Rendezvous search when marks are left at the starting points

Leaving marks at the starting points in a rendezvous search problem may provide the players with important information. Many of the standard rendezvous search problems are investigated under this new framework which we call markstart rendezvous search. Somewhat surprisingly, the relative difficulties of analysing problems in the two scenarios differ from problem to problem. Symmetric rendezvous on the line seems to be more tractable in the new setting whereas asymmetric rendezvous on the line when the initial distance is chosen by means of a convex distribution appears easier to analyse in the original setting. Results are also obtained for markstart rendezvous on complete graphs and on the line when the players' initial distance is given by an unknown probability distribution. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 722–731, 2001     

New results on rendezvous search on the interval

In a rendezvous search problem, two players are placed in a network and must try to meet each other in the least possible expected time. We look at rendezvous search on a discrete interval in which the players are initially placed using independent draws (usually assumed to be from the same distribution). Some optimal solutions are known if this distribution is uniform, and also for certain other special types of distribution. In this article, we present two new results. First, we characterize the complete set of solutions for the uniform case, showing that all optimal strategies must have two specific properties (namely, of being swept and strictly geodesic). Second, we relate search strategies on the interval to proper binary trees, and use this correspondence to derive a recurrence relation for solutions to the symmetric rendezvous problem for any initial distribution. This relation allows us to solve any such problem computationally by dynamic programming. Finally, some ideas for future research are discussed. © Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 454–467, 2013     

Detection of a Markovian target with optimization of the search efforts under generalized linear constraints

This paper deals with search for a target following a Markovian movement or a conditionally deterministic motion. The problem is to allocate the search efforts, when search resources renew with generalized linear constraints. The model obtained is extended to resource mixing management. New optimality equations of de Guenin's style are obtained. Practically, the problem is solved by using an algorithm derived from the FAB method. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 117–142, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.10009     

Note: Two rendezvous search problems on the line

A new upper bound is obtained for the two‐person symmetric rendezvous value on the real line when the distribution function of their initial distance apart is bounded. A second result shows that if three players are placed randomly on adjacent integers on the real line facing in random directions and able to move at a speed of at most 1, then they can ensure a three‐way meeting time of at most 7/2; the fact that 7/2 is a best possible result follows from work already in the literature. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 335–340, 1999     

Many‐player rendezvous search: Stick together or split and meet?

Rendezvous search finds the strategies that players should use in order to find one another when they are separated in a region. Previous papers have concentrated on the case where there are two players searching for one another. This paper looks at the problem when there are more than two players and concentrates on what they should do if some but not all of them meet together. It looks at two strategies—the stick together one and the split up and meet again one. This paper shows that the former is optimal among the class of strategies which require no memory and are stationary, and it gives a method of calculating the expected rendezvous time under it. However, simulation results comparing both strategies suggest that in most situations the split up and meet again strategy which requires some memory leads to faster expected rendezvous times. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48:710–721, 2001     

Optimal search for a moving target with the option to wait

We investigate the problem in which an agent has to find an object that moves between two locations according to a discrete Markov process (Pollock, Operat Res 18 (1970) 883–903). At every period, the agent has three options: searching left, searching right, and waiting. We assume that waiting is costless whereas searching is costly. Moreover, when the agent searches the location that contains the object, he finds it with probability 1 (i.e. there is no overlooking). Waiting can be useful because it could induce a more favorable probability distribution over the two locations next period. We find an essentially unique (nearly) optimal strategy, and prove that it is characterized by two thresholds (as conjectured by Weber, J Appl Probab 23 (1986) 708–717). We show, moreover, that it can never be optimal to search the location with the lower probability of containing the object. The latter result is far from obvious and is in clear contrast with the example in Ross (1983) for the model without waiting. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Continuous accumulation games on discrete locations

In an accumulation game, a HIDER attempts to accumulate a certain number of objects or a certain quantity of material before a certain time, and a SEEKER attempts to prevent this. In a continuous accumulation game the HIDER can pile material either at locations $1, 2, …, n, or over a region in space. The HIDER will win (payoff 1) it if accumulates N units of material before a given time, and the goal of the SEEKER will win (payoff 0) otherwise. We assume the HIDER can place continuous material such as fuel at discrete locations i = 1, 2, …, n, and the game is played in discrete time. At each time k > 0 the HIDER acquires h units of material and can distribute it among all of the locations. At the same time, k, the SEEKER can search a certain number s < n of the locations, and will confiscate (or destroy) all material found. After explicitly describing what we mean by a continuous accumulation game on discrete locations, we prove a theorem that gives a condition under which the HIDER can always win by using a uniform distribution at each stage of the game. When this condition does not hold, special cases and examples show that the resulting game becomes complicated even when played only for a single stage. We reduce the single stage game to an optimization problem, and also obtain some partial results on its solution. We also consider accumulation games where the locations are arranged in either a circle or in a line segment and the SEEKER must search a series of adjacent locations. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 60–77, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1048     

