“处突”后勤保障的主要策略

“处突”行动中，因为恐怖活动的不确定性，决定了反恐地域不可能有预定战场，就后勤保障而言，即使有周密细致的保障方案和完善配套的后方保障设施，也难以做到充分准备。只有认真研究各种恐怖活动的特点规律，宏观谋划反恐后勤保障策略，综合运用各种互补的保障手段，     

生化恐怖袭击及其应对策略

本文指出了生化恐怖活动发展的历史趋势、分析了大规模生化恐怖活动兴起的原因 ,并分析了恐怖分子获得生化武器的可能性 ,对于可能发生的大规模生化恐怖活动提出了的应对策略     

现代恐怖活动的组织类型特点及发展趋势

美国发生"9·11"恐怖袭击以后,恐怖主义及恐怖活动成为人们研究的重要课题.研究恐怖活动,深刻分析恐怖活动的组织类型、特点及发展趋势,对于我们搞好警卫工作具有特别重要的参考价值和现实意义.     

美国反核恐怖精英“核危机搜索队”

“9.11”事件后,美国情报机构一再发出警报,称恐怖分子可能使用核材料或核装置进行恐怖活动。看不见的核阴云似乎笼罩在世人头上,核恐怖问题成了美国人生活中最大的恐惧之一。为此,美国政府采取了一系列防范措施。在美国公众的关注目光中,一直鲜为人知的美国反核恐怖精     

核和辐射恐怖活动防范与处置的核监测需求研究

初步研究了我国面临的核和辐射恐怖活动的危险,讨论了防范与处置核和辐射恐怖活动的核监测需求和对策。     

一种可降低CBRN威胁及可对其进行风险评估的综合性方法

减少化生放核（CBRN）危害事件已得到了国际社会的高度重视，因此需要一种科学的方法来评估恐怖分子使用CBRN武器造成的潜在威胁。这种综合性的方法应该通过危机管理和防御措施来预防和减少该威胁可能造成的后果。     

美国陆军旅战斗队化生放核力量研究及启示

化生放核部队是美军重要的作战保障力量。为有效应对化生放核威胁和危害,美国陆军通过重塑旅战斗队化生放核力量,不仅提升了自我保障能力,还具备了全频谱作战和可持续作战能力。本文通过研究和分析美国陆军步兵旅战斗队、斯特赖克旅战斗队和装甲旅战斗队化生放核兵员的力量编制和装备编配,试图为未来一个时期陆军合成旅防化兵建设和发展,实现全域作战和立体防护要求提供一定借鉴。研究表明,美国陆军旅战斗队在旅司令部、营司令部和连司令部编设不同岗位的化生放核参谋,作战指挥能力强;在旅司令部、工兵营、侦察营、步兵营/装甲营和支援营编配了大量便携式化生放核装备和少量车载式化生放核装备,自我保障能力较强。     

恐怖活动对新疆边境地区的影响及对策

长期以来,新疆恐怖活动组织与＂三股势力＂相勾结,制造了多起恐怖活动事件,给新疆边境地区的安全与稳定带来了严重威胁。为此,针对新疆边境地区的特殊性以及恐怖活动的态势,分析了恐怖活动对新疆边境地区的影响,从提升反恐的主动发现能力、加强情报预警工作、加强防范措施的严密性等方面提出了遏制新疆恐怖活动的对策。     

简论当代恐怖活动的特点及产生恐怖活动的原因

当今世界 ,恐怖活动已成为世界公害 ,引起各国的普遍谴责和高度关注。武警部队作为社会治安的维护者 ,在反恐斗争中负有重要责任 ,了解现代恐怖主义和恐怖活动的特点及产生的原因 ,对于我们采取有针对性的反恐斗争措施 ,具有一定的启示作用。     

国际反恐形势发展对我国武警部队反恐行动的影响及对策

美国“9·11”恐怖活动之后 ,国际反恐形势发生了巨大变化 ,呈现出全球化、长期化、复杂化和扩大化的趋势。反恐形势对我国武警部队反恐行动的影响很大。恐怖活动的广泛性使我国的国家安全受到严重挑战 ,武警部队当前及今后所担负的任务将更加繁重。恐怖分子的隐蔽性必将促使我国武警部队加强游击战和反游击战的研究与训练 ,以适应反恐斗争的需要。恐怖活动的突发性对我国武警作战指挥效能提出了更高的要求 ,而改进现有的指挥体系成为必然     

The rise and fall of counterproliferation policy

The US government initiated a Defense Counterproliferation Initiative to address the concern that, in the post-Cold War years, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons would be widespread and create a significant challenge to the US military’s combat operations. In particular, non-nuclear states might use chemical or biological warfare agents against US forces with the belief that nuclear weapons would not be used against them in retaliation. Following the events of September 11, 2001, defense strategy and policy shifted to a wider view of the threat of adversarial use of “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) and the term “counterproliferation” was replaced by “combating” or “countering WMD.” Over time, the Defense Department increasingly moved away from counterproliferation principles with the detrimental effect of losing capabilities that US forces still need for contemporary adversaries. This shift has been aggravated by other US government agencies’ use of “counterproliferation” in lieu of what would have been termed “nonproliferation” activities in the 1990s. The loss of clarity within the US government on these terms has led to the inability to focus the “whole of government” on this significant national security challenge. To alleviate this challenge, the US government needs a top-down initiative to refocus policy on the distinctly different aspects of WMD with respect to military combat operations, combating terrorism, and homeland security.     

