The 1907 Naval War Plans and the second Hague peace conference: A case of propaganda 1

The phenomenon of mutual sea denial had rendered offensive naval actions such as commercial blockade impossible in the narrow seas around Europe. Consequently, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, abandoned commercial blockade for the safer option of interdicting enemy commerce on the high seas where the Royal Navy could control communications. The proposal to extend immunity to all private property at sea at the 1907 Hague Conference threatened this strategy. As part of a wider campaign to convince the British establishment to oppose immunity, Fisher created the 1907 Naval War Plans to directly influence Cabinet decision-making. Fisher's close involvement in the creation of the ‘Plans’ indicates that they are an expression of Fisher's strategic vision. Moreover, Fisher's attempt to influence the Cabinet asks questions of the bureaucratic decision-making process within the British establishment before 1914.     

Regina Maris and the Command of the Sea: The Sixteenth Century Origins of Modern Maritime Strategy

The concept of the command of the sea has its roots in medieval notions of the sovereignty of coastal waters, as claimed by several monarchs and polities of Europe. In the sixteenth century, a surge of intellectual creativity, especially in Elizabethan England, fused this notion with the Thucydidean term ‘thalassocracy’ – the rule of the sea. In the light of the explorations of the oceans, this led to a new conceptualisation of naval warfare, developed in theory and then put into practice. This falsifies the mistaken but widespread assumption that there was no significant writing on naval strategy before the nineteenth century.     

Expanding the Dragon’s Reach:The Rise of China’s Anti-access Naval Doctrine and Forces

Among the multiple dimensions of the tous azimuths modernisation of Chinese naval forces, the development of China’s anti-access capacity has recently elicited considerable interest. The important link between this capacity and an overarching vision of the use of force – i.e. a naval doctrine – has, however, often been left implicit. This article shows that the particular development of China’s naval anti-access forces – more precisely, forces with an impact on the naval balance – can be explained by a shift of China’s naval doctrine towards a distinctly pre-emptive posture, which, itself, stems from the set of constraints imposed by the framework of ‘local war under informationised conditions’.     

How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO Archives

From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the ‘High North’ constituted a central theatre for military forces. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway, and frequent and large-scale exercises were carried out. These developments, from the late 1970s, were much discussed by scholars and strategists. However, the change of perception, laying the foundation for the military build-up, had actually occurred a decade earlier, in the late 1960s. This change has not yet been given its rightful attention, partly because the relevant documents have only recently become available. This essay takes the chronology of events back into the 1960s and to NATO's secret discussions between the national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. The most significant turning-points were the Flexible Response strategy of 1967; SACLANT's concern over increased Soviet naval activity and his ‘Maritime Strategy’ studies of 1965 and 1967; NATO's awakening to the Soviet SSBN threat in 1967; and the concept of ‘External Reinforcement of the Flanks’ of 1968 – finally followed by the ‘Brosio Study’ (named after the then NATO Secretary-General) of 1969. As a consequence of these developments NATO's ‘tactical northern flank’ was set to become an independent strategic theatre.     

Rising Tide,Dispersing Waves: Opportunities and Challenges for Chinese Seapower Development

Abstract

This article surveys China’s current naval forces and considers key dynamics and possible Chinese naval futures to 2020, the projected end of Beijing’s ‘strategic window of opportunity’, the idea that a peaceful external environment for economic development, globalization, and integration of China into the global economy allows China to benefit from diversion of US attention to countering terrorism. It considers broad possibilities through 2030, the general limit of public US government projections, and by which time multiple factors will likely slow China’s growth and compete for leadership focus and resources.     

Shielding the ‘Hot Gates’: Submarine Warfare and Japanese Naval Strategy in the Cold War and Beyond (1976–2006)

The build-up of Japan's military apparatus in the 1990s and 2000s has been often regarded by security analysts as indicative of a departure from the country's Cold War strategic posture. Japan appears to be engaged in a process of militarisation that is eroding the foundations of its ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ policy. In the case of the archipelago's naval strategy, such assessments overlook the longstanding significance of a core feature of its defence policy, namely the surveillance of maritime crossroads delivering the wealth of the country. The paper reassesses the evolution of the Japanese strategy since the Cold War by examining the development of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force's submarine force, one of the key components of the defensive shield for these crossroads. The paper argues that with the changes in the security environment of the 1990s, Japan already fielded a mature force with state-of-the-art submarines, and that the rise of a new naval competitor aiming at controlling key strategic points along Japan's sea lanes reconfirmed the critical importance of submarine operations to Japanese national security.     