Rendezvous search on labeled networks

Two players are independently placed on a commonly labelled network X. They cannot see each other but wish to meet in least expected time. We consider continuous and discrete versions, in which they may move at unit speed or between adjacent distinct nodes, respectively. There are two versions of the problem (asymmetric or symmetric), depending on whether or not we allow the players to use different strategies. After obtaining some optimality conditions for general networks, we specialize to the interval and circle networks. In the first setting, we extend the work of J. V. Howard; in the second we prove a conjecture concerning the optimal symmetric strategy. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 256–274, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10011     

Discrete search allocation game with false contacts

This paper deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game, where a searcher and a target participate, taking account of false contacts. The searcher distributes his search effort in a search space in order to detect the target. On the other hand, the target moves to avoid the searcher. As a payoff of the game, we take the cumulative amount of search effort weighted by the target distribution, which can be derived as an approximation of the detection probability of the target. The searcher's strategy is a plan of distributing search effort and the target's is a movement represented by a path or transition probability across the search space. In the search, there are false contacts caused by environmental noises, signal processing noises, or real objects resembling true targets. If they happen, the searcher must take some time for their investigation, which interrupts the search for a while. There have been few researches dealing with search games with false contacts. In this paper, we formulate the game into a mathematical programming problem to obtain its equilibrium point. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Heuristics for the location of inspection stations on a network

This article considers the preventive flow interception problem (FIP) on a network. Given a directed network with known origin‐destination path flows, each generating a certain amount of risk, the preventive FIP consists of optimally locating m facilities on the network in order to maximize the total risk reduction. A greedy search heuristic as well as several variants of an ascent search heuristic and of a tabu search heuristic are presented for the FIP. Computational results indicate that the best versions of the latter heuristics consistently produce optimal or near optimal solutions on test problems. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 287–303, 2000     

Solving partially observable agent‐intruder games with an application to border security problems

In this paper, we introduce partially observable agent‐intruder games (POAIGs). These games model dynamic search games on graphs between security forces (an agent) and an intruder given possible (border) entry points and high value assets that require protection. The agent faces situations with dynamically changing, partially observable information about the state of the intruder and vice versa. The agent may place sensors at selected locations, while the intruder may recruit partners to observe the agent's movement. We formulate the problem as a two‐person zero‐sum game, and develop efficient algorithms to compute each player's optimal strategy. The solution to the game will help the agent choose sensor locations and design patrol routes that can handle imperfect information. First, we prove the existence of ?‐optimal strategies for POAIGs with an infinite time horizon. Second, we introduce a Bayesian approximation algorithm to identify these ?‐optimal strategies using belief functions that incorporate the imperfect information that becomes available during the game. For the solutions of large POAIGs with a finite time horizon, we use a solution method common to extensive form games, namely, the sequence form representation. To illustrate the POAIGs, we present several examples and numerical results.     

A m‐parallel crane scheduling problem with a non‐crossing constraint

In this paper, we study a m‐parallel machine scheduling problem with a non‐crossing constraint motivated by crane scheduling in ports. We decompose the problem to allow time allocations to be determined once crane assignments are known and construct a backtracking search scheme that manipulates domain reduction and pruning strategies. Simple approximation heuristics are developed, one of which guarantees solutions to be at most two times the optimum. For large‐scale problems, a simulated annealing heuristic that uses random neighborhood generation is provided. Computational experiments are conducted to test the algorithms. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007.     

