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在Hilbert空间中,利用超梯度算法,用以逼近混合均衡问题的解集与半压缩映像不动点集的公共元,并且证明了该算法的收敛性。使用新的分析技巧证明了一个强收敛定理。 相似文献
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郑瑞林 《海军工程大学学报》1992,(3)
本文由热力学理论定量指出,只要两相平衡的饱和蒸气比热为负,饱和蒸气经绝热膨胀后成过饱和蒸气,并讨论了饱和蒸气比热为负的条件。 相似文献
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本文采用11组元化学模型对双曲体粘性激波层化学非平衡绕流流场进行了数值计算,给出了压力、温度,N+2、O+2、N+、O+和NO+摩尔浓度及e-数密度在驻点的分布,并与7组元、5组元的计算结果作了比较。 相似文献
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研究一类易感者和潜伏者都有新增常数输入,疾病具有饱和发生率的SEIS传染病模型.经计算得到模型的基本再生数,证明当基本再生数〉1时,模型只存在惟一的地方病平衡点的结论,并利用特征方程和Hurwitz判据分析地方病平衡点的局部稳定性,通过采用第二加性复合矩阵理论证明地方病平衡点的全局渐近稳定性. 相似文献
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针对高超声速飞行器纵向平面内准平衡滑翔制导控制问题,提出一种基于动态面控制和滑模控制的制导与姿态控制系统设计方法。建立高超声速飞行器纵向平面质心和绕质心运动模型,以航程预测-校正控制为出发点得到期望速度倾角并结合飞行器纵向模型中速度倾角、攻角和俯仰角速率间的关系,利用动态面控制方法、终端滑模控制和二阶滑模控制方法完成高超声速飞行器纵向平面内制导与姿控系统设计。基于偏导系数矩阵形式的通用高超声速飞行器气动模型,完成期望攻角和左右升降舵偏角指令的解析计算。通过高超声速飞行器对该制导控制系统设计方法的有效性和鲁棒性进行仿真验证。根据数值仿真结果,系统阐述了高超声速飞行器进入准平衡滑翔飞行前后制导控制系统工作的特点,进而总结了从初始下降段到准平衡滑翔段交班飞行阶段制导控制系统设计需要注意的问题。 相似文献
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对一类食饵染病的随机食饵-捕食者系统,应用伊藤公式,给出系统均衡解的全局随机渐近稳定的条件,并通过数值模拟对理论结果进行论证. 相似文献
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Colin Jennings 《Defence and Peace Economics》2016,27(3):404-422
This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence which does not provide a material benefit. Rabin’s (1993) theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be a Nash equilibrium it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifice in choosing peace. 相似文献
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描述战斗毁伤"规模效应"的Lanchester模型默认作战体系内部是"完美的"。本文扬弃此假设,首次从作战体系内部"共识"涌现的视角提出了一个模拟体系对抗价值链的网络"同步效应"模型,研究了战场变化、个体/群体认知、自同步与对抗均衡等概念的网络拓扑和权值演化形式,并发现在对抗均衡条件下无标度网络具有"同步脆弱性"。 相似文献
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We study the competition problem of purchase and multiretrieval of perishable seasonal produce, where wholesalers purchase and stock their products in the first period, and then retrieve and sell them in subsequent periods. We first consider the duopoly case and assume that the prices are exogenous and fluctuate. In each period, after the price realization, the wholesalers retrieve some stock from their warehouses to satisfy their demands. One wholesaler's unsatisfied customers can switch to another and be satisfied by its left retrieved products. Any unsold retrieved stock has no salvage value and any unsatisfied demand is lost. The unretrieved stock is carried to the next period at a perishable rate. The wholesalers compete for the substitute demand by determining their own purchase and retrieval quantities. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and that the Nash equilibrium strategy has the simple “sell-down-to” structure. We also consider the general N-person game and show the existence of the Nash equilibrium, and characterize the structure of the equilibrium strategy for the symmetric case. In addition, we consider the case with endogenous prices, and show that the problem reduces to a repeated newsvendor game with price and inventory competition. We derive the conditions under which a unique Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium strategy. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to examine the impacts of the model parameters on the equilibrium outcomes and to generate managerial insights. 相似文献