Resource rents,institutions, and violent civil conflicts

Natural resources have been blamed for inducing slow growth and sparking civil conflicts and violence. This paper first develops a model to account for the hazard of armed civil conflicts as a manifestation of the natural resource curse, which is mediated by the quality of both economic and political institutions. We then use recently published data on institutional quality and natural resource rents to measure the potential impact of the resource curse on violent civil conflicts using a panel of data for over 100 countries in the period 1970–2010. Our model explicitly accounts for the role of good economic and political institutions in deterring the recourse to violence as well as the extent to which they might weaken the resource rents effect.     

The resource-conflict debate revisited: Untangling the case of farmer–herdsman clashes in the North Central region of Nigeria

The resource debate is easily discerned as part of the ongoing history of farmer–herdsman conflict in the North Central region of Nigeria. Scarcity theorists are adept at linking scarcity with the onset of livelihood conflict while on the other hand resource abundance pundits insist it is profusion and not scarcity that impels conflict. This article traverses these wrangles and proceeds to downplay the resource polemic altogether. It is proposed that the resource debate, despite its profoundness, presents a narrow reading of farmer–herdsman clashes in Nigeria’s North Central region. It is suggested that a number of other factors, including elite land grabbing, ethno-religious identity construction, weak state capabilities, the citizenship question, corrupt traditional institutions, the lack of an effective land tenure system and a widespread culture of impunity, make for better readings of the conflict. Owing to the negative impacts of the conflict on state and society, it is recommended that the state in Nigeria should commit itself to addressing the citizenship question, strengthening the capabilities of security institutions, extirpating the culture of impunity and revaluing its policy on land redistribution.     

Cost allocation rules for elastic single‐attribute situations

Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in queueing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is described by an elastic function (which means that the per‐demand cost is non‐increasing in the total demand served). For this class of situations, we introduce and analyze several cost allocation rules: the proportional rule, the serial cost sharing rule, the benefit‐proportional rule, and various Shapley‐esque rules. We study their appeal with regard to fairness criteria such as coalitional rationality, benefit ordering, and relaxations thereof. After showing the impossibility of combining coalitional rationality and benefit ordering, we show for each of the cost allocation rules which fairness criteria it satisfies. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 271–286, 2017     

Probabilistic resource pooling games

We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation.     

Constrained minimax optimization of continuous search efforts for the detection of a stationary target

Analytical resolution of search theory problems, as formalized by B.O. Koopman, may be applied with some model extension to various resource management issues. However, a fundamental prerequisite is the knowledge of the prior target density. Though this assumption has the definite advantage of simplicity, its drawback is clearly that target reactivity is not taken into account. As a preliminary step towards reactive target study stands the problem of resource planning under a min–max game context. This paper is related to Nakai's work about the game planning of resources for the detection of a stationary target. However, this initial problem is extended by adding new and more general constraints, allowing a more realistic modeling of the target and searcher behaviors. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

神经规则与案例融合的专家系统知识表示和推理

为了对专家系统中的知识进行表示,并使得推理变得更加准确高效,介绍了一种结合符号规则、神经网络和案例的方法。该方法是把一种混合规则,即神经规则和案例结合在一起。它与传统的基于符号规则推理不同的是,即使有一些未知的输入,也可以执行基于神经规则的推理。实验证明,与传统的专家系统比较,混合推理可以提高故障诊断的效率和精确度。     

雷达组网探测资源可监控性分析

探测资源可监控性是实现雷达组网系统资源优化管理与控制的前提,与管控灵活性有着密切的关系。以雷达群组网系统为背景,综合考虑组网探测资源可监控性需求、技术可行性与经济性等因素,深入分析了雷达组网系统指控中心、组网雷达及附属设备等资源的可监视性与可控性,并提出了探测资源可监控性设计原则,这对组网管控系统及组网雷达的升级改造与研制具有一定的指导与参考价值。     

分布式海战场资源规划问题

分布式海战场资源规划是实现海上联合作战的关键。首先分析了海战场资源的分类及战场资源规划特点,建立了基于多智能体的分布式海战场资源规划系统,深入分析了该规划系统的组成和功能,并构造了相应的资源规划结构模型,为实现定性和定量相结合的海战场资源规划与管理提供了一条有效的途径。     

边消警文献信息资源保障体系建设构想

阐述了边消警文献信息资源保障体系建设的内涵和建设原则,从资源体系建设、服务体系建设、网络平台建设和保障体系建设等四方面对边消警文献信息资源保障体系建设的内容进行了探讨.