Economic lot sizing with constant capacities and concave inventory costs

This article studies the classical single‐item economic lot‐sizing problem with constant capacities, fixed‐plus‐linear order costs, and concave inventory costs, where backlogging is allowed. We propose an O(T³) optimal algorithm for the problem, which improves upon the O(T⁴) running time of the famous algorithm developed by Florian and Klein (Manage Sci18 (1971) 12–20). Instead of using the standard dynamic programming approach by predetermining the minimal cost for every possible subplan, we develop a backward dynamic programming algorithm to obtain a more efficient implementation. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

A dual criteria sequencing problem with earliness and tardiness penalties

We consider the problem of sequencing n jobs on a single machine, with each job having a processing time and a common due date. The common due date is assumed to be so large that all jobs can complete by the due date. It is known that there is an O(n log n)‐time algorithm for finding a schedule with minimum total earliness and tardiness. In this article, we consider finding a schedule with dual criteria. The primary goal is to minimize the total earliness and tardiness. The secondary goals are to minimize: (1) the maximum earliness and tardiness; (2) the sum of the maximum of the squares of earliness and tardiness; (3) the sum of the squares of earliness and tardiness. For the first two criteria, we show that the problems are NP‐hard and we give a fully polynomial time approximation scheme for both of them. For the last two criteria, we show that the ratio of the worst schedule versus the best schedule is no more than . © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 422–431, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10020     

A search game on the union of graphs with immobile hider

We consider a search game for an immobile hider on one arc of the union of n graphs joined at one or two points. We evaluate a lower bound on the value of a strategy for the hider on this union. When we have identical graphs, we give the conditions under which the value of the strategy for the hider on this union is greater than or equal to n times the value of this strategy on one graph. We also solve search games on graphs, consisting of an odd number of arcs, each of length one, joining two points. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Search and the introduction of improved technologies

Modeling R&D as standard sequential search, we consider a monopolist who can implement a sequence of technological discoveries during the technology search process: he earns revenue on his installed technology while he engages in R&D to find improved technology. What is not standard is that he has a finite number of opportunities to introduce improved technology. We show that his optimal policy is characterized by thresholds ξ_i(x): introduce the newly found technology if and only if it exceeds ξ_i(x) when x is the state of the currently installed technology and i is the number of remaining introductions allowed. We also analyze a nonstationary learning‐by‐doing model in which the monopolist's experience in implementing new technologies imparts increased capability in generating new technologies. Because this nonstationary model is not in the class of monotone stopping problems, a number of surprising results hold and several seemingly obvious properties of the stationary model no longer hold. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Scheduling stochastic jobs with asymmetric earliness and tardiness penalties

We consider a stochastic counterpart of the well-known earliness-tardiness scheduling problem with a common due date, in which n stochastic jobs are to be processed on a single machine. The processing times of the jobs are independent and normally distributed random variables with known means and known variances that are proportional to the means. The due dates of the jobs are random variables following a common probability distribution. The objective is to minimize the expectation of a weighted combination of the earliness penalty, the tardiness penalty, and the flow-time penalty. One of our main results is that an optimal sequence for the problem must be V-shaped with respect to the mean processing times. Other characterizations of the optimal solution are also established. Two algorithms are proposed, which can generate optimal or near-optimal solutions in pseudopolynomial time. The proposed algorithms are also extended to problems where processing times do not satisfy the assumption in the model above, and are evaluated when processing times follow different probability distributions, including general normal (without the proportional relation between variances and means), uniform, Laplace, and exponential. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44, 531–557, 1997.     

Using Lagrangean relaxation to minimize the weighted number of late jobs on a single machine

This paper tackles the general single machine scheduling problem, where jobs have different release and due dates and the objective is to minimize the weighted number of late jobs. The notion of master sequence is first introduced, i.e., a sequence that contains at least an optimal sequence of jobs on time. This master sequence is used to derive an original mixed‐integer linear programming formulation. By relaxing some constraints, a Lagrangean relaxation algorithm is designed which gives both lower and upper bounds. The special case where jobs have equal weights is analyzed. Computational results are presented and, although the duality gap becomes larger with the number of jobs, it is possible to solve problems of more than 100 jobs. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 2003     

Duality in constrained multi‐facility location models

We consider the ??_p‐norm multi‐facility minisum location problem with linear and distance constraints, and develop the Lagrangian dual formulation for this problem. The model that we consider represents the most general location model in which the dual formulation is not found in the literature. We find that, because of its linear objective function and less number of variables, the Lagrangian dual is more useful. Additionally, the dual formulation eliminates the differentiability problem in the primal formulation. We also provide the Lagrangian dual formulation of the multi‐facility minisum location problem with the ??_pb‐norm. Finally, we provide a numerical example for solving the Lagrangian dual formulation and obtaining the optimum facility locations from the solution of the dual formulation. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 410–421, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10010