考虑弹体动态特性的非奇异有限时间制导律

为满足导弹拦截机动目标时交会角约束和有限时间收敛的需求,建立了考虑弹体一阶动态特性的制导模型。把目标加速度视为有界外界干扰,同时结合非线性反步设计法中的动态面法,设计一种考虑弹体动态延迟的非奇异滑模制导律,并且证明了基于Lyapunov稳定性理论制导系统状态可渐进收敛到零。在所设计的制导律下,对单侧机动的低空高速目标进行仿真。仿真结果表明所设计的非奇异制导律可以有效降低弹体动态延迟带来的影响,而且具有较低的脱靶量与交会角误差;与考虑弹体动态特性和交会角约束的最优导引律相比,其具有更高的制导精度。     

基于角色的仿真动态建模研究

提出的基于角色的仿真建模方法，详细论述了该方法的建模过程与步骤，阐述了利用角色来达成建模的本质。典型仿真应用表明，该方法在建立仿真动态模型方面是有效可行的，且其具有良好的通用性、封装性、异步并发性及多分辨率特性，能够很好地解决日益复杂的仿真动态模型的建模问题。     

ANSYS在方位保持部件温度场分析中的应用

在对方位保持部件进行合理简化的基础上,建立了方位保持部件的三维有限元模型.运用ANSYS5.6的热分析功能对温控过程中方位保持部件的工作环境进行了定量热分析,为测温点的设置提供了重要参考.     

一种分析广义脊形传输器件的新型数值方法

利用Compact 2-D频域有限差分(FDFD)法分析广义脊形传输器件特性,得到的本征方程只涉及4个横向场分量,与同时处理6个场分量的本征问题相比,大大降低了CPU时间,同时由给定的工作频率f求解相移常数β,易于实际应用.针对广义脊形传输器件的复杂结构,本文划分了不同的子区.几种代表性的脊形波导传输结构分析结果与其他方法一致,表明了本文分析思路的可行性.     

低功率霍尔推力器阳极供气环工程设计关键参数仿真

为了提高低功率霍尔推力器放电通道内中性原子分布均匀性,采用有限元方法对阳极供气环关键结构参数进行优化研究。针对双腔式阳极供气环结构,重点分析了缓冲腔容积比以及缓冲腔隔板导流小孔数量等关键参数对阳极供气均匀性的影响。研究结果表明:随着缓冲腔容积比的增大,阳极供气环出气孔差异率先快速减小后趋于稳定,其中当容积率k=1.0时,平均差异率和最大差异率分别为1.77%和3.79%;隔板间导流小孔数量从8增加到14时,出气孔差异率呈现浴盆曲线特性,其中导流孔数量为10时,平均差异率和最大差异率分别为1.8%和3.8%。研究结果可为霍尔推力器阳极供气环工程设计提供理论支撑。     

基于自适应二阶终端滑模的航天器有限时间姿态机动算法

针对航天器有限时间姿态机动问题,提出一种自适应二阶终端滑模控制算法。设计一种终端滑模面,保证系统状态能够在有限时间内沿滑模面收敛到系统原点;为克服系统抖振,设计了二阶终端滑模控制器,并采用参数自适应估计项补偿系统中的外部干扰力矩。基于Lyapunov函数法证明了二阶自适应终端滑模控制器能够保证闭环系统实际有限时间稳定。仿真结果表明,提出的姿态机动算法响应速度快、精度高,能够有效实现对系统抖振和外部干扰的抑制,具有重要的科学意义和工程应用价值。     

罐底渗漏的罐基油气质量分数探测法识别

油罐是油品储运的重要设备,罐底最易出现穿孔渗漏油现象,致使罐基内部油气质量分数高于正常值。以油库中柴油覆土罐群为例,研究并试验了根据罐基油气质量分数识别罐底渗漏的方法：分析罐基探漏孔位置分布并钻孔;多次探测罐基油气质量分数,根据探测数据识别各罐有无底部渗漏;为了便于以后检测油库时识别各罐有无渗漏,为各罐建立状态监测表,并将无渗漏的罐基油气质量分数最高值暂定为该类罐的安全值,低于该安全值的油罐可直接判定为无渗漏。实践结果证明,这种不开罐检测罐底渗漏油的方法可及时发现故障并采取措施,对储油安全具有重要意义。     

From stopping to preventing atrocities

The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) provides for the right of the continental body to intervene in the face of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. According to its formulation, Article 4(h) intervention entails military force, which is triggered when a target state fails to discharge its duty to protect its population from mass atrocities. Although Article 4(h) is an ambitious statutory commitment to intervene in a member state by the AU, the Libyan crisis in 2011 showed the ambivalence of the continental institution to act in a decisive and timely manner. The AU's failure to invoke Article 4(h) exposed the need for building the capacity and political will to intervene and to interpret Article 4(h). Therefore, the primary focus of this article is on how Article 4(h) should be interpreted. Flowing from the Pretoria Principles, which seek to provide clarity on the implementation of the AU's right of intervention, Article 4(h) should be viewed as a duty rather than a right to prevent or stop mass atrocities. The duty dimension of Article 4(h) derives from the international instruments that AU member states have ratified to prevent mass atrocities. Rather than being a paper tiger, Article 4(h) should be used in a proactive and timely manner as a military option available to the AU to persuade member states to prevent or halt atrocities. As a last resort, military force pursuant to Article 4(h) should aim at protecting the population at risk and pursuing the perpetrators in order to avoid contravening Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Although military intervention can save lives in the short term, it cannot necessarily address the underlying, structural causes of atrocities, such as ethnic rivalries, economic inequalities and scramble for natural resources, among others. Therefore, the prevention of mass atrocities should not be equated with, or be seen through the prism of, Article 4(h) intervention alone. The focus should instead be on the entire spectrum of preventive strategies at the disposal of the AU in the face of mass atrocities, including the African human rights system and the African Peer Review Mechanism.     

THE ACRS EXPERIENCE AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE WMDFZ CONFERENCE

This article examines the arms control logic that was applied to the only regional arms control talks that have taken place in the Middle East to date: the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group that was part of the multilateral track of the Madrid peace process in the early 1990s. It highlights both the successes and major constraints of the ACRS talks in an effort to assess what might be relevant to the weapons of mass destruction-free zone conference proposed for later this year. In addition to the basic arms control dilemmas that will continue to challenge this conference—as they did ACRS—the article suggests that current conditions in the Middle East are even less conducive to regional dialogue than they were in the earlier period, due to the internal upheavals in several key Arab states, and the specific challenge of Iran's move to develop a military nuclear capability.     

THE MIDDLE EAST WMD-FREE ZONE CONFERENCE

This article reviews the origins and evolution of the Middle East weapons of mass destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) concept and the proposal for a 2012 conference on the subject, and explores new challenges and opportunities for regional arms control in the current regional environment. It suggests that new models may be necessary to revitalize regional arms control efforts. The establishment of a broad regional security forum could include, but should not be limited to, curtailing weapons of mass destruction through the zone approach. Even if the 2012 conference fails to materialize, or is limited to a one-time event, the proposal for such a conference has provided an important opportunity to rethink future options for a regional arms control and security process.