When the Going Gets Tough… Monitoring Missions and a Changing Conflict Environment in Sri Lanka, 2002–2008

This article analyzes how the conflict environment in which a civilian monitoring mission is deployed influences the monitors' assessment of the operation. It draws on unique empirical material from the experience of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), deployed to oversee a ceasefire agreement in Sri Lanka 2002–2008. With material from a survey and in-depth interviews, experiences of the monitors are analyzed and changes over time are traced in relation to the monitors' assessment of the mandate and organizational set-up of the mission. The study points to the difficulty of monitoring missions to address escalation during an ongoing peace process. Its function is dependent on the goodwill of the parties. In essence, monitoring missions have the potential to strengthen peace when there is momentum in favor of progress, but when relations between the parties turn sour and the conflict escalates a civilian monitoring mission basically loses its potential. During the final stages of the war, which saw a very large number of civilian casualties, the war-torn areas were closed to international observers. Moreover, international pressure for a short-term ceasefire to alleviate the humanitarian situation was dismissed by the Sri Lankan government, which also saw the backing of several important actors, not the least China.     

汉语语境下教师对学生冲突性话语的回应策略与面子的语用分析

师生间的言语冲突在课堂教学中时有发生,而这一现象并未引起足够重视。课堂教学中师生间冲突性话语为本文的研究对象,分析其语言表现,并依据Brown&Levinson的面子威胁论,探析教师对于学生不合作话语引发的冲突回应,旨在揭示师生间冲突性话语的面子威胁性特征及语用理据。     

RAISING THE COST OF REBELLION: THE ROLE OF THIRD‐PARTY INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

This paper presents a simple model to characterize explicitly the role that an intervening third party plays in raising the cost of rebellion in an intrastate conflict. Extending the Gershenson‐Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]) framework of conflict in a two‐stage game to the case involving outside intervention in a three‐stage game as in Chang et al. (2007b Chang, Y.‐M., Potter, J. and Sanders, S. 2007b. War and peace: third‐party intervention in conflict. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4): 954–974.  [Google Scholar]), we examine the conditions under which an outside party optimally intervenes such that (i) the strength of the rebel group is diminished or (ii) the rebellion is deterred altogether. We also find conditions in which a third party optimally intervenes but at a level insufficient to deter rebellion. Such behavior, which improves the incumbent government’s potential to succeed in conflict, is overlooked in some conflict studies evaluating the effectiveness of intervention. One policy implication of the model is that an increase in the strength of inter‐governmental trade partnerships increases the likelihood that third‐party intervention deters rebellion.     

Economic reconstruction amidst conflict: Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq

Economic reconstruction typically takes place after the end of war. Yet recently, economic reconstruction has been viewed as a means to ‘win hearts and minds’ during ongoing conflict. Drawing on a variety of reconstruction experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq, we identify four ‘reconstruction traps’ that result from the incentives and constraints faced by actors involved in economic reconstruction during ongoing conflict. These traps include: 1. the credible commitment trap, 2. the knowledge trap, 3. the political economy trap, and 4. the bureaucracy trap. Avoiding these traps is critical for successful economic reconstruction; and we discuss potential strategies for doing so.     

The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad factor in the Mali crisis

Mali has been a battleground for more than a year now. While the armed conflict came in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis that left the regional security environment depleted, it also served as a catalyst for the collapse of state authority in Mali. This created conditions conducive for the proliferation of, and attacks by, radical religious armed groups in the northern regions of the country, including the Tuareg armed movement: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). But, far from being a new phenomenon, the Tuareg-led armed insurrection in the northern regions is as old as the post-colonial Malian state, and continues to pose tremendous challenges in West Africa and the Sahel region for both regional and extra-regional actors. The recent crisis in the Sahel region is seen as one of the most serious since the end of the Cold War, with anticipated dire long-term impacts on the security of the region and beyond. While attention is predominantly focused on defeating the jihadist groups that have threatened the survival of the Malian state, one must not lose sight of the fact that the ‘Tuareg Factor’, as represented by the rebellion launched by MNLA, remains critical both in terms of appreciating the deterioration of the situation and attempting to frame long-lasting solutions. The paper argues that the Tuareg's persistent recourse to rebellion against Bamako needs to be understood within a historical trajectory that takes into consideration three key parameters: firstly, the post-colonial state in Mali and its African leadership's relations with the descendants of the Tuareg communities; secondly, the amalgamation created by the so-called war on terror; and, finally, the contradictions of the democratisation process of the 1990s.¹1 This article is based on field research carried out between 2008 and 2013 on the ‘Resurgence of Tuareg-led Rebellions’.     

