Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny. By Joshua Muravchik, American Enterprise Institute (1991) ISSN 0–8447–3734–8. $12.95.
Generals in the Palacio. By Roderick Ai Camp. Oxford University Press, (1992), ISBN 0–19–507300–2, £45.
L'Armement en France. Genèse, Ampleur et Coût d'une Industrie By François Chesnais and Claude Serfati, Editions Nathan, Collection Economie/Sciences Sociales, Paris (1992), ISBN 2–09–190086–9.
The Têt Offensive. Intelligence Failure in War. By James Wirtz, Cornell University Press, New York (1991), ISBN 0–8014–2486–0. $38.50.
Restructuring of arms producton in Western Europe. Edited by Michael Brzoska and Peter Lock. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1992), ISBN 0–1982–9147–7. £25.00.
What is Proper Soldiering? A study of new perspectives for the future uses of the Armed Forces of the 1990s. By Michael Harbottle. The Centre for International Peacebuilding, Chipping Norton (1992), £3.50.
The Strategic Defence Initiative By Edward Reiss, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1992), ISBN 0–521–41097–5. £30.00. 相似文献
A model, for assessing the effectiveness of alternative force structures in an uncertain future conflict, is presented and exemplified. The methodology is appropriate to forces (e.g., the attack submarine force) where alternative unit types may be employed, albeit at differing effectiveness, in the same set of missions. Procurement trade-offs, and in particular the desirability of special purpose units in place of some (presumably more expensive) general purpose units, can be addressed by this model. Example calculations indicate an increase in the effectiveness of a force composed of general purpose units, relative to various mixed forces, with increase in the uncertainty regarding future conflicts. 相似文献
We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation. 相似文献
This article examines military expenditure and defence policy in Norway from 1970 to 2013. Until 1990 Norwegian military expenditure remained between 2.5 and 3.0 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Despite constant GDP shares, the military expenditure could not sustain a large and properly armed mobilization army. The constant nominal defence budgets of the 1990s accentuated the Norwegian Armed Forces' underlying imbalance between tasks, structure and budget. Around year 2000, large organizational reforms were effectuated, in which costs, the number of man-years, and underlying imbalances between tasks, structure and budget were reduced. Military expenditure increased in nominal terms between 2003 and 2013, while real military expenditure remained practically constant. 相似文献