The German campaign in Norway 1940 as a joint operation

The German invasion in Norway in April 1940 was unique in that it was the first major ‘triphibious’ campaign. It was an operation that was equally dependent upon naval, air and ground forces for success. Norway had long been of interest to German strategists, especially naval thinkers. However, no serious Wehrmacht plans for occupying Norway were even started until December 1939. A small group of staff officers of the three services put together a comprehensive plan in a matter of weeks. The article examines the effectiveness of the German interservice co‐operation and OKW leadership in a very tough and close run campaign. Although there were numerous problems, interservice co‐operation was fairly effective at the tactical and operational levels. Indeed, the Germans won the campaign largely because their services worked together much better than their Allied opponents.     

无线传感器网络在海防工程结构健康监测中的应用

海防工程是海军赢得非接触、非对称作战胜利和保存作战潜力的重要硬件基础,将关系到海军作战装备战斗力的发挥,直接影响作战的进程与结局。因此,海防工程结构健康监测系统正成为军内学术界和工程界的研究热点。无线传感器网络由于安装方便、维护成本低和部署灵活等特点,已被广泛应用于各类工程结构健康监测系统中。本文阐述了基于无线传感器网络的海防工程结构健康监测系统提出的背景、基本概念和构成体系,通过模拟部署舰艇洞库结构健康监测系统,协作地实时感知和采集洞库结构信息及环境数据,从而实现海防工程、信息网络和后勤管理的无缝衔接,形成一体化保障能力。     

MAD,not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution

The revival of nuclear strategy in US policy and scholarship has been strengthened by arguments that the ‘nuclear revolution’ – the assumption that thermonuclear bombs and missiles had made major war too dangerous to wage – does not affect international behaviour as much as nuclear revolution advocates claim. This article shows that the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev indeed regarded nuclear war as too dangerous to wage, a decision which manifested itself not so much in foreign policy or military doctrine but in his determination to avoid war when the possibility arose. We argue that Khrushchev’s experience provides us with a more useful way to characterise the nuclear revolution and suggest some implications of this argument for contemporary debates about nuclear weaponry.     

SLOWING DOWN TO KEEP THE LEAD IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

We develop a model of military technology competition among states. States can choose to introduce new military technology, mimic rivals’ level of technology, or withdraw from the contest. States can choose to implement any level of technology within their current feasible technologies. We find that states with significant technological leads should sometimes withhold new technologies, only strategically releasing them to trump rivals’ efforts. We develop the model by refining Admiral Jackie Fisher’s roughly articulated concept of ‘plunging’. We then use this refined argument to reanalyze the case of naval rivalries among European powers between the Crimean War and the First World War. Finally, we conclude by discussing the model’s implications for current US military force structure planning.     

Strategy,Fleet Logistics,and the Lethbridge Mission to the Pacific and Indian Oceans 1943–1944

In modern warfare at and from the sea, logistics are crucially important to the implementation of strategy and conduct of operational campaigns. Between August 1943 and March 1944, a British joint service mission led by Major-General John Lethbridge travelled to North America, the Pacific, and India to study the organisation, equipment, and methods necessary for coming offensive operations against Japan. The British obtained valuable information from the Americans and connected with those countries of the British Empire most directly involved. The Lethbridge Mission's progress and findings informed evolving Admiralty planning for supporting naval forces to be sent to the Indian and Pacific Oceans in pursuance of British wartime strategy.     

Holding the Bridge in Troubled Times: The Cold War and the Navies of Europe

European navies made a fundamental contribution to the Cold War at sea, ensuring the effectiveness of deterrence even as Soviet naval forces grew to ominous proportions. European fleets were tasked with containing a Soviet attack until US forces could arrive on the scene. Many European navies pursued essential niche capabilities tailored for their own unique maritime environments. Others made important contributions to broader NATO efforts in the high-stakes arenas of sea control, power projection and even nuclear deterrence. Contentious issues did arise, for example concerning burden-sharing, but true to its name, the alliance succeeded collectively in wielding formidable sea power. This paper is based on the premise that the maritime players in the Cold War at sea were by no means restricted to the US and Soviet navies. The navies of Western Europe and Canada had major roles to play as well within the NATO area. They contributed a great deal to the political cohesion crucial to an essentially maritime alliance, and in many cases had a real operational contribution to make as well. What follows, then, is the Cold War at sea from a European point of view.     