Natural resource degradation and conflict in the East African pastoral drylands

Based on a literature review, this article examines the dynamics in pastoral systems, natural resource conservation and conflict in the drylands of East Africa. It argues that, in the context of East Africa, pastoralism and biodiversity conservation in general are distinct forms of land use that are complementary rather than competitive. The present state of natural resource degradation in the drylands is explained in terms of factors related to ecological and demographic pressures, land use conflicts and inefficient land administration policies. When the customary pastoral institutions of land administration and resource management are threatened, the problem of degradation is further exacerbated and violent conflicts occur among multiple resource users, including pastoralists, farmers and the state. The article recommends the revitalisation, empowerment and recognition of pastoral institutions in a way that ensures effective synergy between the formal and customary structures of resource governance.     

TANZANIA

Protracted state collapse in Somalia has led to a multiplication and diversification of armed groups. We can speak of at least five types of armed group: faction, warlord, business, court, and Islamic militias. These groups differ in important ways, yet often are simply classified as ‘militia’ or ‘warlord’. This essay seeks to add a measure of analytical rigour to the classification of armed groups and provides a comparison using a framework of purpose, motivations, logistics, and command, control and communication. It concludes with some observations about the importance of making these distinctions when formulating policy for this region.     

军事冲突模糊超对策认知信息的融合

针对现代军事冲突的不确定性和模糊性,用直觉模糊数来表示军事冲突中的局中人对另一局中人在结局空间上的偏好认知,建立了军事冲突的模糊超对策模型,并对实际军事冲突中的各级指挥员对对方策略集和结局偏好的群体认知,应用D-S证据理论进行了有效融合。最后,通过实例分析说明了文中所提出方法的有效性和合理性。     

无人机感知避让技术分析

无人机的安全性能特别是防相撞能力是影响无人机发展的一个重要因素,无人机感知避让技术是防止无人机发生相撞事故的重要保证。为了解和发展无人机感知避让技术,从无人机空中态势感知、飞行冲突预测和飞行冲突解脱3个方面对当前感知避让技术的研究现状进行了总结介绍,探讨了无人机防相撞工作的发展趋势。     

Socioeconomic impact of conflict: state of emergency ruling in Turkey

Uprising tensions during 2010 in eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey provoked arguments about the necessity for a State of Emergency (SOE; ‘Ola?anüstü Hal’ in Turkish) declaration in those regions, with a belief of enduring political sustainability. The discussion is inflamed by a speech of the Nationalist Movement Party’s leader about the suggestion to announce a SOE ruling after the death of 24 Turkish soldiers in Hakkari (a city in the southeast of Turkey) in an attack of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) on the 19 October 2011. Although a new announcement of SOE did not take place, the discussion itself induced the idea behind this paper which is to provide a quantitative analysis of the SOE in Turkey. In fact, the SOE ruling is not a new concept for Turkey and it has been implemented in 13 cities in the eastern and southeastern regions from 1987 to 2002. Although there have been many discussions about the costs of these 15 years of the SOE ruling in terms of military expenditure and, thus, on the national budget, there is a lack of quantitative analytical examination of the economic and social costs of it. Difference-in-differences analysis reveals negative spillover impacts of the SOE, especially on the forced migration, unemployment, and educational investments. The results also show that SOE ruling is an important factor for the underdevelopment of the eastern and southeastern regions in Turkey and, thus, a new SOE will bring enormous inequalities, both economically and socially, and an intensification of the ethnic tensions in Turkey.