Successful or Failed Rebellion? The Casamance Conflict from a Framing Perspective

Empirical evidence and theoretical work suggest that conflicts over self-determination are particularly likely to escalate into very violent and protracted civil wars. However, the intensity of the secessionist conflict in Casamance, Senegal, remained low. As prevailing theories on armed conflicts fail to explain the limited escalation in Casamance, this article resorts to framing theory. Framing helps to include a micro-approach towards conflict studies in order to overcome deficits of macro-approaches. It reveals how movements interpret and construct their environment in order to mobilise potential followers to participate in their activities with the help of strategic communication. However, framing only leads to collective action, if it effectively resonates with the population addressed. The article shows that the movement's framing successfully initiated rebellion in Casamance, but did not broadly resonate with the population, which accounts for the limited intensity of violence.     

Selling the end of terrorism: a framing approach to the IRA’s disengagement from armed violence

Experiences from the end of the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s campaign of armed violence have informed broader debates on how terrorism ends, yet this research has underplayed the internal dynamics which made the IRA’s disengagement successful. The article utilises a framing approach to explain how a network within the IRA managed to ensure the majority of the movement supported an end to violence. A disengagement frame was constructed by this network within the IRA which maintained narrative fidelity, it utilised the credibility of mid-ranking commanders, and there were sufficient linkages to diffuse the frame due to generational hegemony, the structure of the IRA, and the unique structure of the prisons system. Finally, the article challenges the utility of decapitation strategies because organisational stability can maintain the components which ensure a disengagement frame will resonate.     

Theory,Method, and the Mechanism of Framing: Reflections on the Syrian Civil War and Palestinian Intifada

This article bridges two literatures: research on social movements, in which framing is widely recognized as an important causal mechanism; and research in civil wars and insurgencies, which tends to deemphasize cultural-interpretative factors such as framing. We argue that it is important that insights of framing be applied to insurgencies because there is a fundamental framing action that often occurs. We have in mind civil wars in which oppositional activists, who previously had pursued nonviolent tactics, apply a prognostic frame of ‘what to do’ that specifies armed conflict. Drawing on methodologies of subject–verb–object grammars used to analyze political texts, this article elaborates a comprehensive approach to framing that involves not only shifts in the < verb>, or specifications of ‘what to do’, but also shifts in a < subject>, or definitions of ‘who we are’, and in an < object>, or the targets of ‘who the enemy is’. We use organizational texts from the first Palestinian Intifada to demonstrate the approach. We also consider frame shifts in the Syrian civil war, inferring the grammatical structures of the frame transformations for secularists and radical Islamists from events leading up to the outbreak of sustained violence. This article proposes that a three-part grammatical approach captures the interrelated elements of a full and robust framing mechanism that is generalizable. It represents an advance over framing perspectives that typically isolate identity and target components from action prognoses, therefore missing the synchronization among the three, and how limits and/or opportunities for one shape the definition of the others.     

Framing Political Violence: Success and Failure of Religious Mobilization in the Philippines and Thailand

How do religious civil wars evolve? Many violent conflicts are fought between groups of different faiths. The paper argues, however, that religious differences rarely directly lead to conflict onset. Rather, the apparent religious dimension of many civil wars is a consequence of successful religious framing. Political and military leaders offer religious interpretations designed to legitimize the use of force and to mobilize believers to violent action. Such framing processes can be more or less successful, depending inter alia on the authority of the political and religious leadership, on the coherence and appropriateness of the frames, on the existence of persuasive counter-frames, and on the availability of communication infrastructures that allow for effective dissemination of religious frames. Comparing violent conflicts in the Philippines and Thailand, the paper shows that religious mobilization can fail along the theoretically predicted lines.     

