/G/1 queues with instantaneous,bernoulli feedback

Queueing systems which include the possibility for a customer to return to the same server for additional service are called queueing systems with feedback. Such systems occur in computer networks for example. In these systems a chosen customer will wait in the queue, be serviced and then, with probability p, return to wait again, be serviced again and continue this process until, with probability (1 – p) = q, it departs the system never to return. The time of waiting plus service time, the nth time the customer goes through, we will call his nth sojourn time. The (random) sum of these sojourn times we will call the total sojourn time (abbreviated, sojourn time when there is no confusion which sojourn time we are talking about). In this paper we study the total sojourn time in a queueing system with feedback. We give the details for M/G/1 queues in which the decision to feedback or not is a Bernoulli process. While the details of the computations can be more difficult, the structure of the sojourn time process is unchanged for the M/G/1 queue with a more general decision process as will be shown. We assume the reader is familiar with Disney, McNickle and Simon [1].     

Radar pulse interleaving for multi‐target tracking

In a multifunction radar, the maximum number of targets that can be managed or tracked is an important performance measure. Interleaving algorithms developed to operate radars exploit the dead‐times between the transmitted and the received pulses to allocate new tracking tasks that might involve transmitting or receiving pulses, thus increasing the capacity of the system. The problem of interleaving N targets involves a search among N! possibilities, and suboptimal solutions are usually employed to satisfy the real‐time constraints of the radar system. In this paper, we present new tight 0–1 integer programming models for the radar pulse interleaving problem and develop effective solution methods based on Lagrangian relaxation techniques. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Periodic inspection policy with preventive maintenance

This article considers a modified inspection policy with periodic check intervals, where the unit after check has the same age as before with probability p and is as good as new with probability q. The mean time to failure and the expected number of checks before failure are derived, forming renewal-type equations. The total expected cost and the expected cost per unit of time until detection of failure are obtained. Optimum inspection policies which minimize the expected costs are given as a numerical example.     

Discrete search allocation game with false contacts

This paper deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game, where a searcher and a target participate, taking account of false contacts. The searcher distributes his search effort in a search space in order to detect the target. On the other hand, the target moves to avoid the searcher. As a payoff of the game, we take the cumulative amount of search effort weighted by the target distribution, which can be derived as an approximation of the detection probability of the target. The searcher's strategy is a plan of distributing search effort and the target's is a movement represented by a path or transition probability across the search space. In the search, there are false contacts caused by environmental noises, signal processing noises, or real objects resembling true targets. If they happen, the searcher must take some time for their investigation, which interrupts the search for a while. There have been few researches dealing with search games with false contacts. In this paper, we formulate the game into a mathematical programming problem to obtain its equilibrium point. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Optimal policies for M/M/m queue with two different kinds of (N,T)‐policies

In this paper, two different kinds of (N, T)‐policies for an M/M/m queueing system are studied. The system operates only intermittently and is shut down when no customers are present any more. A fixed setup cost of K > 0 is incurred each time the system is reopened. Also, a holding cost of h > 0 per unit time is incurred for each customer present. The two (N, T)‐policies studied for this queueing system with cost structures are as follows: (1) The system is reactivated as soon as N customers are present or the waiting time of the leading customer reaches a predefined time T, and (2) the system is reactivated as soon as N customers are present or the time units after the end of the last busy period reaches a predefined time T. The equations satisfied by the optimal policy (N*, T*) for minimizing the long‐run average cost per unit time in both cases are obtained. Particularly, we obtain the explicit optimal joint policy (N*, T*) and optimal objective value for the case of a single server, the explicit optimal policy N* and optimal objective value for the case of multiple servers when only predefined customers number N is measured, and the explicit optimal policy T* and optimal objective value for the case of multiple servers when only predefined time units T is measured, respectively. These results partly extend (1) the classic N or T policy to a more practical (N, T)‐policy and (2) the conclusions obtained for single server system to a system consisting of m (m ≥ 1) servers. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 240–258, 2000     

A note on the relationship between correlation and circular error probability (CEP)

This note investigates the effects of ignoring correlation (p) as is sometimes done when estimating or placing confidence intervals on circular error probability (CEP). It is shown that better estimates of CEP can be made if the axis is rotated [5] so that the estimate of p is zero. It is also shown that ignoring variability in estimating correlation can affect the confidence intervals on CEP or the placing of a lower bound on the probability content of a circle.     

