The impact of arms production on the South African manufacturing industry

The 1977 UN arms embargo was one of the main factors which led South Africa to establish a largely self sufficient import‐substituting arms industry capable of meeting the apartheid state's demand for sophisticated weaponry. While macroeconomic studies suggest that high military spending had a damaging effect on economic growth, no studies have investigated the disaggregated impact of military expenditure on industrial development. This paper applies panel data methods to the Industrial Development Corporation's Sectoral Database in order to analyse the level effects of military spending.     

The financing factor in military trade

Available sources value transfers of weapons irrespective of whether they are paid for and how. Data from the U.S. indicates that the shares of arms given for free or on credit are high. If other arms exporters, all military aid and all credits used for military purposes are considered, which is done here on the basis of rough estimates and an opportunity cost model, the true cash costs of weapons in the year of the actual transfer are small. On the other hand, the financial burden of earlier arms imports via debt service has grown over time. It most probably exceeded the true cash cost of imports of arms in the late 1980s. Large differences between arms transfer data and the actual true costs of arms transfers means that analysis of the economic effects of arms imports without considering these financial aspects makes little sense.     

The disconnect between arms control and DDR in peace processes

The article discusses the disconnect between arms control and disarmament practices vis-à-vis peacebuilding practices. It critically analyzes Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) practices focusing on their absence of dialogue with international arms control and disarmament (ACD) practices. It proposes that a conversation between experts involved in these distinct practices could promote a political discussion on the place of weapons held by state and non-state actors in times of peace. The argument is illustrated through an analysis of the treatment of rules on weapons in the Colombian peace process (2012–present) with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The article concludes that the disconnect between the arms control and disarmament and the peacebuilding associations, as seen in the context of DDR practices, reinstates the rule on the monopoly of violence by the state, preventing a broader discussion of the role of weapons and violence in the building of political communities.     

Defense spending and economic growth across the Taiwan straits: a threshold regression model

This paper employs both linear and non‐linear models to investigate the relationship between national defense spending and economic growth for Taiwan and China. Using data from 1953–2000 on defense spending, GDP, import, export and capital, we find that China's defense spending leads that of Taiwan. There exists the phenomenon of an arms race between both countries when official Chinese data are used. On the one hand, feedback relations prevail between economic growth and defense spending growth in Taiwan. On the other hand, China's national defense is found to lead economic growth.     

The role and capabilities of major weapon systems transferred between 1950 and 2010: Empirical examinations of an arms transfer data set

Arms transfers provide exporters an avenue to provide security to other states while gaining economic benefits. Arms transfers provide importers an avenue to gain security without having to rely on alliances. Past research uses aggregate measures of the monetary or security value of major weapon system transfers without accounting for strategic differences in possible use in interstate and civil conflict. This article presents a data set on interstate transfers of major weapon systems between 1950 and 2010 building upon Stockholm Peach Research Institute’s Arms Trade Register with several improvements. First, it disaggregates land weapons and air weapons into categories reflecting their strategic capabilities. Second, model level characteristics (e.g. age, speed, and range) are drawn from Jane’s Defence sources. Additionally, the data set covers a larger range of time and states than previous data sets categorizing arms. To demonstrate the usefulness, this article first presents summary statistics of the data set and then replicates an earlier test to show that the effect of human rights and regime types on United States transfers differs across the categories of arms compared to alternative measures of arms transfers.     

ON THE USE OF TERROR WEAPONS VERSUS MODERN WEAPON SYSTEMS IN AN ARMS RACE BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Some of the most active arms races are taking place between developed and less developed countries. The inability of less developed countries to compete financially, as well as technologically, with developed countries may be forcing the former to acquire terror weapons (TWP). The Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s and the events of 9/11 proved that the use of TWP is no longer a mere threat; there are several organizations and countries that will not hesitate to use them. This study develops a model of resource allocation in an arms race between a developed country that is characterized by state‐of‐the‐art technology and high GDP, and a less developed country whose technological capability and GDP are much lower. The model is used to predict the optimal mix of weapons of the two countries that are engaged in the arms race. Applying the model to the arms race between Israel and Syria demonstrates its use.     

