关于Reich的公开问题

设E是具有一致G -可微范数的实Banach空间 ,D是E的非空闭凸子集 ,T :D→D是非扩张映象 ,F(T)非空。设 {αn} ,{ βn}是 [0 ,1]中满足一定条件的两个序列 ,定义压缩映象St:D→D为 :St(z) =(1-t)x tTz , x ,z∈D , n≥ 1,t∈ (0 ,1) .设zt 是St 的唯一不动点 ,若当t→ 1-时 ,{zt}强收敛于某点z∈F(T) .那么 ,Reich序列 {xn}强收敛于某点z∈F(T) .     

凸度量空间中广义拟-压缩映象的不动点的逼近问题

设 (E ,d ,W )是完备的凸度量空间 ,T :E→E是广义拟—压缩映象 ,{xn}为T的带误差项的Ishikawa迭代序列。则 {xn}收敛于T的唯一的不动点 p∈E。     

Banach空间中含Lipschitz强增生 算子的算子方程之构造可解性

设X为实一致光滑Banach空间 ,A :X→X为Lipschitz强增生算子 ,设L≥ 1和k∈( 0 ,1)分别为A的Lipschitz常数与强增生常数。设 {tn}n≥ 0 为 ( 0 ,1]中的实数列满足条件 :(i)tn→ 0 (n→∞ ) ;(ii)∑∞n =0 tn=∞ , f∈X , x0 ∈X ,迭代地定义序列 {xn}n≥ 0如下 :( )　　xn 1 =xn-tn(Axn- f) ,n≥ 0 .则 {xn}n≥ 0 强收敛于方程Ax =f的唯一解 ,而且对充分大的n≥n0 ,‖Axn- f‖ ≤ exp{-k∑n- 1j=n0tj}‖Axn0 - f‖　　一个相关的结果研究含强伪压缩映象的方程Tx =x的构造可解性。     

关于强增生算子的Mann迭代序列收敛的充要条件

设Z是一致光滑Banach空间,T：X→X是次连续强增生算子,｛an｝、｛βn｝是两个实数列且满足0≤an≤1,及an→0（n→∞）,令Mann迭代序列｛Xn｝定义为证明了迭代序列｛xn｝强收敛于S的不动点q的充要条件是｜｜Txn｜｜有界。     

极大单调算子零点的逼近问题

设H为实Hilbert空间,C为H的非空闭凸子集,T:C→2H为极大单调算子,假设S(T)={x∈H:0∈Tx}≠Φ。 xk∈H,βk>0,求 xk及ek满足( )　　xk+ek∈ xk+βkT( xk),‖ek‖≤ηk‖xk- xk‖, k≥0,其中,ηk≥0,supk>0ηk<1,βk≥β>0。设PC:H→C为H到C上的最近点投影算子,定义xk+1=PC( xk-ek),k≥0,证明了若T满足(S)型条件,则{xk}k≥0强收敛于T的某个零点。     

一类随机差分方程的解序列的最优停止规则

设报酬序列{x_(?),(?),n≥0}满足随机差分方程x_(n+1)=x_n+a_n+b_nε_(n+1)(ε_1,ε_2,…为白噪声序列)。本文讨论了用有限情形{x_n,0≤n≤N}的Snell包逼近无限情形{x_n,n≥0)的Snell包的条件,得到了x_n=E(x_n|(?))((?)=σ{ε_0,ε_1,…,ε_n},ε_0=0)的Snell包r_n的分解形式和最优停时存在的条件。最后讨论了最优停止规则的迭代计算法,并得出了迭代过程在有限步停止的充分条件。     

集值拟终下鞅的收敛性与Riesz分解

本文在X^＊可分的条件下证明了集值拟终下鞅在弱收敛意义下的收敛定理，同时给出了如下集值拟终下鞅的Riesz分解定理：设{Fn，n≥1}包含Lc（X）为集值拟终下鞅，且满足（i）E｜｜Fτ｜｜I（τ〈∞）〈∞，偏dτ∈T，（ii）{｜｜Fn｜｜，n≥1}一致可积，则以下两条等价：（1）{Fn，n≥1}可Riesz分解； （2）Vn≥1，Fn关于E（F｜Bn）（n≥1）位似，其中Fn→w F。     

Banach空间中严格拟伪压缩映像族公共不动点的迭代算法

根据Banach空间中严格拟伪压缩映像不动点的迭代格式,将其扩充到无穷多个严格拟伪压缩映像族公共不动点的迭代算法,证明其强收敛定理,扩展了已知的相关结果．     

关于非扩展映象的有限族的一个强收敛性定理

讨论了一个非扩展映象的有限族所定义的迭代格式,证明了Banach空间中的一个非扩展映象的有限族的强收敛性定理。     

Hilbert空间极大单调算子零点的逼近问题

设H为实Hilbert空间,C为H的非空闭凸子集,T:C→2H为极大单调算子,假设S(T)={X∈H:O∈Tx}≠Φ。求xk及ek满足设Pc:H→C为H到C上的最近点投影算子,定义证明了Hilbert空间中由上式产生的序列{xk}k≥0弱收敛于T的某个零点。     