舰艇导弹武控系统分析

水面舰艇海上作战的主要威胁来自于敌方反舰导弹的攻击,水面舰艇的防空作战能力成为其作战效能的重要指标之一,而武控系统又是舰载防空导弹武器系统的核心。通过分析舰载武控系统的设计原则、种类、内涵等内容,结合武控系统软件的特点,对开放式体系结构在大型复杂军用实时系统中的应用进行了论述,通过分析得出了几个有益的结论。     

An historical review of US defense strategy from Vietnam to operation Iraqi freedom

Facing nearly half a billion dollars in spending cuts over the next five years, US defense planners and strategists must simultaneously rebuild a war-weary Army weakened from over a decade of war, build new sea and air capabilities for the Pacific theater, and reduce manpower, procurement, and contractor budgets while promoting innovation. The US defense department is embarking on what may be the most sweeping period of defense transformation in recent memory. This article reviews the history of American defense transformation, focusing on an important but largely overlooked period of military innovation that began in the shadow of Vietnam and ended with troops fighting through blinding sandstorms at night on the road to Baghdad. The multifaceted transformation strategy conceived in the 1970s paved the way for a military revolution in the 1990s and enabled unprecedented battlefield adaptation in the 2000s. After reviewing the revolutionary changes that led to American dominance in conventional warfare in the 1990s, the article examines US transformation policies in the 2000s to inform defense strategy and planning efforts in the 2010s.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

International Security,Multiple Public Good Provisions,and The Exploitation Hypothesis

Since the 1960s Olson-Zeckhauser’s (1966) analysis, its ‘exploitation of the great by the small’ has provided economists’ core model of alliance’s provision of security/defense. But with the end of the Cold War, countries’ allocative behavior has diverged markedly from OZ’s predictions for defense as a homogeneous pure public good voluntarily provided. This paper suggests a replacement for OZ, with the essential difference that ‘defense’ rather than being aggregated into their single public good is disaggregated into more realistic categories of self-insurance and self-protection. Because allocative behavior in public good groups is essentially driven by income effects, we concentrate on these, which become complex and conflicted, giving much greater scope for goods-inferiority. The analysis is followed by numerical simulations, which conform to actual experienced allocations in NATO much better than the conventional ‘exploitation’ model.     

ANALYSING QUITS AND SEPARATIONS FROM THE ROYAL NAVY

Manning difficulties and retention of skilled personnel is a timely issue in the British armed forces, and especially in the all‐volunteer Royal Navy. Allied with difficulties of matching personnel numbers and posts, significant skill mismatches can take a long time to eradicate, with obvious financial and operational penalties. In the light of these factors, a holistic understanding of the exit behaviour of naval personnel is vital for naval manpower planners. This paper analyses ratings’ voluntary (quits) and involuntary (separation) exit patterns from the Royal Navy using an independent competing risks hazard regression analysis framework. The results show that both voluntary and involuntary exits are pro cyclical with respect to macroeconomic and labour market conditions for both male and female ratings. Male ratings are more likely to quit or separate due to a lack of promotion to higher ranks as compared with females. Male ratings are also more likely to quit as a result of a hectic operational tempo when compared with their female counterparts. Frequency of sea/shore deployments also seems to exert a significant effect with respect to quits and separation outcomes of both genders. In terms of marital status married males are less likely to quit compared with their unmarried male counterparts, whereas the opposite is the case for female ratings.     

美军“作战信息中心”的概念、内涵及启示

自20世纪中叶,美军舰载指挥控制系统中频繁出现一个词“CIC（ Combat Information Center）”,由此,CIC作为舰艇中枢神经,几乎成为美军各型舰艇的标准配置。国内很多技术人员和参考书籍将CIC翻译成“作战情报中心”,这容易引起很多误解。注意CIC用词“Information”,不是“Intelligence”,一词之差、谬之千里,应该译为“作战信息中心”。侧重于对CIC的内涵进行剖析,试图揭示其内在的发展规律。 CIC的演化过程中蕴涵着美军在装备发展过程中的各种试错、实践、经验和教训,美军装备建设的严谨、求实和科学的成份,特别是其技术进步的持续性和连贯性,值得借鉴和思考。     

Reform,democratization, and counter-insurgency: evaluating the US experience in Cold War-era Latin America

Current debate on US counter-insurgency doctrine is dominated by the notion that promoting ‘legitimacy’ and ‘good governance’ constitutes a central strategic imperative. This idea is hardly new; during the Cold War US officials often sought to encourage democratization and socio-economic reform as antidotes to revolution in Latin America. This article reviews four such cases – Venezuela during the first half of the 1960s, Guatemala throughout the 1960s, Nicaragua during the late 1970s, and El Salvador during the 1980s. The purpose is to bring a historical perspective to bear on current debates about the feasibility of US counter-insurgency strategy by evaluating the effectiveness of previous campaigns to promote improved governance in developing societies wracked by guerrilla violence.