The Dark Side of Extended Deterrence: Thinking through the State Sponsorship of Terrorism

States employ extended deterrence to shield third parties from aggression. The concept is traditionally applied to interstate relations, collective security arrangements, and strategic considerations. The protective relationship that exists between a state sponsor of terrorism and its non-state militant proxy is rarely considered. This article will introduce and explore the sponsor–proxy relationship in the context of extended deterrence, and relate it to Iran’s support and sponsorship of political violence, militancy, and terrorism in Europe. The article reviews the rationale states have for sponsoring terrorism, and illustrates the promises and pitfalls associated with extending deterrence to non-state militants.     

End of the cycle: assessing ETA’s strategies of terrorism

ABSTRACT

In May 2018, the Basque insurgent group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) officially disbanded after a 60-year struggle. This inquiry assesses ETA’s violent campaigns using recent conceptual and theoretical advancements from the field of terrorism studies. Three conclusions concerning the group’s strategies of terrorism are advanced. First, ETA regularly targeted civilians to achieve goals other than coercing the Government of Spain; these objectives included outbidding rival separatist groups and spoiling negotiation processes. Second, ETA’s most rapid period of organizational growth occurred as the result of an aggressive terrorist campaign, demonstrating that civilian targeting can serve as a stimulus to rebel group recruitment. Finally, while terrorism did not advance ETA’s primary political objective of creating an independent Basque state, it did enable the group to assume a leading position within the radical Basque separatist movement, helping extend ETA’s lifespan and making the group an embedded actor within the contentious political processes surrounding the question of Basque self-determination. Collectively, these conclusions support recent theoretical findings arguing that non-state terrorism often enables insurgent groups to prolong their lifespans while paradoxically making it more difficult for them to advance their long-term political objectives.     

Terrorism, Crime and Private Armies

The nature of crime and conflict is rapidly evolving. Postmodern war is increasingly influenced by non-traditional and irregular combatants: non-state soldiers. These actors are exploiting technology and networked doctrine to spread their influence across traditional geographic boundaries. This emphasis on non-traditional actors accompanies a shift in political and social organization. This shift may well be a shift in state form: from nation-state to market-state. This transition is fueled by rapid developments in technology and the adoption of network organizational forms. Conflict during this transition blurs the distinctions between and among crime, terrorism and warfare. This essay explores the dynamics of terrorism, crime and private armies during this epochal shift.     

State Capacity,Inequality and Inter-Group Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: 1989–2011

Most studies on internal armed conflict focus on the dyadic interaction between the state and a rebel group, leaving less attention to inter-group fighting. Addressing this gap in the literature, this study argues that the interplay between economic and political inequality and weak state capacity increases the risk of non-state conflict. An empirical analysis of 178 non-state conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1989 and 2011 provides support for the theorized conditional effect, but only for the role of economic inequality. The effect of political exclusion in the context of a weak state is not confirmed, suggesting that such conditions may be more prone to violence of another kind (i.e., mobilization against the state). Overall, these findings highlight the importance of a functioning state for maintaining peaceful inter-group relations, while they also lend support to earlier research that reports divergent effects of economic and political inequalities on civil conflict risk.     

Drone Strikes and Grand Strategy: Toward a Political Understanding of the Uses of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Attacks in US Security Policy

This article analyzes the political utility of US drone strikes theoretically and deductively. Placing strikes within the context of the theorized political functions of force and considering how they fit into two grand strategies, restraint and selective engagement, I argue that these strikes buy the United States relatively little in the way of political effects assuring its own security because the terrorism threat they are intended to combat is a limited one within the skein of US global interests. Furthermore, their contribution to counter-terrorism efforts is likely to diminish with the adoption of armed drones by non-state actors. Drone strikes can, however, provide leverage over recalcitrant US client states while reassuring liberal partners and giving them some leverage over US choices. In addition, within the counter-terrorism sphere, drone strikes are less likely to inflame popular opinion than are alternative uses of force. This analysis contributes to an increasingly rigorous examination of the strikes’ role in US foreign and security policy.     

Between the Cracks: Actor Fragmentation and Local Conflict Systems in the Libyan Civil War

Abstract

After nearly four years of civil war, Libya continues to be described as an ‘ungoverned space’ where the collapse of state institutions reignited tribal, political, religious and ideological tensions. These accounts, however, obscure Libya’s complex subnational governance, and the role of non-state armed groups in shaping the emerging political orders. By contrast, we contend that distinct subnational political orders have emerged in Libya since 2014 in which actors engage in state-making practices driven by local interests. Using empirical evidence to explore the activity of non-state armed groups during the Libyan civil conflict, we highlight that the local conflict environments in eastern, western and southern Libya provide specific incentives that shape the process of armed group splintering and patterns of violence. The findings demonstrate that claims to authority and notions of statehood extend far beyond the state whereby governance relations are negotiated between state and non-state actors. Conflict patterns, (in)stability and the prevailing political order are therefore conditional on the nature of the dominant actor, their strategies and modes of violence within their areas of influence. Through this analysis, the paper provides a more granular understanding of the local political dynamics that drive violence in Libya and civil wars more generally.     

Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia

Stability among the great powers during the Cold War is widely theorized in terms of nuclear deterrence. Rationality of States and their preference for survival are the basis of nuclear deterrence. The rationality of non-state terrorist groups is different from that of nation-states. Even though they are also rational actors with their own hierarchy of preferences, survival may not be their ultimate goal. Deterrence of nuclear terrorism is therefore different from deterrence against states. South Asia is more vulnerable to nuclear terrorism than any other region of the world for many reasons. This article analyzes the possibility of nuclear terrorism and the ways of deterrence against it in the context of South Asia.     

Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia

Stability among the great powers during the Cold War is widely theorized in terms of nuclear deterrence. Rationality of states and their preference for survival are the basis of nuclear deterrence. The rationality of non-state terrorist groups is different from that of nation-states. Even though they are also rational actors with their own hierarchy of preferences, survival may not be their ultimate goal. Deterrence of nuclear terrorism is therefore different from deterrence against states. South Asia is more vulnerable to nuclear terrorism than any other region of the world for many reasons. This article analyzes the possibility of nuclear terrorism and the ways of deterrence against it in the context of South Asia.     

The Political Economy of Legislation on Terrorism

^{1 1}This research was funded in part by a grant from the Lowe Institute of Political Economy. The corresponding author is S. Brock Blomerg. We thank Chris Blomberg and Brianna Loyosa for their excellent research assistance on the project. This paper presents an empirical analysis of what drives congressional legislation on terrorism during the period 1995 to 2010. We utilize and augment current methodology to compile and analyze data on sponsorship and cosponsorship of terrorism related data. Our results on the sources of legislation on terrorism are largely in line with past examinations of the importance of committee membership and leadership, party majority-ship, and other political factors. Further, we find that the most significant and robust drive for legislation on terrorism is the September 11^th attacks. And while the impact of 9/11 affected legislative productivity everywhere, we find that it most significantly affected states surrounding New York and Washington D.C. Our results indicate that the economy may be one factor motivating politicians to legislate on terrorism; however, these results are not robust.     

NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF CIVILIAN HEU ELIMINATION

An increasing number of countries recognize the special risks of nuclear terrorism associated with the civilian use and storage of and commerce in highly enriched uranium (HEU). They are especially concerned that non-state actors might gain access to HEU and use it to build and detonate improvised nuclear devices. The risk is aggravated by the very large global stocks of HEU, some of which are inadequately protected. Although HEU has few commercial uses, and most experts believe it is technically feasible to substitute low-enriched uranium for HEU in nearly all civilian applications, efforts to reduce HEU stocks have been impeded by a variety of economic, political, and strategic considerations. This article analyzes the nature of these impediments and discusses what is required to overcome them.     

Competitive Statehood in Libya: Governing Differently a Specific Setting or Deconstructing its Weak Sovereign State with a Fateful Drift Toward Chaos?

Abstract

Libya in 2011 witnessed a real process of political change, though different from all the policy-oriented jargon equating transition with a teleological transition to democracy. Due to the resilience of the Qadhafi regime in power and with the essential role of NATO intervention, the process was eased out by a eight-month civil war. Governance in post-Qadhafi Libya was not done through the rebuilding of centralized authorities. But it took the specific form of the emergence of multiple non-state actors embedded in local dynamics and then connected with weakened central authorities that had access to the huge Libyan resources. That raised complex questions about the quality of this mode of governance, especially at a time of pressing problems for Libya and its neighbors, whether direct ones (Tunisia, Egypt, Mali) or farther countries across the Mediterranean sea: terrorism with the expansion of Da’esh into the country and flows of refugees crossing Libya’s uncontrolled borders and flowing into Italy and then Europe by thousands.     

On the Determinants of Terrorism Risk Concern in Europe

We investigate whether differences in terrorism risk are mirrored on terrorism risk perception across European countries for the period 2003–2007. We find that the average propensity for terrorism risk concern is affected by actual risk levels. Country and individual heterogeneity contribute substantially to the variation of observed risk perception. Singles and individuals with white collar jobs are less likely to mention terrorism as one of the most pressing issues their country faces, while political positioning towards the right makes it more likely to be concerned about terrorism. As far as competing risks are concerned, we find that the likelihood terrorism is mentioned, decreases with spending on pensions as a percentage of GDP being higher. Finally, based on the Bayesian framework, we also examined the formation of terrorism risk perceptions, and decompose the observed country-level time series of terrorism activity into a long- and a short-run component. We concluded that the observed risk perception variation is only explained by the long-term trend of terrorism activity countries face.     

ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS IN AFRICA AND THE BAN ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

A truly universal ban on anti-personnel mines cannot be realized without engagement of armed non-state actors and armed groups operating outside state control, including rebels and national liberation movements. Events after 9/11 have complicated engagement with organizations that can be classified as ‘terrorists’. Yet, the use of anti-personnel landmines itself can be viewed as an act of terrorism and African leaders have, on various occasions, classified the use of landmines and the presence of unexploded ordnance as engendering insecurity and a serious impediment to development. The success of a total ban ultimately depends upon ensuring that armed non-state actors act in accordance with international humanitarian law. The Geneva Call Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action (DoC) might be described as an alternative instrument to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and can serve an important and impartial channel of communication with non-state actors. Already 18 armed groups in Africa have signed the Geneva Call DoC.     

