Evergreening and operational risk under price competition

“Evergreening” is a strategy wherein an innovative pharmaceutical firm introduces an upgrade of its current product when the patent on this product expires. The upgrade is introduced with a new patent and is designed to counter competition from generic manufacturers that seek to imitate the firm's existing product. However, this process is fraught with uncertainty because the upgrade is subject to stringent guidelines and faces approval risk. Thus, an incumbent firm has to make an upfront production capacity investment without clarity on whether the upgrade will reach the market. This uncertainty may also affect the capacity investment of a competing manufacturer who introduces a generic version of the incumbent's existing product but whose market demand depends on the success or failure of the upgrade. We analyze a game where capacity investment occurs before uncertainty resolution and firms compete on prices thereafter. Capacity considerations that arise due to demand uncertainty introduce new factors into the evergreening decision. Equilibrium analysis reveals that the upgrade's estimated approval probability needs to exceed a threshold for the incumbent to invest in evergreening. This threshold for evergreening increases as the intensity of competition in the generic market increases. If evergreening is optimal, the incumbent's capacity investment is either decreasing or nonmonotonic with respect to low end market competition depending on whether the level of product improvement in the upgrade is low or high. If the entrant faces a capacity constraint, then the probability threshold for evergreening is higher than the case where the entrant is not capacity constrained. Finally, by incorporating the risk‐return trade‐off that the incumbent faces in terms of the level of product improvement versus the upgrade success probability, we can characterize policy for a regulator. We show that the introduction of capacity considerations may maximize market coverage and/or social surplus at incremental levels of product improvement in the upgrade. This is contrary to the prevalent view of regulators who seek to curtail evergreening involving incremental product improvement. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 71–89, 2016     

Resource allocation with lumpy demand: To speed or not to speed?

In the classical EPQ model with continuous and constant demand, holding and setup costs are minimized when the production rate is no larger than the demand rate. However, the situation may change when demand is lumpy. We consider a firm that produces multiple products, each having a unique lumpy demand pattern. The decision involves determining both the lot size for each product and the allocation of resources for production rate improvements among the products. We find that each product's optimal production policy will take on only one of two forms: either continuous production or lot‐for‐lot production. The problem is then formulated as a nonlinear nonsmooth knapsack problem among products determined to be candidates for resource allocation. A heuristic procedure is developed to determine allocation amounts. The procedure decomposes the problem into a mixed integer program and a nonlinear convex resource allocation problem. Numerical tests suggest that the heuristic performs very well on average compared to the optimal solution. Both the model and the heuristic procedure can be extended to allow the company to simultaneously alter both the production rates and the incoming demand lot sizes through quantity discounts. Extensions can also be made to address the case where a single investment increases the production rate of multiple products. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

EUROPEAN DEFENCE FIRMS: THE INFORMATION BARRIER ON PRIVATE FINANCE*

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, European governments adopted a hands‐off policy towards the defence industrial base, in an attempt to increase the sector’s efficiency and reactivity. In this context, one topical issue is how to motivate defence firms to apply for private rather than public finance. Since banks have no prior experience with European defence firms, a problem of asymmetric information may block this transition. The problem is analysed within the framework of a game between defence firms and banks. It is shown that the Bayesian Equilibrium might correspond to a situation where low‐risk firms prefer the state‐financed scheme; yet, in a perfect information set‐up, the same firms would apply for bank credit. In order to facilitate the transition to private finance, the government might decide to subsidize investors who agree on financing defence firms; the state aid should be made available during a transitory learning period.     

The management of security incidents by private security

This article is about the management of security incidents in organisations and companies which are under the protection of private security personnel, whether in-house or contracted. Incidents can be defined as accidental or anecdotal (bird flies into a camera) to a violation of law or company policy. Managing security incidents is one of the key functions of a private security service provider. The purpose of this study is to explore the management of security incidents and the information related thereto, identify shortcomings and find solutions for managing these shortcomings. Interviews were used to gain insight from personnel within the private and government sectors which are served by the private security industry. It was found that security incidents are handled in a routine way by organisations from the different sectors. One major shortcoming is that security incidents and the information related thereto are not managed by security service providers according to an operational framework or model with the required infrastructure and resources. The significance of this study is for security incidents to be managed correctly, so that the information related thereto may be captured accurately, analysed and used proactively and reactively to improve physical protection systems, develop preventative strategies and provide actionable information products in order to reduce crime, increase detection rates and prevent losses.     

