Dynamic capacity reservation and due date quoting in a make‐to‐order system

We consider a make‐to‐order manufacturer facing random demand from two classes of customers. We develop an integrated model for reserving capacity in anticipation of future order arrivals from high priority customers and setting due dates for incoming orders. Our research exhibits two distinct features: (1) we explicitly model the manufacturer's uncertainty about the customers' due date preferences for future orders; and (2) we utilize a service level measure for reserving capacity rather than estimating short and long term implications of due date quoting with a penalty cost function. We identify an interesting effect (“t‐pooling”) that arises when the (partial) knowledge of customer due date preferences is utilized in making capacity reservation and order allocation decisions. We characterize the relationship between the customer due date preferences and the required reservation quantities and show that not considering the t‐pooling effect (as done in traditional capacity and inventory rationing literature) leads to excessive capacity reservations. Numerical analyses are conducted to investigate the behavior and performance of our capacity reservation and due date quoting approach in a dynamic setting with multiple planning horizons and roll‐overs. One interesting and seemingly counterintuitive finding of our analyses is that under certain conditions reserving capacity for high priority customers not only improves high priority fulfillment, but also increases the overall system fill rate. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Flexible capacity strategy in an asymmetric oligopoly market with competition and demand uncertainty

This article studies flexible capacity strategy (FCS) under oligopoly competition with uncertain demand. Each firm utilizes either the FCS or inflexible capacity strategy (IFCS). Flexible firms can postpone their productions until observing the actual demand, whereas inflexible firms cannot. We formulate a new asymmetrical oligopoly model for the problem, and obtain capacity and production decisions of the firms at Nash equilibrium. It is interesting to verify that cross‐group competition determines the capacity allocation between the two groups of firms, while intergroup competition determines the market share within each group. Moreover, we show that the two strategies coexist among firms only when cost differentiation is medium. Counterintuitively, flexible firms benefit from increasing production cost when the inflexible competition intensity is sufficiently high. This is because of retreat of inflexible firms, flexibility effect, and the corresponding high price. We identify conditions under which FCS is superior than IFCS. We also demonstrate that flexible firms benefit from increasing demand uncertainty. However, when demand variance is not very large, flexible firms may be disadvantaged. We further investigate the effects of cross‐group and intergroup competition on individual performance of the firms. We show that as flexible competition intensity increases, inflexible firms are mainly affected by the cross‐group competition first and then by the intergroup competition, whereas flexible firms are mainly affected by the intergroup competition. Finally, we examine endogenous flexibility and identify its three drivers: cost parameters, cross‐group competition, and intergroup competition. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 117–138, 2017     

Strategic obfuscation of production capacities

Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014     

Evergreening and operational risk under price competition

“Evergreening” is a strategy wherein an innovative pharmaceutical firm introduces an upgrade of its current product when the patent on this product expires. The upgrade is introduced with a new patent and is designed to counter competition from generic manufacturers that seek to imitate the firm's existing product. However, this process is fraught with uncertainty because the upgrade is subject to stringent guidelines and faces approval risk. Thus, an incumbent firm has to make an upfront production capacity investment without clarity on whether the upgrade will reach the market. This uncertainty may also affect the capacity investment of a competing manufacturer who introduces a generic version of the incumbent's existing product but whose market demand depends on the success or failure of the upgrade. We analyze a game where capacity investment occurs before uncertainty resolution and firms compete on prices thereafter. Capacity considerations that arise due to demand uncertainty introduce new factors into the evergreening decision. Equilibrium analysis reveals that the upgrade's estimated approval probability needs to exceed a threshold for the incumbent to invest in evergreening. This threshold for evergreening increases as the intensity of competition in the generic market increases. If evergreening is optimal, the incumbent's capacity investment is either decreasing or nonmonotonic with respect to low end market competition depending on whether the level of product improvement in the upgrade is low or high. If the entrant faces a capacity constraint, then the probability threshold for evergreening is higher than the case where the entrant is not capacity constrained. Finally, by incorporating the risk‐return trade‐off that the incumbent faces in terms of the level of product improvement versus the upgrade success probability, we can characterize policy for a regulator. We show that the introduction of capacity considerations may maximize market coverage and/or social surplus at incremental levels of product improvement in the upgrade. This is contrary to the prevalent view of regulators who seek to curtail evergreening involving incremental product improvement. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 71–89, 2016     

A three‐stage procurement optimization problem under uncertainty

This article examines a problem faced by a firm procuring a material input or good from a set of suppliers. The cost to procure the material from any given supplier is concave in the amount ordered from the supplier, up to a supplier‐specific capacity limit. This NP‐hard problem is further complicated by the observation that capacities are often uncertain in practice, due for instance to production shortages at the suppliers, or competition from other firms. We accommodate this uncertainty in a worst‐case (robust) fashion by modeling an adversarial entity (which we call the “follower”) with a limited procurement budget. The follower reduces supplier capacity to maximize the minimum cost required for our firm to procure its required goods. To guard against uncertainty, the firm can “protect” any supplier at a cost (e.g., by signing a contract with the supplier that guarantees supply availability, or investing in machine upgrades that guarantee the supplier's ability to produce goods at a desired level), ensuring that the anticipated capacity of that supplier will indeed be available. The problem we consider is thus a three‐stage game in which the firm first chooses which suppliers' capacities to protect, the follower acts next to reduce capacity from unprotected suppliers, and the firm then satisfies its demand using the remaining capacity. We formulate a three‐stage mixed‐integer program that is well‐suited to decomposition techniques and develop an effective cutting‐plane algorithm for its solution. The corresponding algorithmic approach solves a sequence of scaled and relaxed problem instances, which enables solving problems having much larger data values when compared to standard techniques. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Coordinated dynamic control of marketing and production

We study the dynamic profit maximization problem for a firm exercising control on both marketing and production. The firs marketing effort impacts the current‐period demand, which in turn affects future demand in a dissipating fashion. Under linear‐cost and zero‐leadtime assumptions, we show that the firm should follow base‐point rules for both marketing and production, whereas trends of the base points reflect a certain complementarity between marketing and production. We obtain comparable results when marketing costs are convex. Our computational study identifies conditions under which simple fixed‐marketing‐effort and fixed‐marketing‐target heuristics would perform well. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Integrated capacity,demand, and production planning with subcontracting and overtime options

Models for integrated production and demand planning decisions can serve to improve a producer's ability to effectively match demand requirements with production capabilities. In contexts with price‐sensitive demands, economies of scale in production, and multiple capacity options, such integrated planning problems can quickly become complex. To address these complexities, this paper provides profit‐maximizing production planning models for determining optimal demand and internal production capacity levels under price‐sensitive deterministic demands, with subcontracting and overtime options. The models determine a producer's optimal price, production, inventory, subcontracting, overtime, and internal capacity levels, while accounting for production economies of scale and capacity costs through concave cost functions. We use polyhedral properties and dynamic programming techniques to provide polynomial‐time solution approaches for obtaining an optimal solution for this class of problems when the internal capacity level is time‐invariant. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

A note on optimal pricing for finite capacity queueing systems with multiple customer classes

This article investigates optimal static prices for a finite capacity queueing system serving customers from different classes. We first show that the original multi‐class formulation in which the price for each class is a decision variable can be reformulated as a single dimensional problem with the total load as the decision variable. Using this alternative formulation, we prove an upper bound for the optimal arrival rates for a fairly large class of queueing systems and provide sufficient conditions that ensure the existence of a unique optimal arrival rate vector. We show that these conditions hold for M/M/1/m and M/G/s/s systems and prove structural results on the relationships between the optimal arrival rates and system capacity. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Collaboration in contingent capacities with information asymmetry

We study the optimal contracting problem between two firms collaborating on capacity investment with information asymmetry. Without a contract, system efficiency is lost due to the profit‐margin differentials among the firms, demand uncertainty, and information asymmetry. With information asymmetry, we demonstrate that the optimal capacity level is characterized by a newsvendor formula with an upward‐adjusted capacity investment cost, and no first‐best solution can be achieved. Our analysis shows that system efficiency can always be improved by the optimal contract and the improvement in system efficience is due to two factors. While the optimal contract may bring the system's capacity level closer to the first‐best capacity level, it prevents the higher‐margin firm from overinvesting and aligns the capacity‐investment decisions of the two firms. Our analysis of a special case demonstrates that, under some circumstances, both firms can benefit from the principal having better information about the agent's costs. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 54:, 2007     

Scheduling and due‐date quotation in a make‐to‐order supply chain

We consider a manufacturer, served by a single supplier, who has to quote due dates to arriving customers in a make‐to‐order production environment. The manufacturer is penalized for long lead times and for missing due dates. To meet due dates, the manufacturer has to obtain components from a supplier. We model this manufacturer and supplier as a two‐machine flow shop, consider several variations of this problem, and design effective due‐date quotation and scheduling algorithms for centralized and decentralized versions of the model. We perform extensive computational testing to assess the effectiveness of our algorithms and to compare the centralized and decentralized models to quantify the value of centralized control in a make‐to‐order supply chain. Since complete information exchange and centralized control is not always practical or cost‐effective, we explore the value of partial information exchange for this system. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Competitive location and capacity decisions for firms serving time‐sensitive customers

In this article we explore how two competing firms locate and set capacities to serve time‐sensitive customers. Because customers are time‐sensitive, they may decline to place an order from either competitor if their expected waiting time is large. We develop a two‐stage game where firms set capacities and then locations, and show that three types of subgame perfect equilibria are possible: local monopoly (in which each customer is served by a single firm, but some customers may be left unserved), constrained local monopoly (in which firms serve the entire interval of customers but do not compete with each other), and constrained competition (in which firms also serve the entire interval of customers, but now compete for some customers). We perform a comparative statics analysis to illustrate differences in the equilibrium behavior of a duopolist and a coordinated monopolist. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Capacitated warehouse location model with risk pooling

In this article, we introduce the capacitated warehouse location model with risk pooling (CLMRP), which captures the interdependence between capacity issues and the inventory management at the warehouses. The CLMRP models a logistics system in which a single plant ships one type of product to a set of retailers, each with an uncertain demand. Warehouses serve as the direct intermediary between the plant and the retailers for the shipment of the product and also retain safety stock to provide appropriate service levels to the retailers. The CLMRP minimizes the sum of the fixed facility location, transportation, and inventory carrying costs. The model simultaneously determines warehouse locations, shipment sizes from the plant to the warehouses, the working inventory, and safety stock levels at the warehouses and the assignment of retailers to the warehouses. The costs at each warehouse exhibit initially economies of scale and then an exponential increase due to the capacity limitations. We show that this problem can be formulated as a nonlinear integer program in which the objective function is neither concave nor convex. A Lagrangian relaxation solution algorithm is proposed. The Lagrangian subproblem is also a nonlinear integer program. An efficient algorithm is developed for the linear relaxation of this subproblem. The Lagrangian relaxation algorithm provides near‐optimal solutions with reasonable computational requirements for large problem instances. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Risk‐sensitive sizing of responsive facilities

We develop a risk‐sensitive strategic facility sizing model that makes use of readily obtainable data and addresses both capacity and responsiveness considerations. We focus on facilities whose original size cannot be adjusted over time and limits the total production equipment they can hold, which is added sequentially during a finite planning horizon. The model is parsimonious by design for compatibility with the nature of available data during early planning stages. We model demand via a univariate random variable with arbitrary forecast profiles for equipment expansion, and assume the supporting equipment additions are continuous and decided ex‐post. Under constant absolute risk aversion, operating profits are the closed‐form solution to a nontrivial linear program, thus characterizing the sizing decision via a single first‐order condition. This solution has several desired features, including the optimal facility size being eventually decreasing in forecast uncertainty and decreasing in risk aversion, as well as being generally robust to demand forecast uncertainty and cost errors. We provide structural results and show that ignoring risk considerations can lead to poor facility sizing decisions that deteriorate with increased forecast uncertainty. Existing models ignore risk considerations and assume the facility size can be adjusted over time, effectively shortening the planning horizon. Our main contribution is in addressing the problem that arises when that assumption is relaxed and, as a result, risk sensitivity and the challenges introduced by longer planning horizons and higher uncertainty must be considered. Finally, we derive accurate spreadsheet‐implementable approximations to the optimal solution, which make this model a practical capacity planning tool.© 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Dynamic server assignment policies for assembly‐type queues with flexible servers

We seek dynamic server assignment policies in finite‐capacity queueing systems with flexible and collaborative servers, which involve an assembly and/or a disassembly operation. The objective is to maximize the steady‐state throughput. We completely characterize the optimal policy for a Markovian system with two servers, two feeder stations, and instantaneous assembly and disassembly operations. This optimal policy allocates one server per station unless one of the stations is blocked, in which case both servers work at the unblocked station. For Markovian systems with three stations and instantaneous assembly and/or disassembly operations, we consider similar policies that move a server away from his/her “primary” station only when that station is blocked or starving. We determine the optimal assignment of each server whose primary station is blocked or starving in systems with three stations and zero buffers, by formulating the problem as a Markov decision process. Using this optimal assignment, we develop heuristic policies for systems with three or more stations and positive buffers, and show by means of a numerical study that these policies provide near‐optimal throughput. Furthermore, our numerical study shows that these policies developed for assembly‐type systems also work well in tandem systems. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Impact of transfer pricing methods for tax purposes on supply chain performance under demand uncertainty

Transfer pricing refers to the pricing of an intermediate product or service within a firm. This product or service is transferred between two divisions of the firm. Thus, transfer pricing is closely related to the allocation of profits in a supply chain. Motivated by the significant impact of transfer pricing methods for tax purposes on operational decisions and the corresponding profits of a supply chain, in this article, we study a decentralized supply chain of a multinational firm consisting of two divisions: a manufacturing division and a retail division. These two divisions are located in different countries under demand uncertainty. The retail division orders an intermediate product from the upstream manufacturing division and sets the retail price under random customer demand. The manufacturing division accepts or rejects the retail division's order. We specifically consider two commonly used transfer pricing methods for tax purposes: the cost‐plus method and the resale‐price method. We compare the supply chain profits under these two methods. Based on the newsvendor framework, our analysis shows that the cost‐plus method tends to allocate a higher percentage of profit to the retail division, whereas the resale‐price method tends to achieve a higher firm‐wide profit. However, as the variability of demand increases, our numerical study suggests that the firm‐wide and divisional profits tend to be higher under the cost‐plus method than they are under the resale‐price method. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Production‐inventory systems with imperfect advance demand information and updating

We consider a supplier with finite production capacity and stochastic production times. Customers provide advance demand information (ADI) to the supplier by announcing orders ahead of their due dates. However, this information is not perfect, and customers may request an order be fulfilled prior to or later than the expected due date. Customers update the status of their orders, but the time between consecutive updates is random. We formulate the production‐control problem as a continuous‐time Markov decision process and prove there is an optimal state‐dependent base‐stock policy, where the base‐stock levels depend upon the numbers of orders at various stages of update. In addition, we derive results on the sensitivity of the state‐dependent base‐stock levels to the number of orders in each stage of update. In a numerical study, we examine the benefit of ADI, and find that it is most valuable to the supplier when the time between updates is moderate. We also consider the impact of holding and backorder costs, numbers of updates, and the fraction of customers that provide ADI. In addition, we find that while ADI is always beneficial to the supplier, this may not be the case for the customers who provide the ADI. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

The United States' Use of Exiles in Promoting Regime Change in Cuba, 1961 and Iraq, 2002–3

Issues raised by the United States' relations with and potential use of Iraqi exile groups in 2003–3 bear important similarities to those surrounding the failed Bay of Pigs operation against Fidel Castro's Cuba 40?years previously. In both cases, questions of legitimacy were of prime importance. In both cases too, the role played by the US had ramifications for the effectiveness of the exiles' own roles in the political and operational spheres. Finally, in each case the exile ‘movements’ were characterised by numerous, often rancorous, internal divisions, raising questions about their capacity to effectively constitute alternative governments.     

Optimal capacity in a coordinated supply chain

We consider a supply chain in which a retailer faces a stochastic demand, incurs backorder and inventory holding costs and uses a periodic review system to place orders from a manufacturer. The manufacturer must fill the entire order. The manufacturer incurs costs of overtime and undertime if the order deviates from the planned production capacity. We determine the optimal capacity for the manufacturer in case there is no coordination with the retailer as well as in case there is full coordination with the retailer. When there is no coordination the optimal capacity for the manufacturer is found by solving a newsvendor problem. When there is coordination, we present a dynamic programming formulation and establish that the optimal ordering policy for the retailer is characterized by two parameters. The optimal coordinated capacity for the manufacturer can then be obtained by solving a nonlinear programming problem. We present an efficient exact algorithm and a heuristic algorithm for computing the manufacturer's capacity. We discuss the impact of coordination on the supply chain cost as well as on the manufacturer's capacity. We also identify the situations in which coordination is most beneficial. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Collaborative procurement among competing buyers

Collaborative procurement emerged as one of the many initiatives for achieving improved inter‐firm coordination and collaboration. In this article, we adopt a game‐theoretical approach to study the interaction between two firms who procure jointly, but produce independently and remain competitors in a product market characterized by price‐sensitive demand. We study the underlying economics behind collaborative procurement, examine the effects of collaboration on buyer and supplier profitability, and derive conditions under which collaboration is beneficial to each participant. We find that a necessary and sufficient condition for a buyer to collaborate is to increase its sales. We identify the conditions that lead equal size buyers (i.e., consortia consisting of only large buyers or only small buyers) versus different size buyers to collaborate. We also determine the conditions that make collaboration profitable for the supplier, and show that rather than selling a large quantity to a single buyer, the supplier prefers to sell to multiple buyers in smaller quantities. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008