基于区块链的装备数据安全共享方案研究

军事装备大数据是实现军事现代化、智能化的基础,其中,数据共享对实现装备可视化管理、整合装备供应链、优化指挥控制系统等具有至关重要的作用。军事装备数据涉及核心机密,数据的安全共享问题是导致这些技术发展迟缓的关键因素之一。区块链是一种具有去中心化、不可篡改、稳定可靠等特性的分布式链式账本技术,利用区块链技术和云计算可以保障装备数据安全,在军事领域有着广阔的发展前景。本文面向装备数据安全共享业务开展研究,探讨利用基于属性加密技术和智能合约技术解决不同主体间的信任问题,并提出了基于区块链的装备数据安全共享方案,以打破传统装备系统中的“信息孤岛”现象。     

基于GO法的军事供应链可靠性分析

军事供应链管理要获得高效率和效益，最基础的必须是有高可靠性作保证。结合GO法——一种系统可靠性分析方法和军事供应链自身的特点，阐明了将GO法应用于军事供应链可靠性分析中的可行性。通过构建军事供应链结构模型，运用GO法原理，分析出军事供应链系统中的信号流和操作符，将军事供应链系统结构图转化为GO图，通过GO运算，求出各信号流的等效故障率，进而求出军事供应链中各节点的等效可靠度，对供应链网络结构模型的可靠性问题进行定量分析，并通过实例对该方法的应用进行了具体说明。结果表明：GO法不仅能够计算出整个军事供应链的可靠性，还可以清楚地得到各环节的可靠性，从而可以追溯出影响军事供应链系统整体可靠性的瓶颈，为制定相关的可靠性管理措施提供科学依据。     

The transshipment fund mechanism: Coordinating the decentralized multilocation transshipment problem

The multilocation replenishment and transshipment problem is concerned with several retailers facing random demand for the same item at distinct markets, that may use transshipments to eliminate excess inventory/shortages after demand realization. When the system is decentralized so that each retailer operates to maximize their own profit, there are incentive problems that prevent coordination. These problems arise even with two retailers who may pay each other for transshipped units. We propose a new mechanism based on a transshipment fund, which is the first to coordinate the system, in a fully noncooperative setting, for all instances of two retailers as well as all instances of any number of retailers. Moreover, our mechanism strongly coordinates the system, i.e., achieves coordination as the unique equilibrium. The computation and information requirements of this mechanism are realistic and relatively modest. We also present necessary and sufficient conditions for coordination and prove they are always satisfied with our mechanism. Numerical examples illustrate some of the properties underlying this mechanism for two retailers. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Inventory transshipment game with limited supply: Trap or treat

Inventory transshipment is generally shown to be beneficial to retailers by matching their excess demand with surplus inventory. We investigate an inventory transshipment game with two newsvendor-type retailers under limited total supply and check whether the retailers are better off than the case without transshipment. We derive the ordering strategies for the retailers and show that unlike the unlimited supply case, a pure Nash equilibrium only exists under certain conditions. Furthermore, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that inventory transshipment may not always benefit both retailers. Although one of the retailers is guaranteed to be better off, the other could be worse off. The decision criteria are then provided for the retailers to determine if they will benefit from the exercise of inventory transshipment. Numerical study indicates that the carefully chosen transshipment prices play an important role in keeping inventory transshipment beneficial to both retailers. Subsequently, a coordinating mechanism is designed for the retailers to negotiate transshipment prices that maximize the total profit of the two retailers while keeping each of them in a beneficial position.     

Strategic obfuscation of production capacities

Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014     

Impact of tax reduction policies on consumer purchase of new automobiles: An analytical investigation with real data‐based experiments

We investigate and compare the impact of the tax reduction policies implemented in the United States and China to stimulate consumer purchase of new automobiles and improve manufacturers' profits. The U.S. policy provides each qualifying consumer with a federal income tax deduction on state and local sales and excise taxes paid on the purchase price (up to a cutoff level), whereas the Chinese policy reduces the vehicle sales tax rate for consumers. We observe that these policy designs are consistent with the tax management system and the economic environment in the respective country. We analytically determine the effects of the two tax reduction policies on the automobile sales and the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits. Numerical examples are then used to provide insights on the importance of certain factors that influence the effects of the two policies. Finally, a numerical experiment with sensitivity analysis based on real data is conducted to compare the merits and characteristics of the two policies under comparable conditions. We find that the U.S. policy is better than the Chinese policy in stimulating the sales of high‐end automobiles, whereas the Chinese policy is better than the U.S. policy in improving the sales of low‐end automobiles. The U.S. policy is slightly more effective in increasing the profitability of the automobile supply chain; but, in general, the Chinese policy is more cost effective. The methodology developed herein can be used to evaluate other tax reduction policies such as those related to the purchase of energy‐saving vehicles and to serve as a decision model to guide the choice of alternative tax reduction policies. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 61: 577–598, 2014     

基于险度函数的装备供应链库存风险损失度量

目前,对供应链库存风险损失的定量研究比较少,而定量研究中鲜有对风险偏好变化问题的研究,因此首先分析了各种风险度量方法,通过比较采用了险度函数作为对装备供应链风险损失的度量方法;然后,结合装备供应链实际,提出了定常风险偏好特性险度函数和可变风险偏好特性险度函数的适用范围,以及装备供应链库存风险损失度量的损失水平值,并给出了装备供应链库存风险损失度量函数;最后,通过算例进行了验证.实验结果表明:行为人的不同风险偏好特性会对同一事态产生不同的预判,进而可能影响对风险的决策,这是符合客观现实的.     

Markovian models of three‐on‐one combat involving a hidden defender

In this paper, Markovian models of three‐on‐one stochastic firefights between ground‐based weapon systems are developed. These models address a common scenario of interest to the military, but one which has been much neglected in analytic combat models, that of combat between a hidden defender and an exposed attacking force. Each combatant must detect an opponent before commencing their firing cycle, a task which is considerably more difficult for the attacker. In the models developed here, the defender detects the exposed attacking group after an exponentially distributed time interval, while each attacker has a fixed probability of detecting the defender via the flash signature produced after each shot fired by him. The utility of the approach is demonstrated by investigating what impact the introduction of a coordinated gun‐laying system for the attacking force might have, a system made possible by battlefield digitization. The method used here allows models to be developed incrementally. This and other advantages of the Markovian approach are discussed. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 627–646, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10041     

不完备检测下视情维修的多级劣化系统性能评估

视情维修是改善多级劣化系统性能表现的重要措施,然而在实际中检测不完备问题会制约视情维修的有效开展,从而影响劣化系统性能评估结果。针对这一问题,将多级劣化系统检测维修马尔科夫链模型中的状态转移进行调整,建立其在不完备检测下进行视情维修的性能评估模型,给出系统性能参数的求解方法。实例验证表明:在实际工作中,虚警和漏检对于系统瞬态可用度的影响是随时间变化而不定的,但对于系统可靠度的影响则是确定的,即在任意时刻虚警提高系统可靠度,而漏检降低系统可靠度。