On the timing of adoption of multiproduct technologies

This article examines a game of multiproduct technology adoption. We consider a duopoly model in which firms choose when to switch from a traditional single-product technology to a more flexible and more expensive multiproduct technology. The multiproduct technology allows a firm to invade the other firm's market, creating a more competitive environment and reducing profits. We analyze this investment decision as a game of timing using two different equilibrium concepts. First, we utilize the “silent” equilibrium concept, where firms commit at time zero to a switching time. This concept would be applicable to situations where firms cannot observe each other's actions, or when the implementation of the technology requires long lead times and the investment decision is private information. Using this notion we find that both firms adopt the multiproduct technology simultaneously within a certain time interval. We then characterize this time interval in terms of cost and demand conditions. We also derive conditions under which sequential adoption of the multiproduct technology occurs. The second concept used is that of noisy equilibrium, where firms cannot precommit themselves to an adoption time. This concept is appropriate when investment decisions are common knowledge. In this case a firm can credibly threaten to immediately follow suit if the other firm decides to adopt. This threat is sufficient to ensure the collusive outcome where neither firm adopts the flexible technology. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

The impact of animal welfare regulations on firms' product offerings: Humane or organic product?

Increased public concerns about animal welfare have spurred new regulations to improve animals' treatment and living conditions. We study how these regulations affect firms' product offerings, prices, and profits. We consider two competing animal agriculture supply chains, each consisting of a supplier and a buyer. New regulations require firms to choose between offering humane or organic products, which are differentiated by animals' living conditions. We find that consumers' growing awareness of animal welfare encourages firms to offer organic products, which require the highest standards for animals' living conditions. We also show that tightening humane product standards and loosening organic product standards encourage firms to offer organic products—but with distinct pricing implications. The former leads to higher retail prices whereas the latter may lower retail prices. Depending on costs and consumers' awareness of animal welfare, a humane product may be priced higher or lower than an organic product. Furthermore, we provide conditions under which a regulator should offer a unit-cost or an investment cost subsidy to improve social welfare. We show that subsidies can encourage firms to change from offering humane to organic products, or vice versa, to enhance total social welfare.     

Coordination of pricing and inventory control across products

We consider the joint pricing and inventory‐control problem for a retailer who orders, stocks, and sells two products. Cross‐price effects exist between the two products, which means that the demand of each product depends on the prices of both products. We derive the optimal pricing and inventory‐control policy and show that this policy differs from the base‐stock list‐price policy, which is optimal for the one‐product problem. We find that the retailer can significantly improve profits by managing the two products jointly as opposed to independently, especially when the cross‐price demand elasticity is high. We also find that the retailer can considerably improve profits by using dynamic pricing as opposed to static pricing, especially when the demand is nonstationary. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Dynamic regulation on innovation and adoption of green technology with information asymmetry

This study investigates a regulator's dynamic policy to motivate firms' research on and adoption of green technology. In the proposed model, a firm makes unobservable efforts and can hide the technology's arrival from the regulator to avoid adoption costs. We find that the optimal policy follows a simple structure and induces part-time efforts, rather than the maximal effort reported in previous studies. In particular, the regulator should offer no subsidy before the arrival of a technology report, provide a one-time subsidy contingent upon that report, and always set a termination deadline. At the deadline, the firm is forced to select an external option that is associated with social costs. The optimal report-based subsidy decreases with time. Under the optimal policy, the firm works until an effort deadline, makes no effort thereafter, and reports the technology as soon as it arrives. This study also characterizes the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the optimal policy reduces to one that leads, in terms of throughout time, to effort that is maximal or minimal. Our results indicate that policymakers should implement a policy that compensates firms more in the present and less in the future.     