DETERMINING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

This paper models the determination of the defence industrial base – the number of different military systems a country decides to maintain. High R&D costs means that few countries can afford to produce major weapons systems and the producers also import systems. Non‐producers rely on imports and we assume their demand is driven by regional arms races. Military capability is determined by the number of systems and the quantity and quality of each. We examine how the defence industrial base is influenced by military expenditures, R&D costs, export controls, the nature of regional arms races and a variety of other factors.     

Country survey XVI the defence sector in the economy of a declining superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965-2001

The Soviet Union was able to develop a large military-industrial complex and become the world's second superpower despite deficiencies in its centrally planned economy because defence was given high priority status and special planning, rationing and administrative mechanisms were used to attain national security objectives. However, in the period 1976-85 the effectiveness of priority protection diminished and defence institutions experienced more of the problems typical of the shortage economic system. The heavy defence burden also created growing difficulties for the civilian economy. The attempts by the Gorbachev government to reform the defence sector and improve defence-economic relationships during perestroika (1985-91) uniformly failed. For most of the transition period, the Russian military-industrial complex has been adversely affected by its low priority status, cuts in defence spending, instability of the hybrid politico-economic system, and negative growth of the economy. The armed forces and defence industry have been reduced in size and their outputs of military services and equipment have fallen to low levels. Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces still have over one million troops, significant stocks of sophisticated conventional weapons, and a large nuclear arsenal. The government of President Putin has raised the priority of the defence sector, increased real defence spending, and adopted ambitious plans to revive Russian military power. It is likely, though, that tight resource constraints will hamper efforts to reform the armed forces and to upgrade weapons. By 2010 Russia will be an important, but not dominant, military power in Eurasia.     

Arms Control,Proliferation and Terrorism: The Bush Administration's Post-September 11 Security Strategy

The current Bush Administration considers ‘outlaw regimes’ and their terrorist clients acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the gravest danger to international security. Thus, arms control, proliferation and terrorism are inextricably linked. The administration also believes that arms control and non-proliferation, as traditionally practiced, do not provide effective tools for preventing WMD spread. As evidenced in Iraq, Washington subscribes to an interventionist policy of rolling back WMD programs it considers threatening. This article examines the logic that underpins US arms control and proliferation thinking and considers the implications of US policy for relations with other states deemed to be proliferation risks.     

Is there a Greek‐Turkish arms race?: Evidence from cointegration and causality tests†

Greece and Turkey are both members of NATO and are two of the principal players in the Balkan region. Their respective defence burdens (i.e. the share of military expenditure to GDP) are the highest in NATO. Their bilateral relations are marred by serious friction and conflict of interest and have on a number of occasions come close to an armed confrontation. Their strategic interaction and mutual weapons build‐up has recently attracted the attention of researchers in the field testing the hypothesis of a Greek‐Turkish arms race with conflicting results. This paper, using cointegration and causality tests, finds evidence of a systematic armaments competition between the two countries provided that a defence policy regime shift estimated to occur in 1985 is explicitly taken into consideration. This policy regime change is associated with the stagnation of defence spending in Greece owing to the gradual deterioration of Greek public finances over the last decade.     

Potential and actual arms production: Implications for the arms trade debate

In this paper I develop indices and rankings of potential and actual arms production for about one hundred and fifty countries for data pertaining to the early to mid‐1990s. The countries’ ranked indices are then compared. I find evidence that countries that can produce arms (potential) do produce arms (actual). I also compare the current findings to findings published nine years ago, pertaining to potential and actual arms production in developing nations for the early 1980s. A number of countries then having the potential to produce arms have, in fact, become major arms producers ten years later. The results presented in this paper carry policy implications for the arms trade debate: shall policymakers continue to focus on arms supply restriction and continue to ignore the increasing capacity of developing nations to self‐supply their arms demand?     

Strategic “defensivism” and post-reset blues: US–Russian nuclear arms reductions,missile defenses and minimum deterrence

US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.     

Arms trade,arms control,and security: Collective action issues

This article puts forth collection action as a unifying theme for the conference essays on arms trade, control, and production. For each of these topics, collective action failures are related to group size and group composition considerations. Other issues are also examined including the manner in which individual contributions determine the overall level of the associated collective good ‐ the so‐called aggregation technology of public supply. Based on alternative aggregation technologies, the game‐theoretic underpinnings of these arms issues are explored.     

