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双机编队协同制导的火控机理 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
针对半主动雷达中制导的远距空空导弹在制导过程中对载机的强依赖性问题,提出了双机协同制导的概念;首次给出了双机协同制导的过程描述.分析了长、僚机制导过程中对导弹导引和目标跟踪过程中的各计算要素;提出了长机对目标预测并进行数据传递,僚机再通过预测值对目标实施机动和照射的协同制导思想. 相似文献
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The nucleolus solution for cooperative games in characteristic function form is usually computed numerically by solving a sequence of linear programing (LP) problems, or by solving a single, but very large‐scale, LP problem. This article proposes an algebraic method to compute the nucleolus solution analytically (i.e., in closed‐form) for a three‐player cooperative game in characteristic function form. We first consider cooperative games with empty core and derive a formula to compute the nucleolus solution. Next, we examine cooperative games with nonempty core and calculate the nucleolus solution analytically for five possible cases arising from the relationship among the value functions of different coalitions. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010 相似文献
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Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in queueing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is described by an elastic function (which means that the per‐demand cost is non‐increasing in the total demand served). For this class of situations, we introduce and analyze several cost allocation rules: the proportional rule, the serial cost sharing rule, the benefit‐proportional rule, and various Shapley‐esque rules. We study their appeal with regard to fairness criteria such as coalitional rationality, benefit ordering, and relaxations thereof. After showing the impossibility of combining coalitional rationality and benefit ordering, we show for each of the cost allocation rules which fairness criteria it satisfies. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 271–286, 2017 相似文献
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We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation. 相似文献
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