Collaboration in contingent capacities with information asymmetry

We study the optimal contracting problem between two firms collaborating on capacity investment with information asymmetry. Without a contract, system efficiency is lost due to the profit‐margin differentials among the firms, demand uncertainty, and information asymmetry. With information asymmetry, we demonstrate that the optimal capacity level is characterized by a newsvendor formula with an upward‐adjusted capacity investment cost, and no first‐best solution can be achieved. Our analysis shows that system efficiency can always be improved by the optimal contract and the improvement in system efficience is due to two factors. While the optimal contract may bring the system's capacity level closer to the first‐best capacity level, it prevents the higher‐margin firm from overinvesting and aligns the capacity‐investment decisions of the two firms. Our analysis of a special case demonstrates that, under some circumstances, both firms can benefit from the principal having better information about the agent's costs. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 54:, 2007     

Designing and pricing menus of extended warranty contracts

Extended warranties provide “piece of mind” to a consumer in that product failures which occur after the base warranty expires are rectified at little or no cost. They also provide an additional source of revenue for manufacturers or third‐party providers, such as retailers or insurance providers, and help cultivate consumer loyalty. In this article, we analyze a number of extended warranty contracts which differ in design, including restrictions on deferrals and renewals. With the use of dynamic programming, we compute the optimal strategy for a consumer with perfect information and determine the optimal pricing policy for the provider given the consumer's risk characterization. We also provide insight into when different contracts should be issued. Finally, we illustrate how profits can be dramatically increased by offering menus of warranty contracts, as opposed to stand alone contracts, with the use of integer programming. Surprisingly, risk‐taking consumers provide the greatest benefit to offering menus. These insights can help a company develop a comprehensive warranty planning strategy for given products or product lines. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Lateral capacity exchange and its impact on capacity investment decisions

We study the problem of capacity exchange between two firms in anticipation of the mismatch between demand and capacity, and its impact on firm's capacity investment decisions. For given capacity investment levels of the two firms, we demonstrate how capacity price may be determined and how much capacity should be exchanged when either manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader in the capacity exchange game. By benchmarking against the centralized system, we show that a side payment may be used to coordinate the capacity exchange decisions. We then study the firms' capacity investment decisions using a biform game framework in which capacity investment decisions are made individually and exchange decisions are made as in a centralized system. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium capacity investment levels and study the impact of firms' share of the capacity exchange surplus on their capacity investment levels.© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Multi-item service constrained (s,S) policies for spare parts logistics systems

Many organizations providing service support for products or families of products must allocate inventory investment among the parts (or, identically, items) that make up those products or families. The allocation decision is crucial in today's competitive environment in which rapid response and low levels of inventory are both required for providing competitive levels of customer service in marketing a firm's products. This is particularly important in high-tech industries, such as computers, military equipment, and consumer appliances. Such rapid response typically implies regional and local distribution points for final products and for spare parts for repairs. In this article we fix attention on a given product or product family at a single location. This single-location problem is the basic building block of multi-echelon inventory systems based on level-by-level decomposition, and our modeling approach is developed with this application in mind. The product consists of field-replaceable units (i.e., parts), which are to be stocked as spares for field service repair. We assume that each part will be stocked at each location according to an (s, S) stocking policy. Moreover, we distinguish two classes of demand at each location: customer (or emergency) demand and normal replenishment demand from lower levels in the multiechelon system. The basic problem of interest is to determine the appropriate policies (s_i S_i) for each part i in the product under consideration. We formulate an approximate cost function and service level constraint, and we present a greedy heuristic algorithm for solving the resulting approximate constrained optimization problem. We present experimental results showing that the heuristics developed have good cost performance relative to optimal. We also discuss extensions to the multiproduct component commonality problem.     