Country survey XII: South Africa

This article examines the relationship between defence expenditure and economic performance in South Africa, both prior to and after that country's first fully democratic election in 1994. Prior to 1994 defence expenditure decisions were largely dominated by non‐economic factors; since then defence spending has declined in reaction to, inter alia, the need to address a number of socio‐economic inequities.

After 1975 in particular, military industrialisation in South Africa placed a disproportionately high burden on the country's industrial resources and natural economic and technical capabilities. However, although this suggests that the opportunity cost of domestic arms production has been fairly high, the country's poor economic and development performance since the mid‐1970s is a function of underlying structural deficiencies and institutional constraints rather than the consequence of inordinately high defence spending levels.     

A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016     

An Empirical Analysis of the Arms Race Between South and North Korea

This study analyses an arms race between South and North Korea over the period 1963–2000. Despite the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula, the arms race between South and North Korea has rarely been studied. In this study, the South–North arms race is empirically estimated using Richardson’s action–reaction model. The pattern of South–North arms race between the Cold War (1963–1989) and the post‐Cold War eras (1990–2000) as well as the existence of an arms race is examined comparing both countries’ defence spending, number of military personnel and tactical aircraft.     

濒海战斗舰——美国海军新型装备

美国海军称濒海战斗舰（LCS）是一种适于近海复杂水情的快速、高度机动的水面作战平台。海湾战争之后,美军为了加强水面舰艇对地攻击、加强机动性和适应削减军费的形势,濒海战舰应运而生一跃成为当今世界武器的新宠。LCS具有单体和三体两种船体,根据三种作战任务实现模块化重构。尽管发展十多年来LCS在功能设计和火力配置上远远未达到军方的要求,被人指责为＂中看不中用＂,尽管LCS的费效比一直为美国国会所诟病,然而,LCS的建造代表着美国海军作战理念的战略转型。美海军在LCS的快速灵活、续航能力、武器装备方面不断寻求最优组合,以达到其控制亚太和世界海洋权的目的。文章较为系统地介绍美国LCS崛起的原因、发展历史、战术技术性能及近期发展动态。     

FINANCIAL VERSUS HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE GREEK–TURKISH ARMS RACE 10 YEARS ON: A FORECASTING INVESTIGATION USING ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS

This paper looks into the Greek–Turkish arms race a decade after an earlier contribution to the issue that relied heavily on artificial neural networks. The time period between the two papers contributes to the reliability of the results derived, not just by increasing the number of observations, but also mainly by incorporating the progress made in the realm of artificial intelligence. The focus on the case of both countries unlike the paper mentioned above that dealt with just the Greek side provides ample room for comparative purposes regarding the determinants of defense expenditure on both sides. The results derived in terms of input significance estimation support the findings of the earlier research as indicated above, pointing to the leading role of the demographic preponderance of Turkey over Greece. The paper also points to the fact that 10 years later, Turkey continues to set the arms race rules against its rival by determining the defense expenditure of Greece, whereas the role of the latter in affecting the military spending of Turkey is non‐existent.     

伊拉克战争对中东地区乃至世界军品贸易的影响

在分析了伊拉克战争对中东地区军品贸易影响的基础上,重点分析了其对世界军品贸易的深刻影响———加剧军备竞赛、刺激军工技术发展、引起军贸格局及产品结构发生变化、国际军控形势更加严峻。     

Military Spending,Conflict and External Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa

The damaging economic effects of the debt crises on Africa in the late 1980s encouraged considerable research on the determinants of external debt in developing economies. Although sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) debt was cut by two-thirds by 2008, through two debt relief programmes, debt in the region has since been rising at an increasingly rapid pace. This study provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of external debt in SSA over the period 1960–2016, using dynamic panel methods. It also considers two potentially important factors that have received relatively little attention. One is military spending, rarely considered, despite a number of well-publicised scandals over the procurement of unnecessary and expensive high-tech weapons systems. A second, is the possibility that the countries studied have been involved in conflict. The empirical results point to a positive impact of military spending on external debt, but with some evidence of heterogeneity across the countries. Furthermore, findings indicate that the positive effect of military expenditure on debt becomes more marked in countries that have been affected by conflict. These results imply that policies to improve security and reduce military spending could be beneficial in reducing external debt and, potentially, improving economic performance in the region.