Politics in the shadow of the gun: revisiting the literature on ‘Rebel-to-Party Transformations’ through the case of Burundi

Abstract

This article provides a critical review of ‘rebel-to-party transformation’ scholarship. It shows how three flawed assumptions have underpinned much of the literature: (1) an ideal-typical differentiation between rebel group and political party as distinct by their use or rejection of violence; (2) the analysis of armed conflict as breakdown of ‘normal’ politics, and the study of ‘rebel-to-party conversions’ as a gradual, natural shift from violence back to politics; (3) a failure to integrate the study of rebel legacies into an examination of broader authoritarian legacies. These assumptions have clouded our understanding of politico-military organizations in conflict-torn societies, which combine social protest, armed rebellion, political violence, and party politics throughout their history. Drawing on the ‘no peace, no war’ and ‘armed politics’ paradigms, this article revisits these assumptions through the case of Burundi.     

Reluctant guerrillas in early nineteenth century China: the White Lotus insurgents and their suppressors

ABSTRACT

At the turn of the nineteenth century, China’s Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was hit by a sectarian rebellion. Commonly considered a breakpoint marking the end of the dynasty’s golden age spanning most of the eighteenth century, the war to suppress the rebels, referred to as the White Lotus War (1796–1804) in this article (‘White Lotus’ was the umbrella name used by both the authorities and some sectarians for their teaching), exposed many structural drawbacks of the Qing political and military systems and depleted the dynasty’s financial resources, which had never been recovered. Reluctant in embracing guerrilla warfare in the beginning, the insurgents quickly turned themselves into master guerrillas. Shuttling in two massive mountain ranges in central China, they managed to prolong their rebellion and fought some successful battles against their suppressors. Superior in manpower, weaponry, and logistical support, the government forces had to adapt to guerrilla warfare, albeit passively and ineptly. This article gives a brief introduction to this little-known episode of guerrilla war at the turn of the nineteenth century in Qing China, expounds the strengths and weaknesses of both sides, and sheds light on the roots of the war’s long duration and the grim consequences to the Qing state.     

Political systems,stability and civil wars

In this paper we analyze theoretically and empirically the stability of the different political systems; that is, their ability to prevent conflict. According to our model, the proportional system has a lower probability of group rebellion than the majoritarian system. In the empirical part we test the role of political systems in preventing civil wars. We show that democracy by itself does not play an important explanatory role, while the specific type of political system-majoritarian, presidential and proportional-does. The rationale of this result is that different political systems entail different opportunity costs of rebellion.     

How does state security limit the right to protest? State response to popular participation in South Africa

In South Africa, the right to protest has come under threat from the state. Increasing cases of forceful policing and, at times, unlawful procedural prohibitions of protest attest to this. Interviews with members of different community-based organisations across South Africa show that protest is sometimes delegitimised under the guise of security as protestors are constructed as threats to the state. The larger implication of this treatment is that these protestors are treated as non-citizens who are excluded from participating in governance. This study aims to describe this situation through securitisation theory, arguing that South Africa has become a securitised state. It therefore looks at the implications of this securitised response for popular participation in South Africa.     

Good Guest,Bad Guest: The Micro-Geographies of Violence in Urban Kenya

This article analyses the 2007–08 postelection violence in Kenya arguing that there were significant socio-spatial variations to the conflict in urban areas that can be better understood through an analysis of localised framing processes. It argues that, in some urban neighbourhoods, an underlying frame of autochthony is (re)produced through lived experience, facilitating the casting of ethnic others as either good or bad guests in times of political transition. The flawed elections of 2007 justified the violent eviction of ‘bad’ guests in these settings. This frame of autochthony, however, is absent in other urban neighbourhoods, and so these spaces remained relatively calm for the duration of the crisis. The article further argues that the flexibility of the good guest/bad guest frame enabled its reconfiguration at the local level, leading to variations in the fault lines of conflict across both time and space. It concludes that frame analysis can help to elucidate these micro-geographies of conflict.     

