Social benefits of government investment in enterprises

A critical issue for many governments is boosting the adoption rates of products or technologies that enhance consumer surplus or total social welfare. Governments may, for example, pay subsidies to producers or to consumers to stimulate the manufacture or consumption of specific products, for example, energy-efficient appliances or more effective drugs. This research proposes a strategic government investment policy, namely, share acquisition, and demonstrates its effectiveness in reaching societal objectives. We consider a Cournot quantities-choice market comprised of homogeneous firms where the government intervenes to buy shares, and turning private firms into state-owned enterprises. We recognize that purchasing a single private firm is the optimal policy for the government to reach its societal objectives. Additionally, taking into consideration financial constraints, we find that the optimal stake increases with the budget. Compared with the optimal output-based subsidy policy, when the budget is low, the optimal government investment policy induces a higher consumer surplus. In addition, in differentiated Cournot competition, under which firms compete in selling substitutable products, we find that when the budget is sufficient, the optimal stake purchased first decreases and then increases according to the substitutability level among products.     

To wait or not to wait: Optimal ordering under lead time uncertainty and forecast updating

There has been a dramatic increase over the past decade in the number of firms that source finished product from overseas. Although this has reduced procurement costs, it has increased supply risk; procurement lead times are longer and are often unreliable. In deciding when and how much to order, firms must consider the lead time risk and the demand risk, i.e., the accuracy of their demand forecast. To improve the accuracy of its demand forecast, a firm may update its forecast as the selling season approaches. In this article we consider both forecast updating and lead time uncertainty. We characterize the firm's optimal procurement policy, and we prove that, with multiplicative forecast revisions, the firm's optimal procurement time is independent of the demand forecast evolution but that the optimal procurement quantity is not. This leads to a number of important managerial insights into the firm's planning process. We show that the firm becomes less sensitive to lead time variability as the forecast updating process becomes more efficient. Interestingly, a forecast‐updating firm might procure earlier than a firm with no forecast updating. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

On the timing of adoption of multiproduct technologies

This article examines a game of multiproduct technology adoption. We consider a duopoly model in which firms choose when to switch from a traditional single-product technology to a more flexible and more expensive multiproduct technology. The multiproduct technology allows a firm to invade the other firm's market, creating a more competitive environment and reducing profits. We analyze this investment decision as a game of timing using two different equilibrium concepts. First, we utilize the “silent” equilibrium concept, where firms commit at time zero to a switching time. This concept would be applicable to situations where firms cannot observe each other's actions, or when the implementation of the technology requires long lead times and the investment decision is private information. Using this notion we find that both firms adopt the multiproduct technology simultaneously within a certain time interval. We then characterize this time interval in terms of cost and demand conditions. We also derive conditions under which sequential adoption of the multiproduct technology occurs. The second concept used is that of noisy equilibrium, where firms cannot precommit themselves to an adoption time. This concept is appropriate when investment decisions are common knowledge. In this case a firm can credibly threaten to immediately follow suit if the other firm decides to adopt. This threat is sufficient to ensure the collusive outcome where neither firm adopts the flexible technology. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Optimal control of a production‐inventory system with both backorders and lost sales

We consider the optimal control of a production inventory‐system with a single product and two customer classes where items are produced one unit at a time. Upon arrival, customer orders can be fulfilled from existing inventory, if there is any, backordered, or rejected. The two classes are differentiated by their backorder and lost sales costs. At each decision epoch, we must determine whether or not to produce an item and if so, whether to use this item to increase inventory or to reduce backlog. At each decision epoch, we must also determine whether or not to satisfy demand from a particular class (should one arise), backorder it, or reject it. In doing so, we must balance inventory holding costs against the costs of backordering and lost sales. We formulate the problem as a Markov decision process and use it to characterize the structure of the optimal policy. We show that the optimal policy can be described by three state‐dependent thresholds: a production base‐stock level and two order‐admission levels, one for each class. The production base‐stock level determines when production takes place and how to allocate items that are produced. This base‐stock level also determines when orders from the class with the lower shortage costs (Class 2) are backordered and not fulfilled from inventory. The order‐admission levels determine when orders should be rejected. We show that the threshold levels are monotonic (either nonincreasing or nondecreasing) in the backorder level of Class 2. We also characterize analytically the sensitivity of these thresholds to the various cost parameters. Using numerical results, we compare the performance of the optimal policy against several heuristics and show that those that do not allow for the possibility of both backordering and rejecting orders can perform poorly.© 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2010     

The effect of prior assumptions on the expected cost of m/m/1 queueing systems with unknown arrival rate

In this study we deal with the determination of optimal service rate in an M/M/1 queue. The arrival rate is unknown and assumed to be a random variable with a known distribution function. Holding and operating costs are considered and service rate is determined to minimize total expected discounted costs for infinite horizon. The effects of the arrival rate's distribution properties on the characteristics of the system are examined.     

