基于打击链的智能武器风险分析与控制方法研究

打击链是分析武器和系统等作战要素有效性的一种方法。针对当前智能武器概念缺乏一致定义的问题,本文提出了基于打击链作战方式的智能武器判定方法。针对智能武器认定困难引发的军控措施争论,分析了智能武器两方面的失控风险:人失去对自主武器的控制权与自主武器本身存在不可控因素和缺陷;以及智能武器的问责困境:如何在指挥者、编程者与智能武器之间分配责任。在此基础上,思考了智能武器在未来战争体系对抗中的使用模式,提出了智能武器的风险控制与军备控制方法方面的建议,包括"武器+AI"与"AI+武器"模式探讨、限制智能武器作用域、智能武器应内嵌物理限制系统、限制智能武器的训练数据以及国防采办过程控制等。     

The impact of exponential smoothing forecasts on the bullwhip effect

An important phenomenon often observed in supply chain management, known as the bullwhip effect, implies that demand variability increases as one moves up the supply chain, i.e., as one moves away from customer demand. In this paper we quantify this effect for simple, two‐stage, supply chains consisting of a single retailer and a single manufacturer. We demonstrate that the use of an exponential smoothing forecast by the retailer can cause the bullwhip effect and contrast these results with the increase in variability due to the use of a moving average forecast. We consider two types of demand processes, a correlated demand process and a demand process with a linear trend. We then discuss several important managerial insights that can be drawn from this research. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 269–286, 2000     

Reliability of a two-dimensional demand-based networked system with multistate components

Existing research on multistate system reliability has mainly focused on one-dimensional systems such as parallel systems, linear sliding window systems, and linearly consecutively connected systems. However, two-dimensional networked systems widely exist in real-world applications such as lighting systems, monitoring systems, and computer network systems. This research considers a two-dimensional networked system consisting of multistate components. The system fails if the cumulative performance of any row or any column cannot meet a predetermined demand. A novel reliability evaluation algorithm is proposed for the considered two-dimensional networked system by extending the universal generating function technique. Furthermore, the proposed model and reliability evaluation algorithm are extended to a two-dimensional networked system with phased missions. The proposed models and algorithms are illustrated by a matrix heating system in a thermoforming machine.     

Scheduling and due‐date quotation in a make‐to‐order supply chain

We consider a manufacturer, served by a single supplier, who has to quote due dates to arriving customers in a make‐to‐order production environment. The manufacturer is penalized for long lead times and for missing due dates. To meet due dates, the manufacturer has to obtain components from a supplier. We model this manufacturer and supplier as a two‐machine flow shop, consider several variations of this problem, and design effective due‐date quotation and scheduling algorithms for centralized and decentralized versions of the model. We perform extensive computational testing to assess the effectiveness of our algorithms and to compare the centralized and decentralized models to quantify the value of centralized control in a make‐to‐order supply chain. Since complete information exchange and centralized control is not always practical or cost‐effective, we explore the value of partial information exchange for this system. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Nash bargaining over allocations in inventory pooling contracts

When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Technical note: Reexamination of all‐or‐none inspection policies in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This note studies the optimal inspection policies in a supply chain in which a manufacturer purchases components from a supplier but has no direct control of component quality. The manufacturer uses an inspection policy and a damage cost sharing contract to encourage the supplier to improve the component quality. We find that all‐or‐none inspection policies are optimal for the manufacturer if the supplier's share of the damage cost is larger than a threshold; otherwise, the manufacturer should inspect a fraction of a batch. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

基于概率风险的系统安全性分析

为得到系统层次上的安全性概率风险,获得定量的安全性决策依据,设计了基于概率风险的系统安全性分析方法,该方法将系统按某种标准划分成相应子系统,统计得到各子系统所有的危险源,建立相应的因果链,通过一定法则得到基于系统层次的概率风险,同时还讨论了设计方法中概率风险计算的难点问题。     

A location‐inventory model with lateral transshipments

We study an infinite horizon periodic stochastic inventory system consisting of retail outlets and customers located on a homogenous line segment. In each period, the total demand, generated by the customers on the line, is normally distributed. To better match supply and demand, we incorporate lateral transshipments. We propose a compact model in which the strategic decisions—the number and locations of retail outlets—are determined simultaneously with the operational decisions—the inventory replenishment and transshipment quantities. We find the optimal balance between the risk‐pooling considerations, which drive down the optimal number of retail outlets, and lateral transshipments, which drive up the optimal number of retail outlets. We also explore the sensitivity of the optimal number of retail outlets to various problem parameters. This article presents a novel way of integrating lateral transshipments in the context of an inventory‐location model. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

基于GSPN的编队网络化防空指挥流程研究

为了提高编队指挥员在信息化海战中的作战指挥效率和应变能力,利用广义随机Petri网与马尔可夫链的等价关系,得到一种Petri网与马尔可夫链理论相结合的指挥流程时间性能分析的新方法,通过对模型进行分析与求解,得出了舰艇编队网络化防空作战指挥流程活动的准确作战周期,从而为指挥流程的优化提供有力的支撑,对评估系统效能水平也具有重要指导意义。