Nuclear Disarmament and Stability in the Logic of Habit

ABSTRACT

In 2008, the announcement of the Global Zero campaign—an international effort to eliminate nuclear weapons—coincided with the election of Barack Obama. The new president, avowedly pro-disarmament, made getting to zero nuclear weapons a centerpiece of his foreign policy. This article takes on the question of what impact global disarmament might have on international strategic stability. In a break with much of the literature and analysis on nuclear policy, it explicitly focuses on how publics understand the significance of nuclear weapons. In so doing, the article draws on recent international relations scholarship on the role of habit to argue that eliminating nuclear weapons can generate instability by creating widespread perceptions of insecurity and anxiety. If disarmament campaigners wish to achieve their goal without generating instability, they will need to work over the long-term to break habituated beliefs about nuclear weapons.     

Deferred verification: verifiable declarations of fissile-material stocks for disarmament purposes

ABSTRACT

Nuclear disarmament is often seen as eventually requiring access to nuclear warheads or to the warhead-dismantlement process to verify that a state has not hidden weapons or weapon-materials despite promising to disarm. This article suggests this view is misplaced, and that what is needed is a verification mechanism able to provide reliable assurances of the absence of fissile materials available for use in weapons after a state has disarmed. Such a mechanism will need an initial declaration of the amount of fissile materials held by a state for all purposes, military and civilian. In a state with a nuclear arsenal awaiting elimination, this declaration would have to include materials that may not be available for verification because they are in nuclear weapons or are in other classified or proliferation-sensitive forms. This article describes a verification arrangement that does not require access to materials in weapons and in sensitive forms while still allowing checks on the overall accuracy of the declaration. Verification of the completeness and correctness of the declaration is deferred to the time when the weapons-relevant material enters the disposition process, at which point it no longer has any sensitive attributes. By removing the focus on monitoring warheads and dismantlement, this new approach could provide a more manageable path to nuclear disarmament.     

A sequential attribute sampling inspection game for item facilities

The routine inspection of facilities storing large numbers of identical items is modeled as a two‐person, sequential game. Timely detection of illegal activity is parameterized in terms of a critical time to detection, and equilibria are derived which provide inspection strategies. Necessary conditions for deterrence of illegal behavior are discussed. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 496–505, 2001     

Efficient distributions of arms‐control inspection effort

A rule that constrains decision‐makers is enforced by an inspector who is supplied with a fixed level of inspection resources—inspection personnel, equipment, or time. How should the inspector distribute its inspection resources over several independent inspectees? What minimum level of resources is required to deter all violations? Optimal enforcement problems occur in many contexts; the motivating application for this study is the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in support of the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Using game‐theoretic models, the resource level adequate for deterrence is characterized in a two‐inspectee problem with inspections that are imperfect in the sense that violations can be missed. Detection functions, or probabilities of detecting a violation, are assumed to be increasing in inspection resources, permitting optimal allocations over inspectees to be described both in general and in special cases. When detection functions are convex, inspection effort should be concentrated on one inspectee chosen at random, but when they are concave it should be spread deterministicly over the inspectees. Our analysis provides guidance for the design of arms‐control verification operations, and implies that a priori constraints on the distribution of inspection effort can result in significant inefficiencies. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Reading the Riot Act: Toward a More Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons

ABSTRACT

The recent use of chemicals in warfare in Syria and Iraq illustrates that, despite the important work of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the world has not yet been totally successful in stopping the use of indiscriminate toxic agents in conflicts, either by states or non-state actors. Michael Crowley's excellent and timely new book, Chemical Control, analyzes the use of “riot control agents” (RCAs) and “incapacitating chemical agents” (ICAs), including launch and dispersal systems, by police, paramilitary, and military forces over the last decades and raises the challenging question about where the red line might be drawn between banned and permitted uses of chemicals. He discusses this problem not only in the context of the CWC, which allows use of RCAs for civilian riot control, but also in the context of international law, human rights, and criminal justice, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other disarmament and abolition regimes. He proposes a “holistic, three-stage approach” to addressing this issue “for effective regulation or prohibition of the weapon or weapon-related technology of concern.” As we approach the global abolition of a whole class of weapons of mass destruction in the next decade or even sooner, Chemical Control is helpful in better understanding and solving the dilemma of what's actually banned or permitted under international law, and precluding states undermining the chemical weapons ban.     