The impact of animal welfare regulations on firms' product offerings: Humane or organic product?

Increased public concerns about animal welfare have spurred new regulations to improve animals' treatment and living conditions. We study how these regulations affect firms' product offerings, prices, and profits. We consider two competing animal agriculture supply chains, each consisting of a supplier and a buyer. New regulations require firms to choose between offering humane or organic products, which are differentiated by animals' living conditions. We find that consumers' growing awareness of animal welfare encourages firms to offer organic products, which require the highest standards for animals' living conditions. We also show that tightening humane product standards and loosening organic product standards encourage firms to offer organic products—but with distinct pricing implications. The former leads to higher retail prices whereas the latter may lower retail prices. Depending on costs and consumers' awareness of animal welfare, a humane product may be priced higher or lower than an organic product. Furthermore, we provide conditions under which a regulator should offer a unit-cost or an investment cost subsidy to improve social welfare. We show that subsidies can encourage firms to change from offering humane to organic products, or vice versa, to enhance total social welfare.     

Supplier‐buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation

We consider the problem of designing a contract to maximize the supplier's profit in a one‐supplier–one‐buyer relationship for a short‐life‐cycle product. Demand for the finished product is stochastic and price‐sensitive, and only its probability distribution is known when the supply contract is written. When the supplier has complete information on the marginal cost of the buyer, we show that several simple contracts can induce the buyer to choose order quantity that attains the single firm profit maximizing solution, resulting in the maximum possible profit for the supplier. When the marginal cost of the buyer is private information, we show that it is no longer possible to achieve the single firm solution. In this case, the optimal order quantity is always smaller while the optimal sale price of the finished product is higher than the single firm solution. The supplier's profit is lowered while that of the buyer is improved. Moreover, a buyer who has a lower marginal cost will extract more profit from the supplier. Under the optimal contract, the supplier employs a cutoff level policy on the buyer's marginal cost to determine whether the buyer should be induced to sign the contract. We characterize the optimal cutoff level and show how it depends on the parameters of the problem. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 41–64, 2001     

Competition under time‐varying demands and dynamic lot sizing costs

We develop a competitive pricing model which combines the complexity of time‐varying demand and cost functions and that of scale economies arising from dynamic lot sizing costs. Each firm can replenish inventory in each of the T periods into which the planning horizon is partitioned. Fixed as well as variable procurement costs are incurred for each procurement order, along with inventory carrying costs. Each firm adopts, at the beginning of the planning horizon, a (single) price to be employed throughout the horizon. On the basis of each period's system of demand equations, these prices determine a time series of demands for each firm, which needs to service them with an optimal corresponding dynamic lot sizing plan. We establish the existence of a price equilibrium and associated optimal dynamic lotsizing plans, under mild conditions. We also design efficient procedures to compute the equilibrium prices and dynamic lotsizing plans.© 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Simultaneous price,location, and capacity decisions on a line of time‐sensitive customers

Consider a monopolist who sells a single product to time‐sensitive customers located on a line segment. Customers send their orders to the nearest distribution facility, where the firm processes (customizes) these orders on a first‐come, first‐served basis before delivering them. We examine how the monopolist would locate its facilities, set their capacities, and price the product offered to maximize profits. We explicitly model customers' waiting costs due to both shipping lead times and queueing congestion delays and allow each customer to self‐select whether she orders or not, based on her reservation price. We first analyze the single‐facility problem and derive a number of interesting insights regarding the optimal solution. We show, for instance, that the optimal capacity relates to the square root of the customer volume and that the optimal price relates additively to the capacity and transportation delay costs. We also compare our solutions to a similar problem without congestion effects. We then utilize our single‐facility results to treat the multi‐facility problem. We characterize the optimal policy for serving a fixed interval of customers from multiple facilities when customers are uniformly distributed on a line. We also show how as the length of the customer interval increases, the optimal policy relates to the single‐facility problem of maximizing expected profit per unit distance. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Coordinated dynamic control of marketing and production

We study the dynamic profit maximization problem for a firm exercising control on both marketing and production. The firs marketing effort impacts the current‐period demand, which in turn affects future demand in a dissipating fashion. Under linear‐cost and zero‐leadtime assumptions, we show that the firm should follow base‐point rules for both marketing and production, whereas trends of the base points reflect a certain complementarity between marketing and production. We obtain comparable results when marketing costs are convex. Our computational study identifies conditions under which simple fixed‐marketing‐effort and fixed‐marketing‐target heuristics would perform well. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Optimal redesign decisions through failure rate estimates