Dirty war: chemical weapon use and domestic repression

The utilization of chemical weapons to quash domestic rebellion is a drastic action for a regime facing domestic challengers to take, especially given the reputation costs and risk of international intervention. However, recent developments have illustrated that some regimes have contemplated and implemented extraordinary measures (including the use of chemical munitions) to quash rebellion. This study addresses the question of why some states utilize chemical weapons against domestic challengers while others refrain from this level of state repression. I argue that the utilization of chemical weapons has both domestic and international elements. Specifically, that ethnic cleavages that lead to secessionist challenges and factors associated with inter-state rivalry impact the likelihood that a state utilizes the employment of chemical munitions. I test my argument and other explanations regarding repression with a casestudy approach utilizing captured Iraqi Government documents comparing Iraq’s Al-Anfal campaigns with developments during the recent Syrian Civil War.     

Understanding the ‘failure’ of the Séléka rebellion

This paper examines the downfall of the Séléka rebellion, which staged a coup in the Central African Republic in March 2013. The coup plunged the country into violence and chaos, and there has been an uneasy quest for peace ever since. This article explains why the leader of the rebellion lost control over his troops and was finally pushed by regional actors to leave power. The article concludes that the Séléka rebellion was already fragile and, together with the poor leadership demonstrated by the coalition leader, the rebellion was unable to hold on to power.     

Rebellion and African Ethics

In this paper I draw on Thaddeus Metz’s pioneering work in African ethics, and particularly his account of the concept described by the terms ubuntu (Nguni languages), botho (Sotho-Tswana), hunhu (Shona) or utu (Swahili), to sketch an African normative understanding of the act of rebellion against the authority of the state. Most commonly articulated in the phrase “a person is a person through other persons”, ubuntu is interpreted by Metz as a unique communitarian moral principle which can be described in its essence as the claim that “actions are right, or confer ubuntu (humanness) on a person, insofar as they prize communal relationships, ones in which people identify with each other, or share a way of life, and exhibit solidarity toward one another, or care about each other’s quality of life”. On the face of it, this principle appears at odds with rebellions against state authority. Following Metz, I argue, however, that a deeper grasp of this principle does, in fact, provide a justification for instances of civilian rebellion against state authority, under appropriate circumstances.     

基于星架系统结构参数的卫星载荷减振方法

卫星工程中广泛采用的有效载荷支架结构可能会与卫星主体结构发生动力耦合,进而造成有效载荷响应显著放大。进一步将有效载荷支架与卫星主体结构考虑为一个整体系统(称为星架系统)。采用有限元方法建立某型卫星系统级动力学分析模型,从中提取结构参数建立集中参数模型,并针对结构参数进行单变量影响分析。结果表明:所建集中参数模型能够反映支架结构与卫星主体结构之间动力耦合规律,载荷响应对两者频率参数的敏感程度远高于其阻尼和质量参数,卫星结构设计阶段应重点考量主体结构和支架结构频率关系以优化卫星载荷的动力学环境。     

Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in Sierra Leone

ABSTRACT

Following frustrating campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western interventions are becoming more limited, with troops being deployed for short bursts and residual peace-building tasks being left to others. Although this approach limits exposure for the intervening government, it struggles to achieve meaningful political change. Examining the comparatively successful British intervention in Sierra Leone (2000–02), this article identifies the conditions for effectiveness in these campaigns. It challenges the historiography of the case by framing armed confrontations and raids as enablers of politics rather than ends in themselves; indeed, in both the conduct and study of intervention, politics must reign supreme.     

(Re-)emergent orders: understanding the negotiation(s) of rebel governance

Abstract

The concept of order is often neglected in the study of conflict – seemingly such a ‘disordering’ process. With the recent increase in the examination of rebel governance however, bringing order back into our understanding of rebel and insurgent groups has much to offer in exploring the everyday politics which connect authorities, rebel movements and the population itself, in a complex mass of intersubjective and power-based interactions and negotiations. Rebels both shape and are shaped by existing forms of order in complex and ongoing ways. This article explores how varying elements interact in the negotiation, framing and enforcement of order and develops an original analytical framework to examine the perpetual negotiations of rebel movements in their attempts to cement their control.     

