HARNESSING GLOBAL TRADE DATA FOR BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL

Unlike treaties dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention still lacks formal verification measures, 31 years after entering into force. Here we propose a global export-import monitoring system of biological dual-use items as an additional measure for a web of biological arms controls that could complement traditional export controls. We suggest that such a measure may help to guide consultation or verification processes in the biological area.     

A dynamic,nonstationary inventory problem for a price/quantity setting firm

A dynamic and nonstationary model is formulated for a firm which attempts to minimize total expected costs over a finite planning horizon. The control variables are price and production. The price p and the demand ζ are linked through the relationship ζ = g(p) + η, where g(p) is the riskless demand curve and η is a random variable. The general model allows for proportional ordering costs, convex holding and stockout costs, downward sloping riskless demand curve, backlogging, partial backlogging, lost sales, partial spoilage of inventory, and two modes of collecting revenue. Sufficient conditions are developed for this problem to have an optimal policy which resembles the single critical number policy known from stochastic inventory theory. It is also shown what set of parameters will satisfy these sufficiency conditions.     

Conceptualizing caveats for political research: Defining and measuring national reservations on the use of force during multinational military operations

The upsurge in post-Cold War coalition operations has stimulated research on caveats: national reservations on the use of force in multinational military operations. However, because the concept of caveats has no agreed-upon definition, it is used inconsistently. This in turn impedes comparing research findings across academic and policy studies and therefore systematic research. This article is a contribution to the scholarly debate on how the analytical concept of caveats are to be delimited. Crucially, we argue that caveats result from some calculated political decision, and should not be confused with reserved behavior due to financial and technical limitations, or lack of coordination. We suggest that caveats are empirically observed and measured in two ways: First, we argue that coalition rules of engagement should be used as a yardstick for measuring direct reservations on the use of force. Second, we suggest reservations on task-assignment and geographical mobility should be used to register indirect reservations.