Country Survey XIII: Japan's security posture and defense industry prospects

Defense budgets in Japan have been complicated compromises from numerous inputs ‐ including threat perceptions, domestic industrial/technological base development, support for the bilateral security treaty with the United States and internal bureaucratic politics ‐ but with the fall of the former Soviet Union, the clearest justification for higher spending disappeared. Double‐digit defense spending increases that were common in the 1980s have been replaced by annual increases lower than present inflation rates, resulting in negative real growth in the country's defense budget. Domestic economic problems and consistent government pressures for smaller budgets have further slowed annual growth in total spending and have contributed to lower procurement budgets. As a result, the domestic Japanese defense industry is facing far more constrained conditions from the growth years of a decade before.

Government policymakers are examining Japan's regional security environment as well as its alliance with the United States to determine the appropriate course for the country to take in the coming years. The formal security treaty with the United States is likely to remain a major element of government positions, but other aspects of the country's overall security posture are open to debate. Perceptions of a reduced threat environment are fueling additional pressures for defense budget cuts.

The domestic defense industry seeks means to assure its survival in domestic defense markets in this constrained environment. Expansion into overseas markets to offset declining domestic markets is an option that currently is constrained by policy restrictions on arms exports. Industry is advocating re‐examination of those policies and unlike earlier years, government appears willing to respond positively but cautiously to this lobbying.     

Optimal base stock policies and truck capacity in a two-echelon system

With the recent trend toward just-in-time deliveries and reduction of inventories, many firms are reexamining their inventory and logistics policies. Some firms have dramatically altered their inventory, production, and shipping policies with the goal of reducing costs and improving service. Part of this restructuring may involve a specific contract with a trucking company, or it may entail establishing in-house shipping capabilities. This restructuring, however, raises new questions regarding the choice of optimal trucking capacity, shipping frequency, and inventory levels. In this study, we examine a two-level distribution system composed of a warehouse and a retailer. We assume that demand at the retailer is random. Since the warehouse has no advance notice of the size of the retailer order, inventory must be held there as well as at the retailer. We examine inventory policies at both the warehouse and the retailer, and we explicitly consider the trucking capacity, and the frequency of deliveries from the warehouse to the retailer. Both linear and concave fixed transportation costs are examined. We find the optimal base stock policies at both locations, the optimal in-house or contracted regular truck capacity, and the optimal review period (or, equivalently, delivery frequency). For the case of normally distributed demand we provide analytical results and numerical examples that yield insight into systems of this type. Some of our results are counterintuitive. For instance, we find some cases in which the optimal truck capacity decreases as the variability of demand increases. In other cases the truck capacity increases with variability of demand. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

New product introduction against a predator: A bilevel mixed‐integer programming approach

We consider a scenario with two firms determining which products to develop and introduce to the market. In this problem, there exists a finite set of potential products and market segments. Each market segment has a preference list of products and will buy its most preferred product among those available. The firms play a Stackelberg game in which the leader firm first introduces a set of products, and the follower responds with its own set of products. The leader's goal is to maximize its profit subject to a product introduction budget, assuming that the follower will attempt to minimize the leader's profit using a budget of its own. We formulate this problem as a multistage integer program amenable to decomposition techniques. Using this formulation, we develop three variations of an exact mathematical programming method for solving the multistage problem, along with a family of heuristic procedures for estimating the follower solution. The efficacy of our approaches is demonstrated on randomly generated test instances. This article contributes to the operations research literature a multistage algorithm that directly addresses difficulties posed by degeneracy, and contributes to the product variety literature an exact optimization algorithm for a novel competitive product introduction problem. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Warranty policies and burn-in

Warranty is an important factor for consumer durable products in the marketplace. However, the warranty cost may drastically reduce profitability. Burn in is a common procedure to improve the quality of products after they have been produced, but it is also costly. By taking both the burn-in procedure and warranty policy into consideration, several cost functions can be formulated and optimized. Assuming that the failure-rate function of the product has a bathtub shape, it is shown that the optimal burn-in times that minimize the considered cost functions never exceed the first change point of the failure-rate function. The continuous dependence of the optimal burn-in times on the model parameters and the underlying distribution is also established. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 199–209, 1997     