The Relative Efficacy of the Biological and Chemical Weapon Regimes

The biological and chemical weapon nonproliferation and disarmament regimes are often put forward as models of what the nuclear nonproliferation regime could (or should) be. But are these regimes effective? If so, is one stronger and/or more effective than the other? What is it that makes them relatively stronger than the nuclear nonproliferation regime? In this article, we return to and expand upon a framework for assessing regime health and effectiveness. We utilize this framework to engage in a comparative analysis of the chemical weapon (CW) and biological weapon (BW) nonproliferation regimes, respectively. Our analysis reveals that these two regimes are comparatively healthier than their nuclear counterpart. While some of their behavioral features might be troubling—such as the disputes over stockpile destruction of CW—these tend to be mitigated by the presence of a strong norm against possession and proliferation of both CW and BW. This norm is adequately embedded into the existing institutional features of the regimes in ways that do not exist in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.     

Identification of Pu and U isotopic composition and its applications in environmental and CBRN research

This paper describes the most common presently used methods for detecting uranium and plutonium isotopes after their introduction to environment. Known isotope ratios of U and Pu in different nuclear events are important tool for characterizing the sources of nuclear material. Detection techniques both in field and in laboratory are presented, as well as different models that can be used for identifying the origin and age of the nuclear material. Identification of the source of nuclear material in environmental samples is needed for estimating the quality and quantity of the nuclear hazard. This information is essential in risk assessment and crisis management, in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) research after e.g. a terrorist attack, in radioecology and environmental radioactivity research.     

All Together Now? Questioning WMDs as a Useful Analytical Unit for Understanding Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation

ABSTRACT

The popular use of the term “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) can be understood to imply a relationship between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation insofar as it assumes that the separate weapons technologies can be usefully grouped into a single analytic category. This article explores whether WMD is actually a useful construct. It begins by reviewing the literature on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation, including a recent study that sought to estimate the relationship between the pursuit and acquisition of these different weapons. It then explores some policy inferences that academics and policy makers may be tempted to draw from these studies, particularly regarding the Barack Obama administration's pursuit of deep nuclear reductions. It argues that many of these policy inferences are premature at best and misleading at worst. It concludes with a call for additional research into the causes and consequences of chemical and biological weapons proliferation, and a call for scholars to remain cautious in their desire to draw premature policy implications from their studies in order to be “policy relevant.”     

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Nonproliferation policies to prevent biological and chemical weapons use are important, but insufficient, particularly in view of the rise of global terrorism. Given the history of developing and using these weapons, it is crucial that governments properly prepare for biological and chemical threats, whether naturally occurring or man-made, such as by developing and managing effective healthcare infrastructure to mitigate widespread illness and injuries resulting from pandemics or terrorist attacks. Although the Middle East is one of the most sensitive and complex areas in the world—especially regarding regional arms control efforts and prevention—coordinating preparedness strategies among states in the region may be possible. Cooperatively addressing biological and chemical threats could lead to constructive progress towards the otherwise elusive goal of establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East.     

INCAPACITATING BIOCHEMICAL WEAPONS

Military interest in incapacitating biochemical weapons has grown in recent years as advances in science and technology have appeared to offer the promise of new “non-lethal” weapons useful for a variety of politically and militarily challenging situations. There is, in fact, a long and unfulfilled history of attempts to develop such weapons. It is clear that advances are opening up a range of possibilities for future biological and chemical weapons more generally. The treaties prohibiting biological and chemical weapons make no distinction between lethal and “non-lethal” weapons—all are equally prohibited. Indeed, a sharp and technically meaningful distinction between lethal and “non-lethal” biological and chemical weapons is beyond the capability of science to make. Thus, interest in incapacitating biochemical weapons, and efforts on the part of various states to develop them, pose a significant challenge to the treaty regimes, to the norms against biological and chemical warfare that they embody, and, ultimately, to the essential protections that they provide. Preventing a new generation of biological and chemical weapons from emerging will take concerted efforts and action at the local, national, and international levels.     

Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited

Policies to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have, for the most part, been modeled on strategies originally devised to counter the danger of nuclear proliferation. While useful in countering a traditional CBN (chemical/biological/nuclear)/WMD threat, current counter-proliferation and non-proliferation regimes are insufficient to meet the challenge of maritime terrorism. Maritime terrorism represents a new category of threat; one that partially overlaps with conventional WMD, but for which – due to the scope and nature of the maritime industry – traditional counter-proliferation policies may be inadequate and even inappropriate. This article outlines the means by which maritime shipping can be used as WMD and discusses the policies implemented to deal with these threats, in light of the challenges presented to traditional conceptualizations of WMD and counter-proliferation strategies.     

基于大气扩散模型的危险化学品事故疏散模拟训练方法

根据危险化学品泄漏扩散机理和影响因素，提出了构建包含数据库、模型库和知识库的危险化学品事故疏散模拟训练系统的设想。该系统利用大气扩散软件，对于不同的事故情景，能够用图形形象地表示敏感点的化学品浓度分布和影响范围，可以帮助应急指挥人员快速、准确地预测影响区域，有效地组织、指挥不同区域人员疏散。最后提出了使用该系统进行疏散模拟训练的方法。