Approximations for heavily loaded G/GI/n + GI queues

Motivated by applications to service systems, we develop simple engineering approximation formulas for the steady‐state performance of heavily loaded G/GI/n+GI multiserver queues, which can have non‐Poisson and nonrenewal arrivals and non‐exponential service‐time and patience‐time distributions. The formulas are based on recently established Gaussian many‐server heavy‐traffic limits in the efficiency‐driven (ED) regime, where the traffic intensity is fixed at ρ > 1, but the approximations also apply to systems in the quality‐and‐ED regime, where ρ > 1 but ρ is close to 1. Good performance across a wide range of parameters is obtained by making heuristic refinements, the main one being truncation of the queue length and waiting time approximations to nonnegative values. Simulation experiments show that the proposed approximations are effective for large‐scale queuing systems for a significant range of the traffic intensity ρ and the abandonment rate θ, roughly for ρ > 1.02 and θ > 2.0. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 187–217, 2016     

A duel complicated by false targets and uncertainty as to opponent type

An attacker, being one of two types, initiates an attack at some time in the interval [-T, 0]. The a priori probabilities of each type are known. As time elapses the defender encounters false targets which occur according to a known Poisson process and which can be properly classified with known probability. The detection and classification probabilities for each type attacker are given. If the defender responds with a weapon at the time of attack, he survives with a probability which depends on the number of weapons in his possession and on attacker type. If he does not respond, his survival probability is smaller. These probabilities are known, as well as the current number of weapons in the defender's possession. They decrease as the number of weapons decreases. The payoff is the defender's survival probability. An iterative system of first-order differential equations is derived whose unique solution V₁(t),V₂(t),…,V_k(t) is shown to be the value of the game at time t, when the defender has 1, 2,…, k,… weapons, respectively. The optimal strategies are determined. Limiting results are obtained as t→-∞, while the ratio of the number of weapons to the expected number of false targets remaining is held constant.     

CON/SLK due date assignment and scheduling on a single machine with two agents

We consider scheduling problems involving two agents (agents A and B), each having a set of jobs that compete for the use of a common machine to process their respective jobs. The due dates of the A‐jobs are decision variables, which are determined by using the common (CON) or slack (SLK) due date assignment methods. Each agent wants to minimize a certain performance criterion depending on the completion times of its jobs only. Under each due date assignment method, the criterion of agent A is always the same, namely an integrated criterion consisting of the due date assignment cost and the weighted number of tardy jobs. Several different criteria are considered for agent B, including the maxima of regular functions (associated with each job), the total (weighted) completion time, and the weighted number of tardy jobs. The overall objective is to minimize the performance criterion of agent A, while keeping the objective value of agent B no greater than a given limit. We analyze the computational complexity, and devise polynomial or pseudo‐polynomial dynamic programming algorithms for the considered problems. We also convert, if viable, any of the devised pseudopolynomial dynamic programming algorithms into a fully polynomial‐time approximation scheme. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 416–429, 2016     

Optimal force mix in heterogeneous combat

This article presents models for determining the optimum number of Red weapons required to win a heterogeneous combat in which m(m> 1) types of Red weapons face a single type of Blue weapon under a newly defined termination policy. Red aims at either minimizing the total cost or maximizing the aggregated remaining force strength. Kuhn-Tucker and simulated annealing techniques are used for obtaining the optimal solution. The methodology is illustrated by analysing heterogeneous combat to determine (i) the feasibility of introducing new types of weapons and (ii) the number of weapons required to win if a specific type of weapon, say infantry, dominates. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Branch‐and‐price‐and‐cut for the manpower routing problem with synchronization constraints

In this article, we propose a branch‐and‐price‐and‐cut (BPC) algorithm to exactly solve the manpower routing problem with synchronization constraints (MRPSC). Compared with the classical vehicle routing problems (VRPs), the defining characteristic of the MRPSC is that multiple workers are required to work together and start at the same time to carry out a job, that is, the routes of the scheduling subjects are dependent. The incorporation of the synchronization constraints increases the difficulty of the MRPSC significantly and makes the existing VRP exact algorithm inapplicable. Although there are many types of valid inequalities for the VRP or its variants, so far we can only adapt the infeasible path elimination inequality and the weak clique inequality to handle the synchronization constraints in our BPC algorithm. The experimental results at the root node of the branch‐and‐bound tree show that the employed inequalities can effectively improve the lower bound of the problem. Compared with ILOG CPLEX, our BPC algorithm managed to find optimal solutions for more test instances within 1 hour. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 138–171, 2016     

How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo?