To reduce the time-to-market of newly developed systems, manufacturers increasingly adopt strategies where systems are brought to market while system field reliability is still uncertain. These systems are typically sold under performance-based contracts, which incentivizes potential customers to invest in them despite reliability uncertainty. Such contracts make the manufacturer (partly) responsible for the availability of the system. Subsequently, when field reliability is lower than anticipated, the manufacturer may choose to redesign the system to avoid high contract penalties. Redesign is a costly effort which may substantially increase field reliability. Deciding when to redesign is challenging, especially because the initial failure rate estimate by the system's engineers is refined over time as failure data accrues. We propose a model that endogenizes the failure rate updating to analyze this tactical redesign decision. We study additive and multiplicative redesigns and show that the optimal policy has a control limit structure. We benchmark our optimal policy against a static counterpart numerically, and conclude that basing redesign decisions on the updated estimate of the failure rate can substantially reduce costs.     

The incentive effect of acceptance sampling plans in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This article studies a firm that procures a product from a supplier. The quality of each product unit is measured by a continuous variable that follows a normal distribution and is correlated within a batch. The firm conducts an inspection and pays the supplier only if the product batch passes the inspection. The inspection not only serves the purpose of preventing a bad batch from reaching customers but also offers the supplier an incentive to improve product quality. The firm determines the acceptance sampling plan, and the supplier determines the quality effort level in either a simultaneous game or a Stackelberg leadership game, in which both parties share inspection cost and recall loss caused by low product quality. In the simultaneous game, we identify the Nash equilibrium form, provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and find parameter settings under which the decentralized and centralized supply chains achieve the same outcome. By numerical experiments, we show that the firm's acceptance sampling plan and the supplier's quality effort level are sensitive to both the recall loss sharing ratio and the game format (i.e., the precommitment assumption of the inspection policy). © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Periodic review inventory management with contingent use of two freight modes with fixed costs

We study a stochastic inventory model of a firm that periodically orders a product from a make‐to‐order manufacturer. Orders can be shipped by a combination of two freight modes that differ in lead‐times and costs, although orders are not allowed to cross. Placing an order as well as each use of each freight mode has a fixed and a quantity proportional cost. The decision of how to allocate units between the two freight modes utilizes information about demand during the completion of manufacturing. We derive the optimal freight mode allocation policy, and show that the optimal policy for placing orders is not an (s,S) policy in general. We provide tight bounds for the optimal policy that can be calculated by solving single period problems. Our analysis enables insights into the structure of the optimal policy specifying the conditions under which it simplifies to an (s,S) policy. We characterize the best (s,S) policy for our model, and through extensive numerical investigation show that its performance is comparable with the optimal policy in most cases. Our numerical study also sheds light on the benefits of the dual freight model over the single freight models. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Selling to strategic and loss‐averse consumers: Stocking,procurement, and product design policies

Motivated by the presence of loss‐averse decision making behavior in practice, this article considers a supply chain consisting of a firm and strategic consumers who possess an S‐shaped loss‐averse utility function. In the model, consumers decide the purchase timing and the firm chooses the inventory level. We find that the loss‐averse consumers' strategic purchasing behavior is determined by their perceived gain and loss from strategic purchase delay, and the given rationing risk. Thus, the firm that is cognizant of this property tailors its inventory stocking policy based on the consumers' loss‐averse behavior such as their perceived values of gain and loss, and their sensitivity to them. We also demonstrate that the firm's equilibrium inventory stocking policy reflects both the economic logic of the traditional newsvendor inventory model, and the loss‐averse behavior of consumers. The equilibrium order quantity is significantly different from those derived from models that assume that the consumers are risk neutral and homogeneous in their valuations. We show that the firm that ignores strategic consumer's loss‐aversion behavior tends to keep an unnecessarily high inventory level that leads to excessive leftovers. Our numerical experiments further reveal that in some extreme cases the firm that ignores strategic consumer's loss‐aversion behavior generates almost 92% more leftovers than the firm that possesses consumers’ loss‐aversion information and takes it into account when making managerial decisions. To mitigate the consumer's forward‐looking behavior, we propose the adoption of the practice of agile supply chain management, which possesses the following attributes: (i) procuring inventory after observing real‐time demand information, (ii) enhanced design (which maintains the current production mix but improves the product performance to a higher level), and (iii) customized design (which maintains the current performance level but increases the variety of the current production line to meet consumers’ specific demands). We show that such a practice can induce the consumer to make early purchases by increasing their rationing risk, increasing the product value, or diversifying the product line. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 435–453, 2015     

A dynamic,nonstationary inventory problem for a price/quantity setting firm

A dynamic and nonstationary model is formulated for a firm which attempts to minimize total expected costs over a finite planning horizon. The control variables are price and production. The price p and the demand ζ are linked through the relationship ζ = g(p) + η, where g(p) is the riskless demand curve and η is a random variable. The general model allows for proportional ordering costs, convex holding and stockout costs, downward sloping riskless demand curve, backlogging, partial backlogging, lost sales, partial spoilage of inventory, and two modes of collecting revenue. Sufficient conditions are developed for this problem to have an optimal policy which resembles the single critical number policy known from stochastic inventory theory. It is also shown what set of parameters will satisfy these sufficiency conditions.     