Lost in transition: the South African military and counterinsurgency

Washington's growing reliance upon international private security companies (PSCs) will lead to these firms becoming prominent vehicles in the prosecution of the counterinsurgency in Iraq. This shift, however, risks labeling PSCs as mercenaries and presents considerable challenges regarding the control of non-state violence. Moreover, tradeoffs exist regarding the different nationalities of PSC personnel. Utilization of personnel from the developed world risks compromising the capabilities of Special Operations Forces. Additionally, shifts in casualty recognition amongst US policymakers and the media suggest that the private option is becoming politically salient and thus less useful. Many developing world states are increasingly concerned about how the global outsourcing of security sector expertise risks their stability and ability to execute coherent policy. Finally, the employment of Iraqis in PSCs sends mixed messages to the Iraqi populace about the need for and the effectiveness of a cohesive and responsible indigenous security sector.

Frankly, I'd like to see the government get out of war altogether and leave the whole feud to private industry.

[Catch-22 – Major Milo Minderbinder]     

Maximization of long-run average rate-of-return by stochastic approximation

Suppose that an individual has a surplus stock of wealth and a fixed set of risky investment opportunities over a sequence of time periods. Assuming the criterion of maximal long-run average rate-of-return, the individual may select portfolios sequentially via a modified stochastic approximation procedure. This approach yields optimal asymptotic investment results under minimal assumptions.     

Information theory for ranking and selection

We study the classical ranking and selection problem, where the ultimate goal is to find the unknown best alternative in terms of the probability of correct selection or expected opportunity cost. However, this paper adopts an alternative sampling approach to achieve this goal, where sampling decisions are made with the objective of maximizing information about the unknown best alternative, or equivalently, minimizing its Shannon entropy. This adaptive learning is formulated via a Bayesian stochastic dynamic programming problem, by which several properties of the learning problem are presented, including the monotonicity of the optimal value function in an information-seeking setting. Since the state space of the stochastic dynamic program is unbounded in the Gaussian setting, a one-step look-ahead approach is used to develop a policy. The proposed policy seeks to maximize the one-step information gain about the unknown best alternative, and therefore, it is called information gradient (IG). It is also proved that the IG policy is consistent, that is, as the sampling budget grows to infinity, the IG policy finds the true best alternative almost surely. Later, a computationally efficient estimate of the proposed policy, called approximated information gradient (AIG), is introduced and in the numerical experiments its performance is tested against recent benchmarks alongside several sensitivity analyses. Results show that AIG performs competitively against other algorithms from the literature.     

The value of losing control: Competition in markets for complements

When selling complementary products, manufacturers can often benefit from considering the resulting cross‐market interdependencies. Although using independent retailers makes it difficult to internalize these positive externalities, the ensuing double marginalization can mitigate within‐market competition. We use standard game theoretic analysis to determine optimal distribution channel strategies (through independent retailers or integrated) for competing manufacturers who participate in markets for complements. Our results suggest that a firm's optimal channel choice is highly dependent on its competitive positioning. A firm with a competitive advantage in terms of product characteristics (customer preferences) or production capabilities (cost) might benefit from selling through company‐controlled stores, allowing coordinated pricing across the two markets, whereas a less competitive firm might be better off using independent channel intermediaries to mitigate price competition. We consider two scenarios depending on whether the two firms make their distribution channel decisions sequentially or simultaneously. Although firms are unlikely to make such decisions at exactly the same instant, the simultaneous model also serves as a proxy for the scenario where firms decide sequentially, but where they cannot observe each other's strategic channel choices. For the sequential case, we find that the sequence of entry can have tremendous impact on the two firms'profits; whereas in some cases, the first mover can achieve substantially higher profits, we find that when the two markets are of sufficiently different size and only loosely related, a firm with a competitive advantage might be better off as a follower. Interestingly, our results suggest that, when the markets are of rather similar size, both firms are better off if they enter the industry sequentially. In those cases, the first entrant has incentive to reveal its planned channel strategies, and the follower has incentive to seek out and consider this information. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010