The nuclear weapons taboo is considered one of the strongest norms in international politics. A prohibition against using nuclear weapons has seemingly shaped state behavior for nearly seven decades and, according to some observers, made nuclear use ‘unthinkable’ today or in the future. Although scholars have shown that nuclear aversion has affected decision-making behavior, important questions about the nuclear taboo remain unanswered. This article seeks to answer a basic question: How durable is the taboo? We develop different predictions about norm durability depending on whether the taboo is based primarily on moral logic or strategic logic. We use the comparable case of the norm against strategic bombing in the 20th century to evaluate these hypotheses. The logic and evidence presented in this paper suggest that the norm of nuclear non-use is much more fragile than most analysts understand.     

Capacity investment decisions under risk aversion

This article studies the optimal capacity investment problem for a risk‐averse decision maker. The capacity can be either purchased or salvaged, whereas both involve a fixed cost and a proportional cost/revenue. We incorporate risk preference and use a consumption model to capture the decision maker's risk sensitivity in a multiperiod capacity investment model. We show that, in each period, capacity and consumption decisions can be separately determined. In addition, we characterize the structure of the optimal capacity strategy. When the parameters are stationary, we present certain conditions under which the optimal capacity strategy could be easily characterized by a static two‐sided (s, S) policy, whereby, the capacity is determined only at the beginning of period one, and held constant during the entire planning horizon. It is purchased up to B when the initial capacity is below b, salvaged down to Σ when it is above σ, and remains constant otherwise. Numerical tests are presented to investigate the impact of demand volatility on the optimal capacity strategy. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 218–235, 2016     

A model for geographically distributed combat interactions of swarming naval and air forces

This article describes the Distributed Interaction Campaign Model (DICM), an exploratory campaign analysis tool and asset allocation decision‐aid for managing geographically distributed and swarming naval and air forces. The model is capable of fast operation, while accounting for uncertainty in an opponent's plan. It is intended for use by commanders and analysts who have limited time for model runs, or a finite budget. The model is purpose‐built for the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, and supports analysis of the following questions: What happens when swarms of geographically distributed naval and air forces engage each other and what are the key elements of the opponents’ force to attack? Are there changes to force structure that make a force more effective, and what impacts will disruptions in enemy command and control and wide‐area surveillance have? Which insights are to be gained by fast exploratory mathematical/computational campaign analysis to augment and replace expensive and time‐consuming simulations? An illustrative example of model use is described in a simple test scenario. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 562–576, 2016     

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

As the potential for the involvement of corporations in the manufacture of nuclear weapons has increased, particularly through dual-use technology, global regulation has failed to keep pace. Where regulation of private corporations does exist, in the form of treaties, UN resolutions, or more informal arrangements, the obligations fall only on states. This state of affairs is a result of international law's traditional deference to state sovereignty; yet, it has led to significant shortcomings in the global regulatory regime, where states are unwilling or unable to meet their obligations. While radical departures from the traditional model of international law might remove the regulatory gaps caused by noncompliant states, such changes are unrealistic in the current political climate. More realistic changes must be focused on, offering greater recognition of the role of private corporations in nuclear proliferation and increasing state compliance with existing regulation.     

Distribution of number of point targets killed and higher moments of coverage of area targets

The coverage C of area targets by salvos of weapons generally varies randomly, because of random target location and weapon impact point fluctuations. A third source of variation appears when, instead of an area target, a multiple-element target is considered, consisting of m point targets distributed randomly and independently of one another around the target center. A multiple-integral expression is derived for the probability p_k of killing exactly k target elements. It is shown that p_k is a linear function of the higher moments, of the order k to m, of the area coverage C. More explicit expressions are derived for the case of two weapons and for circular-symmetric functions. Similar to well-known results for the expectation and variance of coverage of area targets, these expressions can be evaluated by numerical quadrature. Furthermore, the coverage problem in which all underlying functions are Gaussian can be completely solved in closed form. For such a problem, with two weapons, numerical results are presented. They show that the distribution of k can be approximated by a binomial distribution only if the target center and weapon impact point fluctuations are small.     