Born violent: Armed political parties and non-state governance in Lebanon's civil war

We know little of the internal governing practices of non-state actors once in control of territory. Some territories have witnessed the establishment of new institutions of public goods remarkably similar to state institutions. This article compares four armed political parties governing territory during the Lebanese civil war. These non-state violent actors established complex political and economic institutions and administrative structures. Despite the wide range of ideologies and identities of these actors, they all converged in their institutional priorities, although not in their capacities or the particular ways of achieving those priorities. Data from interviews and the actions of the armed political parties suggest a combination of ideology and desire for control is causal in generating public institutions, partly attributable to the high degree of citizen activism marking the Lebanese case.     

THE AU PLAN ON TERRORISM

At a senior officials' meeting held in Algiers from 11–14 September 2002, the African Union proved ready and able to provide the political cohesion and sense of purpose needed for Africa to combat terrorism. While member states inevitably played to a global gallery in demonstrating their commitment to the ‘war on terrorism’, the practical counter-terrorist proposals adopted at the meeting substantially address Africa's security challenges. The resulting Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism focuses on state building and inter-governmental co-operation, to literally and figuratively close Africa's borders to terrorist activities. Implementing the plan will be a tough challenge for many African governments, especially to ensure that their counter-terrorist measures adhere to international and regional human rights accords.     

THE POST-9/11 SECURITY AGENDA AND PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

There are two mainstream schools of thought about the impact of the war against terror on international efforts to resolve African conflicts. One sees in the war against terrorism a renewed focus on eradicating the root causes of civil war in Africa and elsewhere, simply because it is believed that it is these conditions that foster the kind of political alienation that propels people into committing acts of terror. The other sees the continued marginalisation of Africa by powerful nations that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, have clearly become so preoccupied with their own security agenda that the bulk of resources will be directed towards combating the symptoms, rather than the root causes, of terrorism. This article asserts that the US, UN and African responses to 11 September open the door for a manipulation and redefinition of terrorism to justify crackdowns on legitimate dissent, and that peacekeeping and peace-building in Africa must inevitably take a back seat to the war on terror. It calls for a more sober and balanced perspective on what is needed to cope with the ever-increasing challenges to human security in Africa.     

Motivation or capabilities? Israeli counterterrorism against Palestinian suicide bombings and violence

Scholars have expressed doubts about the ability of counterterrorism to cope with suicide bombings, resulting in tit-for-tat or loop-like and repetitive violence and counter-violence without meaningful, let alone decisive results for the stronger side. Such skepticism may explain why so much of the recent literature on terrorism and insurgency is focused on the factors motivating the challenger rather than upon the insurgent's capabilities. This article demonstrates the extent to which Israeli offensive measures have reduced considerably the impact of Palestinian violence on the Israeli protagonist corroborating research that counterterrorism should adopt an offensive escalating strategy against the insurgent.     

An intervention analysis of terrorism: The spanish eta case

In this paper we evaluate what terrorism policies have worked best in handling the Spanish ETA terrorism using time series data from 1968 to 2000. We consider the political, deterrence and economic effects, and conclude that their influence on terrorism incidents is mixed. A parsimonious model shows that the behaviour of different terrorism incidents is distinct and the lagged effect is a primary concern. A policy to manage this case is devised.     

Clausewitz and the politics of war: A contemporary theory

ABSTRACT

This paper re-examines the theoretical underpinnings of Strategic Studies, proposing a novel theory and a new framework for analysing war’s fundamental relationship with politics in line with the Clausewitzian tradition. Throughout modern history, Clausewitz’s concept of politics has been misconstrued as referring only to policy whereas in fact, for him, ‘politics’ was a much broader concept, including domestic power struggles. The political logic of war is defined here as the convergence of the interrelating factors of power struggles and policy objectives within a given polity that restrains and enables these political forces. The analysis of the Clausewitzian political logic of war is conducted through the sociological ‘liquid modern’ lens. It is argued that with power increasingly shifting from centralised state-oriented political leadership towards market forces, non-state actors and other political bodies, the effectiveness of war has been reduced. This is evident in the fragmentation of Western political systems and, as a result, suboptimal strategy and the domination of domestic power struggles in political decision-making concerning war.     

Dying to prove a point: The methodology of Dying to Win

Dying to Win is one of the most important works on suicide terrorism. It purports to unravel the strategic, social, and individual logic that gives suicide terrorism its coercive value. The methodology that Pape uses to support his various assertions is problematic for three reasons. First, he defines his key terms in such a way as to artificially set suicide terrorism apart from other forms of political violence. Second, in a number of cases Pape selects data from single sources to support particular assertions when other sources of data, used together, could provide more rigorous and useful insights into the phenomenon of suicide bombing. Finally, Pape codes his data on suicide attacks according to a loose set of criteria which, if recoded, calls into question some of his broader conclusions about the strategic utility of suicide terrorism campaigns.