Continuous accumulation games on discrete locations

In an accumulation game, a HIDER attempts to accumulate a certain number of objects or a certain quantity of material before a certain time, and a SEEKER attempts to prevent this. In a continuous accumulation game the HIDER can pile material either at locations $1, 2, …, n, or over a region in space. The HIDER will win (payoff 1) it if accumulates N units of material before a given time, and the goal of the SEEKER will win (payoff 0) otherwise. We assume the HIDER can place continuous material such as fuel at discrete locations i = 1, 2, …, n, and the game is played in discrete time. At each time k > 0 the HIDER acquires h units of material and can distribute it among all of the locations. At the same time, k, the SEEKER can search a certain number s < n of the locations, and will confiscate (or destroy) all material found. After explicitly describing what we mean by a continuous accumulation game on discrete locations, we prove a theorem that gives a condition under which the HIDER can always win by using a uniform distribution at each stage of the game. When this condition does not hold, special cases and examples show that the resulting game becomes complicated even when played only for a single stage. We reduce the single stage game to an optimization problem, and also obtain some partial results on its solution. We also consider accumulation games where the locations are arranged in either a circle or in a line segment and the SEEKER must search a series of adjacent locations. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 60–77, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1048     

Multiple dispatches in a poisson process

An optimal policy is characterized for operating the following system. Customers arrive in [O, T] according to a homogeneous Poisson process. Instantaneous services are provided at times O and T. Additional instantaneous services can be provided at N intermediate stop ping times. These times must be chosen to minimize the total expected customer-hours in [O, T] spent waiting for service.     

Inventory control in divergent supply chains with time‐based dispatching and shipment consolidation

This article analyses a divergent supply chain consisting of a central warehouse and N nonidentical retailers. The focus is on joint evaluation of inventory replenishment and shipment consolidation effects. A time‐based dispatching and shipment consolidation policy is used at the warehouse in conjunction with real‐time point‐of‐sale data and centralized inventory information. This represents a common situation, for example, in various types of vendor managed inventory systems. The main contribution is the derivation of an exact recursive procedure for determining the expected inventory holding and backorder costs for the system, under the assumption of Poisson demand. Two heuristics for determining near optimal shipment intervals are also presented. The results are applicable both for single‐item and multiitem systems. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 58: 59–71, 2011     

Discrete equal‐capacity p‐median problem

This paper examines the discrete equal‐capacity p‐median problem that seeks to locate p new facilities (medians) on a network, each having a given uniform capacity, in order to minimize the sum of distribution costs while satisfying the demand on the network. Such problems arise, for example, in local access and transport area telecommunication network design problems where any number of a set of p facility units can be constructed at the specified candidate sites (hence, the net capacity is an integer multiple of a given unit capacity). We develop various valid inequalities, a separation routine for generating cutting planes that are specific members of such inequalities, as well as an enhanced reformulation that constructs a partial convex hull representation that subsumes an entire class of valid inequalities via its linear programming relaxation. We also propose suitable heuristic schemes for this problem, based on sequentially rounding the continuous relaxation solutions obtained for the various equivalent formulations of the problem. Extensive computational results are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed valid inequalities, enhanced formulations, and heuristic schemes. The results indicate that the proposed schemes for tightening the underlying relaxations play a significant role in enhancing the performance of both exact and heuristic solution methods for this class of problems. © 2000 John & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 166–183, 2000.