Deferred verification: the role of new verification technologies and approaches

ABSTRACT

Researchers have recently proposed a new approach to nuclear-arms-control verification, dubbed “deferred verification.” The concept forgoes inspections at sensitive nuclear sites and of nuclear weapons or components in classified form. To implement this concept, a state first divides its nuclear program into a closed segment and an open segment. The total fissile-material inventory in the closed segment, which includes the weapon complex, is known and declared with very high accuracy. Essentially no inspections take place in the closed segment. In contrast, inspectors have access to the open segment, which includes in particular the civilian nuclear sector. The fissile-material inventory in the open segment is known with less accuracy, but uncertainties can be reduced over time using nuclear-archaeology methods. Deferred verification relies primarily on established safeguards techniques and avoids many unresolved verification challenges, such as the need for information barriers for warhead confirmation measurements. At the same time, deferred verification faces some unique challenges. Here, we explore some of these challenges and offer possible solutions; to do so, we examine possible noncompliance strategies in which a state would seek to withhold a higher-than-declared inventory.     

Generalizing the survival signature to unrepairable homogeneous multi‐state systems

The notion of signature has been widely applied for the reliability evaluation of technical systems that consist of binary components. Multi‐state system modeling is also widely used for representing real life engineering systems whose components can have different performance levels. In this article, the concept of survival signature is generalized to a certain class of unrepairable homogeneous multi‐state systems with multi‐state components. With such a generalization, a representation for the survival function of the time spent by a system in a specific state or above is obtained. The findings of the article are illustrated for multi‐state consecutive‐k‐out‐of‐n system which perform its task at three different performance levels. The generalization of the concept of survival signature to a multi‐state system with multiple types of components is also presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 593–599, 2017     

Algorithm to solve a chance‐constrained network capacity design problem with stochastic demands and finite support

We consider the problem of determining the capacity to assign to each arc in a given network, subject to uncertainty in the supply and/or demand of each node. This design problem underlies many real‐world applications, such as the design of power transmission and telecommunications networks. We first consider the case where a set of supply/demand scenarios are provided, and we must determine the minimum‐cost set of arc capacities such that a feasible flow exists for each scenario. We briefly review existing theoretical approaches to solving this problem and explore implementation strategies to reduce run times. With this as a foundation, our primary focus is on a chance‐constrained version of the problem in which α% of the scenarios must be feasible under the chosen capacity, where α is a user‐defined parameter and the specific scenarios to be satisfied are not predetermined. We describe an algorithm which utilizes a separation routine for identifying violated cut‐sets which can solve the problem to optimality, and we present computational results. We also present a novel greedy algorithm, our primary contribution, which can be used to solve for a high quality heuristic solution. We present computational analysis to evaluate the performance of our proposed approaches. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 236–246, 2016     

New results on a Ruckle problem in discrete games of ambush

This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game in which player I chooses in integer interval [1, N] two integer intervals consisting of p and q points where p + q < N, and player II chooses an integer point in [1, N]. The payoff to player I equals 1 if the point chosen by player II is at least in one of the intervals chosen by player II and 0 otherwise. This paper complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, Lee, Garnaev, and Zoroa, Zoroa and Fernández‐Sáez. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 98–106, 2001     

Gas,power, and norms: competing logics for the declining use of chemical warfare

ABSTRACT

What restrains states from employing chemical weapons during modern war? Despite widespread and consistent efforts by the international community to outlaw chemical weapons in the twentieth century, major deviations from this goal occur. Two of the strongest explanations that exist for this trend are the logics of deterrence and norms that consider the use of chemical weapons to be a taboo. We test these theories using factor analysis and find that norms provide a better explanation of non-use in the twentieth century among states with a chemical-weapon capability. We then conclude with avenues for future research in this burgeoning field of study, which includes closer qualitative examination of norms, as well as the expansion of the dataset to include intrastate warfare and non-state warfare.