On parallel machine replacement problems with general replacement cost functions and stochastic deterioration

The parallel machine replacement problem consists of finding a minimum cost replacement policy for a finite population of economically interdependent machines. In this paper, we formulate a stochastic version of the problem and analyze the structure of optimal policies under general classes of replacement cost functions. We prove that for problems with arbitrary cost functions, there can be optimal policies where a machine is replaced only if all machines in worse states are replaced (Worse Cluster Replacement Rule). We then show that, for problems with replacement cost functions exhibiting nonincreasing marginal costs, there are optimal policies such that, in any stage, machines in the same state are either all kept or all replaced (No‐Splitting Rule). We also present an example that shows that economies of scale in replacement costs do not guarantee optimal policies that satisfy the No‐Splitting Rule. These results lead to the fundamental insight that replacement decisions are driven by marginal costs, and not by economies of scale as suggested in the literature. Finally, we describe how the optimal policy structure, i.e., the No‐Splitting and Worse Cluster Replacement Rules, can be used to reduce the computational effort required to obtain optimal replacement policies. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

Dynamic inventory control with limited capital and short‐term financing

For most firms, especially the small‐ and medium‐sized ones, the operational decisions are affected by their internal capital and ability to obtain external capital. However, the majority of the literature on dynamic inventory control ignores the firm's financial status and financing issues. An important question that arises is: what are the optimal inventory and financing policies for firms with limited internal capital and limited access to external capital? In this article, we study a dynamic inventory control problem where a capital‐constrained firm periodically purchases a product from a supplier and sells it to a market with random demands. In each period, the firm can use its own capital and/or borrow a short‐term loan to purchase the product, with the interest rate being nondecreasing in the loan size. The objective is to maximize the firm's expected terminal wealth at the end of the planning horizon. We show that the optimal inventory policy in each period is an equity‐level‐dependent base‐stock policy, where the equity level is the sum of the firm's capital level and the value of its on‐hand inventory evaluated at the purchasing cost; and the structure of the optimal policy can be characterized by four intervals of the equity level. Our results shed light on the dynamic inventory control for firms with limited capital and short‐term financing capabilities.Copyright © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 184–201, 2014     

Decentralized admission control of a queueing system: A game‐theoretic model

Consider a distributed system where many gatekeepers share a single server. Customers arrive at each gatekeeper according to independent Poisson processes with different rates. Upon arrival of a new customer, the gatekeeper has to decide whether to admit the customer by sending it to the server, or to block it. Blocking costs nothing. The gatekeeper receives a reward after a customer completes the service, and incurs a cost if an admitted customer finds a busy server and therefore has to leave the system. Assuming an exponential service distribution, we formulate the problem as an n‐person non‐zero‐sum game in which each gatekeeper is interested in maximizing its own long‐run average reward. The key result is that each gatekeeper's optimal policy is that of a threshold type regardless what other gatekeepers do. We then derive Nash equilibria and discuss interesting insights. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 702–718, 2003.     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Environmental regulation in project‐based industries

We study the environmental regulation of industrial activities that are organized as projects. Applications arise in construction, ship and aircraft building, and film making, among other industries. Relative to manufacturing, environmental regulation is different in project‐based industries, due to the uniqueness and geographical diversity of projects, and a lack of product takeback programs. Because the amount of waste and pollution generated by project companies can be large, regulators need environmental policies to ensure reduction of waste and pollution. We consider a regulator who attempts to maximize social welfare. We model this problem as a bilevel nonlinear program. The upper level regulator specifies waste reduction targets, which the lower level project companies meet using waste stream reduction and remediation of pollution, while attempting to control their project costs. We find that high waste diversion targets lead to outcomes with little pollution, but excessive project costs and only modest waste stream reduction. Projects that have lower task precedence density, or that have pollutants with different environmental impacts, show larger increases in project cost and time resulting from regulation. We describe a subsidy for waste stream reduction that coordinates the system, and we estimate the value of coordination. We also describe a bonus that encourages truthful reporting by project companies, and evaluate the relative cost and effectiveness of the subsidy and the bonus. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 228–247, 2015