Britain’s ‘Independent’ V-Bomber Force and US Nuclear Weapons, 1957–1962

This article examines a secret Anglo-American programme, Project ‘E’, which equipped the RAF’s V-bomber Force with US nuclear weapons for use in wartime. It shows Project ‘E’ was ineffective as a warhead supply programme and, furthermore, that it crippled the operational effectiveness of the V-bomber Force as a whole between 1958 and 1962. This article argues that as a result of Project ‘E’, the V-Force was neither operationally nor politically independent as a nuclear deterrent force. This challenges the traditional view of the V-Force as the benchmark of nuclear independence to assess the Skybolt, Polaris and Trident programmes.     

Hard Line: The Republican Party and US Foreign Policy since World War II Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment

This article examines the Dhofar campaign in Oman (1965–75), and the role Britain played in assisting the Omani royal government against left-wing insurgents. Using existing secondary sources and declassified British government papers, it reassesses the contribution of British military advisers and special forces to the counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign, the balance between military action and civil affairs, the external dimension of the conflict, and intelligence and covert operations. It concludes by assessing whether the Dhofar War offers any guidance to Western armed forces involved in contemporary COIN campaigns such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq.     

Programming the procurement of airlift and sealift forces: A linear programming model for analysis of the least-cost mix of strategic deployment systems

A linear programming model for analyzing the strategic deployment mix of airlift and sealift forces and prepositioning to accomplish the composite requirements of a set of possible contingencies is described in this paper. It solves for the least-cost mix of deployment means capable of meeting any one of a spectrum of contingencies, or meeting simultaneous contingencies. The model was developed by RAC as part of the U.S. Army's study program and has been used in analyses of deployment systems conducted in support of the U.S. Army, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Results of analyses have influenced the preparation of long-range plans as well as the formulation of the FY67 Department of Defense budget. The paper gives the background and assumptions of the model, describes the model by means of a simple hypothetical example followed by a selected subset of a complete version, and discusses how the model is used.     

Some constraints on shipping in linear programming models

This note describes some constraints that may be applied to shipping models structured as linear programming problems. These constraints defining port-throughput capability have proven useful in applications of linear programming by the author and provide additional realism in problems of vessel allocation and ship design selection. Increase in model size through the use of the constraints is in general mode rate.     

Maritime interdiction in Sri Lanka's counterinsurgency

A comprehensive maritime interdiction strategy to attack the insurgent's logistic system was a key element in the defeat of the Tamil Tigers. The campaign of maritime interdiction required the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) to attack LTTE arms smuggling, sea piracy, and maritime terrorism. The SLN degraded the insurgency's robust maritime logistical network while also devising tactics to engage the maritime insurgents who reacted with swarm and suicide boat tactics. The efforts of the SLN forced the Tamil Tigers to confront the government's final land offensives with diminished resources, thus collapsing a three decades’ old insurgency in a matter of months.     

THE GEOGRAPHY OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION NETWORKS

This article uses a geographic approach to examine one aspect of the nuclear black market: the coordinators who bring buyers and sellers together, and transport goods between them. The most important factor in determining the geographical structure of a proliferation network is the network coordinator's access (or lack thereof) to unique state resources. Coordinators with access to state resources and prerogatives can avoid embedding themselves in hostile countries or relying on commercial infrastructure, often leading to territorially diffuse logistical networks. Coordinators without such access are forced to rely on commercial infrastructure and favorable local political, economic, and social conditions, often resulting in territorially centralized logistical networks. This is illustrated through case studies of Abdul Qadeer Khan's supply networks to Pakistan, Libya, and Iran. The article concludes with some observations about the implications of a geographical approach for understanding nuclear proliferation networks.     

The centrality of checkpoints for civilians during conflict

Analyses of the violence–displacement relationship motivate a disaggregation of violence into violence in residential areas (home violence) and violence along migration routes (road violence). These two forms of violence have opposite effects upon displacement, with home violence increasing displacement and road violence decreasing displacement. Yet, conflict scholarship would benefit from additional consideration of the specific activities that constitute road violence. This consideration reveals that road violence primarily involves displacement-deterring violence at checkpoints. This motivates the question: How does checkpoint violence deter displacement? Using interviews with Syrian and Somali refugees, as well as daily data on violence and displacement in Somalia, this paper argues that state and non-state armed groups create and foster uncertainty at checkpoints. Then, they use dramatic violence that is tangible to civilians through their ability to physically see, hear, and smell evidence of it as propaganda. As propaganda, the deterrent effect of checkpoint violence is amplified beyond isolated violent events. More broadly, results from quantitative analysis of the daily data on violence and displacement in Somalia indicate that uncertainty about road violence (road uncertainty) and uncertainty about home violence (home uncertainty) amplify the effects of road violence and home violence, respectively.     

Asia-Pacific Demand for Military Expenditure: Spatial Panel and SUR Estimates

This article investigates the demand for military expenditure for a sample of key Asia-Pacific countries. Spatial panel demand estimates are presented for three joined spatial units using a fixed-coefficient spatial lag model based on a two-step efficient GMM estimator. Spatial autoregression estimates are next presented for 1991–2015, founded on alternative kinds of country connectivities, such as contiguity, inverse distance, discrete distance, and power-projection considerations. Finally, 11 select countries’ demands for defense equations are estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions. From alternative perspectives, these estimated models indicate how Asia-Pacific countries respond to the defense spending of other countries. In the spatial runs, free riding is prevalent despite the growing military might of China, which apparently is not generally viewed as a threat. For the sample period, the projection of Chinese or American power is a relevant spatial factor. The main threat is reflected in non-U.S. allies’ reaction to U.S. allies’ defense spending during 1991–2015 and to Chinese defense spending after 2002.