The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad factor in the Mali crisis

Mali has been a battleground for more than a year now. While the armed conflict came in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis that left the regional security environment depleted, it also served as a catalyst for the collapse of state authority in Mali. This created conditions conducive for the proliferation of, and attacks by, radical religious armed groups in the northern regions of the country, including the Tuareg armed movement: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). But, far from being a new phenomenon, the Tuareg-led armed insurrection in the northern regions is as old as the post-colonial Malian state, and continues to pose tremendous challenges in West Africa and the Sahel region for both regional and extra-regional actors. The recent crisis in the Sahel region is seen as one of the most serious since the end of the Cold War, with anticipated dire long-term impacts on the security of the region and beyond. While attention is predominantly focused on defeating the jihadist groups that have threatened the survival of the Malian state, one must not lose sight of the fact that the ‘Tuareg Factor’, as represented by the rebellion launched by MNLA, remains critical both in terms of appreciating the deterioration of the situation and attempting to frame long-lasting solutions. The paper argues that the Tuareg's persistent recourse to rebellion against Bamako needs to be understood within a historical trajectory that takes into consideration three key parameters: firstly, the post-colonial state in Mali and its African leadership's relations with the descendants of the Tuareg communities; secondly, the amalgamation created by the so-called war on terror; and, finally, the contradictions of the democratisation process of the 1990s.¹1 This article is based on field research carried out between 2008 and 2013 on the ‘Resurgence of Tuareg-led Rebellions’.     

Violent vs. Non-Violent Struggle: Investigating the Impact of Frames on Movement Strategies in Yemen

Why do some opposition movements escalate into armed conflict while others abide non-violently under very similar conditions? In order to account for this variance, the article proposes to transcend the limitations of existing structural theories within civil war studies by including a framing perspective. It accentuates and elucidates the agency component and the interactive dynamics of the construction and negotiation of meaning, which remain a ‘black box’ in current models. In a comparative study of two movements in Yemen, the article identifies and describes the respective collective action frames, establishes why and how strategic movement actors construct them in their specific particularity, and relates this to the question of why constituents take certain forms of action. The findings assert the theoretical contribution of an integrative approach.     

Bush path to self-destruction: Charles Taylor and the Revolutionary United Front

This article explains the demise of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebellion. It argues that the main cause of this fate was the group's relationship with its primary sponsor, Charles Taylor. The RUF's dependency on Taylor's patronage, coupled with the rebellion's weak organisational endowments harmed the group's prospects of success. Based on original research, the article shows how Taylor used the RUF as a strategic instrument for his own regional interests, which led to the group's unravelling. More broadly, the article speaks about proxy warfare in Africa and how the relationship between resource flows and rebellion are not always beneficial to rebels as one might expect.     

Desert insurgency: lessons from the third Tuareg rebellion

This article provides an in-depth examination and analysis of the 2006–2009 Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger. It identifies the underlying reasons behind the rebellion, explores contrasting counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies employed by the two governments, and presents some lessons learned. While both COIN approaches ultimately produced similar peace settlements, the article argues that the Malian strategy of reconciliation combined with the selective use of force was far more effective than the Nigerien iron fist approach at limiting the size and scope of the insurgency and producing a more sustainable peace. It concludes by looking at the role of external actors, particularly the United States, and how the failure to internationalize the conflict was actually more beneficial to the local COIN effort, as well as to the longer strategic interests of the United States in the region.     

Icons Off the Mark

In two landmark articles, longtime scholars Kenneth N. Waltz and Thomas C. Schelling have re-emphasized the utility of nuclear deterrence over nuclear nonproliferation (Waltz) and nuclear disarmament (Schelling). While the thrust of the articles is seemingly different, both are rooted in the same intellectual ground: an epistemology that assumes problem-free inferences, drawn from past experiences, are applicable in future scenarios; a foundational rooting in strategic rationality that entangles them in unsolvable contradictions concerning comparable risks of different nuclear constellations, namely deterrence versus proliferation and disarmament; and a bias in framing the empirical record that makes nuclear deterrence more conducive to security than nuclear disarmament. The common normative-practical denominator, then, is to let a nuclear weapon-free world appear both less desirable and less feasible than it might actually be.