Putin – the masked nemesis of the strategy of ambiguity

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

Remembering and forgetting Mirambo: Histories of war in modern Africa

ABSTRACT

While the study of organised violence is considered essential to understanding the history of the West, and accordingly imbued with various layers of meaning and remembrance, war is widely regarded as inimical to the modern nation in Africa and stable development more broadly. Using examples drawn from primarily from East Africa, this paper considers the ways in which warfare in the deeper (‘precolonial’) past has been framed and envisioned in recent decades, in particular by governments whose own roots lie in revolutionary armed struggle and who began life as guerrilla movements. While in some cases particular elements of the deeper past were indeed mobilised in pursuit of contemporary political goals, in many other scenarios histories of precolonial violence were beheld as problematic and unworthy of remembrance. This paper highlights the paradox and ambiguity which has attended the memory of key aspects of Africa’s deeper past.     

The UK,interrogation and Iraq, 2003–2008

The UK’s interrogation operations during the conflict in Iraq (2003–2008) are often portrayed by the media as involving significant amounts of mistreatment. This article demonstrates that these practices are not necessarily representative of the UK’s interrogation operations across this conflict. In doing so it contributes to the limited literature on the practice of interrogation and on the UK’s combat operations in Iraq. The UK’s interrogation capability, and therefore its intelligence-gathering capability, is shown to have rested primarily with the military’s Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT). The JFIT suffered from limitations to the number, training and experience of its interrogators and interpreters. It is argued that maintaining a permanent, higher level of preparedness for interrogation by the British armed forces is desirable.     

SIM—LISP:一个通信网络管理专家系统外壳的设计与实现

本文介绍了笔者为开发名为OONMES的网络管理专家系统所实现的一个简单专家系统工具SIM-LISP。SIM-LISP是一个用C/C++语言来实现的模拟LISP语言的可调用函数集,它短小精巧,速度快,可以完成针对网管专家系统的事实或规则知识的表示、匹配、合一和推理等基本操作,并有与知识对象的连接功能,是网管专家系统内核实现的支撑环境。     

Al Qaida on the US invasion of Afghanistan in their own words

This article consists of selected translations from captured interviews and dairies of Al Qaida members. The time period covered is from mid-2001 to early 2002 and concerns their operations in Afghanistan. The material clearly conveys a range of emotion, from confident to despondent, as well as efforts to contest the US actions. The first several pages give the reader context and some possible “lessons learned,” but the story(ies) are best told by the Al Qaida members themselves. All names are pseudonyms.     

Does Intent equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The prospect of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is often referred to as the foremost danger to American national security. This danger has become more realistic because of al-Qaeda's expanding global network and the expressed willingness to kill thousands of civilians. In the past four years, numerous media reports have documented the group's ongoing quest for WMD capabilities; many reports have detailed al-Qaeda members’ attempts to manufacture or obtain certain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents to use in WMD against targets in the West and the Middle East. Yet the question remains: Does al-Qaeda's current WMD capability match its actual intent? While most studies of the group have focused on its explicit desire for WMD, allegations of CBRN acquisition, and the killing potential of specific CBRN agents, few open-source studies have closely examined the evolution of al-Qaeda's consideration of WMD and, most notably, the merit of actual CBRN production instructions as depicted and disseminated in the group's own literature and manuals. The following report will examine the history of al-Qaeda's interest in CBRN agents, the evolution of the network's attitude toward these weapons, and the internal debate within the organization concerning acquisition and use of WMD. More so, the following research will assess the validity of actual CBRN production instructions and capabilities as displayed and disseminated in al-Qaeda's own literature and websites.     

Late Medieval Lance Use: Mounted Combat and Martial Arts in Western Europe from the 14th to the 16th Century

Despite the lance’s status and the amount of attention the couched lance has received in historiography, study of its martial art has been neglected. The various lance types and techniques used by western European cavalry have only recently begun to receive scholarly attention. Additionally, Medieval European lance use has too often been studied in isolation, without an adequate understanding of the idiosyncratic and asymmetrical dynamics of mounted combat. Although the charge with the couched lance was a valid tactic, it was only one of many. Light and heavy lances were used in one hand or two to trip, block, unhorse, and wrestle. These techniques were governed by the harsh laws of distance, speed, impact, iron, and asymmetry. By utilizing the surviving Fechtbücher and several Peninsular and Near Eastern sources, a brief foray into the diverse techniques of lance use and their purposes has been attempted here.     

物理学中的辩证自然观——控制、信息、系统与辩证自然观

和谐律、守恒律、方向律是自然辩证法中自然观的三大规律,它们贯穿、融合并体现于各具体学科的研究领域中。本文主要以自然辨证规律在控制与系统科学中的体现为依托,系统阐述物理学中控制系统理论与信息理论及其应用中自然观三大规律的具体表现。     

The practice and theory of British counterinsurgency: the histories of the atrocities at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul, 1938–1939

This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936–9, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorised British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counterinsurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents.