游戏：走向教学对话的本真

教学对话是教师、学生与文本之间实现的智识共享、双向理解和意义创生，达成多重视界的融合。教学中教师的独白、预设的问答以及片面的对话向我们展现的是遮蔽的教学对话。游戏与教学对话有着某种契合，游戏与教学对话的相融，教师、学生和文本之间达成智识共享、共同在场、意义的创生、全面的对话直至多重的视界相融，使教学对话真正走向本真之境。     

Delivery‐date and capacity management in a decentralized internal market

We study competitive due‐date and capacity management between the marketing and engineering divisions within an engineer‐to‐order (ETO) firm. Marketing interacts directly with the customers and quotes due‐dates for their orders. Engineering is primarily concerned with the efficient utilization of resources and is willing to increase capacity if the cost is compensated. The two divisions share the responsibility for timely delivery of the jobs. We model the interaction between marketing and engineering as a Nash game and investigate the effect of internal competition on the equilibrium decisions. We observe that the internal competition not only degrades the firm's overall profitability but also the serviceability. Finally, we extend our analysis to multiple‐job settings that consider both flexible and inflexible capacity. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Continuous accumulation games on discrete locations

In an accumulation game, a HIDER attempts to accumulate a certain number of objects or a certain quantity of material before a certain time, and a SEEKER attempts to prevent this. In a continuous accumulation game the HIDER can pile material either at locations $1, 2, …, n, or over a region in space. The HIDER will win (payoff 1) it if accumulates N units of material before a given time, and the goal of the SEEKER will win (payoff 0) otherwise. We assume the HIDER can place continuous material such as fuel at discrete locations i = 1, 2, …, n, and the game is played in discrete time. At each time k > 0 the HIDER acquires h units of material and can distribute it among all of the locations. At the same time, k, the SEEKER can search a certain number s < n of the locations, and will confiscate (or destroy) all material found. After explicitly describing what we mean by a continuous accumulation game on discrete locations, we prove a theorem that gives a condition under which the HIDER can always win by using a uniform distribution at each stage of the game. When this condition does not hold, special cases and examples show that the resulting game becomes complicated even when played only for a single stage. We reduce the single stage game to an optimization problem, and also obtain some partial results on its solution. We also consider accumulation games where the locations are arranged in either a circle or in a line segment and the SEEKER must search a series of adjacent locations. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 60–77, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1048     

微分对策在动态评价舰艇作战能力中的应用

作战能力是表征战斗舰艇战术技术性能的一项重要指标,如何正确评价舰艇的作战能力一直是舰载武器系统配置研究的重点,也是军事系统工程的重要研究方向。该文应用微分对策理论提出了一种动态评价舰艇作战能力的思想,首次定量研究了舰艇机动性与舰炮武器系统毁伤概率之间的关系,为综合评价舰艇的作战能力提供了一条可行途径。     

基于影响网络与不完全信息多阶段博弈的作战行动序列模型及求解方法

拟制作战计划的关键是生成作战行动序列.考虑作战行动过程中的不确定性以及激烈对抗性,以影响网络分析作战行动和战场态势之间的相互影响,用不完全信息博弈分析敌对双方之间的对抗,建立了基于影响网络和不完全信息多阶段博弈的作战行动序列模型,并给出了求解方法.通过计算实例说明了模型及其求解方法.结果显示该模型生成的COA更适应于对抗环境.     

Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds

This article discusses a two‐player noncooperative nonzero‐sum inspection game. There are multiple sites that are subject to potential inspection by the first player (an inspector). The second player (potentially a violator) has to choose a vector of violation probabilities over the sites, so that the sum of these probabilities do not exceed one. An efficient method is introduced to compute all Nash equilibria parametrically in the amount of resource that is available to the inspector. Sensitivity analysis reveals nonmonotonicity of the equilibrium utility of the inspector, considered as a function of the amount of resource that is available to it; a phenomenon which is a variant of the well‐known Braess paradox. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

How not to pay for the war

As a result of allied subsidy and the influence of sunk costs, the marginal cost of the Gulf War to the US was reduced to negligible size. This result is at variance with the Olson‐Zeckhauser thesis that in an alliance “the small exploit the large.” A game theoretic alternative explanation suggests that the relation between allies resembles the game of Chicken, successfully played by the US. The ability to shift the marginal costs of war in the short term raises questions about the possible underestimation of long term effects.     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Solving partially observable agent‐intruder games with an application to border security problems

In this paper, we introduce partially observable agent‐intruder games (POAIGs). These games model dynamic search games on graphs between security forces (an agent) and an intruder given possible (border) entry points and high value assets that require protection. The agent faces situations with dynamically changing, partially observable information about the state of the intruder and vice versa. The agent may place sensors at selected locations, while the intruder may recruit partners to observe the agent's movement. We formulate the problem as a two‐person zero‐sum game, and develop efficient algorithms to compute each player's optimal strategy. The solution to the game will help the agent choose sensor locations and design patrol routes that can handle imperfect information. First, we prove the existence of ?‐optimal strategies for POAIGs with an infinite time horizon. Second, we introduce a Bayesian approximation algorithm to identify these ?‐optimal strategies using belief functions that incorporate the imperfect information that becomes available during the game. For the solutions of large POAIGs with a finite time horizon, we use a solution method common to extensive form games, namely, the sequence form representation. To illustrate the POAIGs, we present several examples and numerical results.     

基于多阶段博弈模拟的作战飞机零部件备用分析

从决策优化的角度出发,提出了一种利用多阶段博弈模拟来分析和解算作战飞机零部件备用的方法.该方法首先分析了多阶段博弈模拟在作战飞机零部件备用的应用,给出了最优化问题的总的目标函数一般形式.然后转换和简化所得到的最优化问题目标函数形式,从而有利于零部件备用的最优化解算.最后,给出了多阶段博弈模拟分析算法的主要步骤.仿真结果表明,这种方法解决了零部件使用模型问题求解的不精确的分析方法.将零部件使用周期作战飞机零部件备用看成一个整体来分析,符合未来网络中心战作战飞机零部件使用备份追求整体效能最大的思想.