An attacker‐defender model for analyzing the vulnerability of initial attack in wildfire suppression

Wildfire managers use initial attack (IA) to control wildfires before they grow large and become difficult to suppress. Although the majority of wildfire incidents are contained by IA, the small percentage of fires that escape IA causes most of the damage. Therefore, planning a successful IA is very important. In this article, we study the vulnerability of IA in wildfire suppression using an attacker‐defender Stackelberg model. The attacker's objective is to coordinate the simultaneous ignition of fires at various points in a landscape to maximize the number of fires that cannot be contained by IA. The defender's objective is to optimally dispatch suppression resources from multiple fire stations located across the landscape to minimize the number of wildfires not contained by IA. We use a decomposition algorithm to solve the model and apply the model on a test case landscape. We also investigate the impact of delay in the response, the fire growth rate, the amount of suppression resources, and the locations of fire stations on the success of IA.     

基于博弈论的装备科研、购置、维修经费比例关系优化分析

通过不同时期国家战略部署、科研发展情况及经济承受能力对装备经费分配的影响分析,采用博弈的方法,建立了装备科研、购置和维修费之间的比例关系优化模型,给出了寻求纳什均衡点的迭代算法,并进行了仿真计算.仿真结果证明了该方法的可行性与正确性.     

信息化条件下基于大数据的后装一体化保障构想

由于契约的不完全性、专用性资产的存在,导致民企参军的谈判过程中,一方可能利用另一方因专用性资产投资的锁定效应,而采取机会主义行为将另一方套牢,攫取可占用专用性准租金。这种套牢风险不是单向的,而是双向的,双向套牢风险的存在不仅会降低军品科研生产项目建设质量,而且还会严重挫伤民营企业承担军品科研生产任务的积极性。为有效防范双向套牢风险,本文将从博弈论的角度,建立民营企业与军队采办部门的期望收益与专用性资产投资的函数关系和博弈矩阵,分阶段讨论民营企业与军队采办部门所面临的套牢风险大小及各自的最佳行为选择。以降低民企参军面临的套牢风险,引导更多优势民营企业进入军品科研生产与维修领域,推动军民融合的深度发展。     

双机编队协同制导的火控机理

针对半主动雷达中制导的远距空空导弹在制导过程中对载机的强依赖性问题,提出了双机协同制导的概念;首次给出了双机协同制导的过程描述.分析了长、僚机制导过程中对导弹导引和目标跟踪过程中的各计算要素;提出了长机对目标预测并进行数据传递,僚机再通过预测值对目标实施机动和照射的协同制导思想.     

Analytic solution for the nucleolus of a three‐player cooperative game

The nucleolus solution for cooperative games in characteristic function form is usually computed numerically by solving a sequence of linear programing (LP) problems, or by solving a single, but very large‐scale, LP problem. This article proposes an algebraic method to compute the nucleolus solution analytically (i.e., in closed‐form) for a three‐player cooperative game in characteristic function form. We first consider cooperative games with empty core and derive a formula to compute the nucleolus solution. Next, we examine cooperative games with nonempty core and calculate the nucleolus solution analytically for five possible cases arising from the relationship among the value functions of different coalitions. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

微分对策界栅理论在舰艇作战能力评估中的应用

作战能力是表征战斗舰艇战术技术性能的一项重要指标,如何正确评价舰艇的作战能力一直是军事运筹研究的热点.利用定性微分对策的界栅理论研究了一类作战问题,通过构造捕获区面积和咽喉区域面积,并以此作为动态评估舰艇作战能力的衡量指标.研究结果可为综合评价舰艇作战能力提供一条新途径.     

A search game taking account of attributes of searching resources

This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game (SAG), in which a searcher and a target participate as players. The searcher distributes his searching resources in a search space to detect the target. The effect of resources lasts a certain period of time and extends to some areas at a distance from the resources' dropped points. On the other hand, the target moves around in the search space to evade the searcher. In the history of search games, there has been little research covering the durability and reachability of searching resources. This article proposes two linear programming formulations to solve the SAG with durable and reachable resources, and at the same time provide an optimal strategy of distributing searching resources for the searcher and an optimal moving strategy for the target. Using examples, we will analyze the influences of two attributes of resources on optimal strategies. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2008     

基于贝叶斯混合博弈的空袭火力资源分配决策模型

从博弈论的角度出发研究空袭火力资源的分配问题,针对空袭编队和防空火力单元攻防对抗过程中存在的不确定性、静态性以及动态性,建立基于贝叶斯混合博弈的空袭对抗火力分配模型。通过构造贝叶斯混合博弈树,采用逆向回溯法分别建立不同的博弈分析模型,利用混合粒子群算法求解那什均衡。仿真结果表明:以博弈论为背景研究空袭作战火力分配问题,符合真实的作战坏境,有效性好,有较高的理论应用价值。     

Cost allocation rules for elastic single‐attribute situations

Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in queueing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is described by an elastic function (which means that the per‐demand cost is non‐increasing in the total demand served). For this class of situations, we introduce and analyze several cost allocation rules: the proportional rule, the serial cost sharing rule, the benefit‐proportional rule, and various Shapley‐esque rules. We study their appeal with regard to fairness criteria such as coalitional rationality, benefit ordering, and relaxations thereof. After showing the impossibility of combining coalitional rationality and benefit ordering, we show for each of the cost allocation rules which fairness criteria it satisfies. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 271–286, 2017     

Alleviating time inconsistent behaviors via a competition scheme

Under quasi‐hyperbolic discounting, the valuation of a payoff falls relatively rapidly for earlier delay periods, but then falls more slowly for longer delay periods. When the salespersons with quasi‐hyperbolic discounting consider the product sale problem, they would exert less effort than their early plan, thus resulting in losses of future profit. We propose a winner‐takes‐all competition to alleviate the above time inconsistent behaviors of the salespersons, and allow the company to maximize its revenue by choosing an optimal bonus. To evaluate the effects of the competition scheme, we define the group time inconsistency degree of the salespersons, which measures the consequence of time inconsistent behaviors, and two welfare measures, the group welfare of the salespersons and the company revenue. We show that the competition always improves the group welfare and the company revenue as long as the company chooses to run the competition in the first place. However, the effect on group time inconsistency degree is mixed. When the optimal bonus is moderate (extreme high), the competition motivates (over‐motivates) the salesperson to work hard, thus alleviates (worsens) the time inconsistent behaviors. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 357–372, 2017